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THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL: THE INDEPENDENCE AND 
IMPARTIALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 
 
Bahma Sivasubramaniam 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
ABSTRACT 
_____________________________________ 
 
It is a sacrosanct principle of the due process of law that the right of the accused to a fair trial 
should be observed. A condition precedent to that requirement is that he should be tried by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. Whilst the concepts of judicial independence and 
impartiality have been explored extensively in national jurisdictions, they have not been 
examined vis-à-vis the international arena. The increase in the number of international criminal 
tribunals corresponded with an increase in the size of the international judiciary. It is therefore 
vital that there remains in place, a body of uniformly applicable standards of international 
judicial independence and impartiality which would provide guidelines to international practice. 
 
The research undertaken raises interesting questions, such as the sources of these principles, 
the mechanism of their application in the national and international arenas, in particular to 
international criminal courts. It explores the relationships between the national and international 
standards and concludes that standards of independence and impartiality are applicable as of 
right to international criminal proceedings and validation through international human rights 
instruments, statutes and jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals is not necessary. 
 
A comparative study has been made with national and international standards of fair trial, 
independence and impartiality. It is the premise of this thesis that the latter two concepts are 
necessary for the guarantee of the fair trial right. Jurisprudence of regional, national and 
international courts was explored to support this aim with particular attention focussed on the 
international criminal tribunal and the permanent international court. Finally, a conclusion is 
formed on the independence and impartiality of the international judiciary and the efficacy of 
the international criminal judicial system in ensuring that the right of the accused to receive a 
fair trial.  
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PROLOGUE 
 
 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL SYSTEM 
 
The establishment and proliferation of international criminal courts and 
tribunals in the last decade and a half have brought about an unprecedented 
pace in the growth in the international criminal law and justice systems. There 
was not much activity1 seen since the end of the Second World War2 until 
1995, with the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (the “ICTY”). Since then, a discernible and substantive 
body of international criminal system has emerged, fortified with legal norms, 
legal principles and procedural rules.3 Many criminal law principles, hitherto 
tested and applied in domestic courts were applied in international criminal 
courts and have made international criminal law vibrant and challenging.4 If 
anything could be said with a degree of certainty is that international criminal 
                                                 
1
 The Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and the subsequent Leipzig Trials, the main events of the post-First 
World War period on the prosecution of war crimes, has largely been ignored by legal experts. Cursory 
reference has been made to events after the First World War, if only to show a historical framework of 
the international criminal courts rather than an analytical discussion of the impact if any, of the Trials 
on the international criminal law and justice. For  a narrative on the Trials, see M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
From Versailles to Rwanda in 75 Years: The Need to Establish an International Criminal Court (1997) 
19 Harv, Hum.Rts J 11 
2
A proposal to set up an international criminal court arose out of the post-War examination and 
crystallisation of what is now known as “Nuremberg Principles”, deriving its name from the Judgement 
of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. The International Law Commission was 
established by the United Nations to examine this possibility, amongst other duties and responsibilities. 
Several factors, political entente being the most significant one, posed obstacles to this and work was 
sporadic at best and indifferent at worst. 1 Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational 
Publishers, 1995) 13-15. (“1 Morris & Scharf”) 
3
There is even an international version of the prestigious and leading authority of criminal practice in 
the United Kingdom: Archbold: International Criminal Courts: Practice, Procedure and Evidence, 
Rodney Dixon and Karlm Khan (Eds) (London: Sweet and Maxwell; 2005). Both the ICTY and its 
counterpart, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda have examined and now decided on many 
legal issues such as elements of crimes under international criminal law, defences and other matters of 
substantive law. The International Tribunals have also made inroads into other areas of law as well, 
such as the doctrine of stare decisis and contempt of court. See for example, Patricia M. Wald,  
Remarks onThe “Horizontal” Growth Of International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges and 
Opportunities  (2002) 96 ASIL  Proc. 369, 377 
4
There are numerous articles on the proliferation of international criminal courts and tribunals. See for 
example, Thomas Buergenthal Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is it Good or Bad? 
(2001),14 LJIL 267 Jonathan Charney, Notes on The “Horizontal” Growth Of International Courts 
and Tribunals: Challenges and Opportunities  (2002) 96 ASIL  Proc. 369, Cesare P.R. Romano The 
Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle  (1998-1999)31 N.Y.U. Journal 
of Int’L & P 709, Gilbert Guillame The Future of International Criminal Judicial Institutions (1995) 
44 ICLQ 848 
2 
 
law has been roused from the comatose state that it was in and is constantly 
evolving either through statutory provisions or judgements and decisions of 
the various international criminal courts and tribunals.5 
 
 
1. THE NUREMBERG AND TOKYO TRIBUNALS 
 
Much has been written elsewhere about the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals.6  It is not proposed to regurgitate those issues here. However, some 
mention must be made of these two Tribunals. The first and obvious reason is 
that they are the precursors of this era‟s international judicial bodies with 
criminal jurisdiction. Secondly, challenges and criticisms were made to the 
Tribunals‟ independence and impartiality and subsequently, their ability to 
guarantee the right of the accused to a fair trial. The judgment of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal to various legal issues has been referred to in the 
judgements of the International Tribunals. Nuremberg Tribunal and its 
judgement have therefore not lost its relevance in the 20th century.7 
 
The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (“the Nuremberg Tribunal”) 
and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (“the Tokyo Tribunal”) 
were established to  prosecute those who were alleged to have committed 
                                                 
5
 Buergenthal, op cit 272.  See also Patricia Wald ICTY Judicial Proceedings: an Appraisal from 
Within (2004) 2 JCIJ 466. The author, a Supreme Court judge from the United States and a former 
serving judge of the ICTY states: …what is arguably the ICTY’s premier accomplishment – the 
development of a corpus juris of international humanitarian law”, 471. It goes without saying that like 
all established or establishing areas of law, not all developments in international criminal law are 
universally welcomed, such as the blanket granting of protective measures for witnesses. See the 
discussion in Chapter 1, 41 et seq. 
6
For an excellent review of the Nuremberg Tribunal and its proceedings, see Telford Taylor, The 
Anatomy of Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir (Boston, Back Bay Books: Little, Brown and 
Company (Canada) Ltd, 1992). See also John Tusa and Ann Tusa, The Nuremberg Trial, (London: 
MacMillan,1984) for critical appraisal of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Richard Minear,Victor’sJustice: The 
Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971) for a critical and 
impassioned analysis of the proceedings at the Tokyo Tribunal,  Hans Ehard The Nuremberg Trial 
Against Major War Criminals and International Law (1949) 43 AJIL 223 and Roger S. Clark:  
Nuremberg and Tokyo In Contemporary Perspective in T.L.H McCormack and G Simpson. (Eds) The 
Law Of  War Crimes: A Synthesis of National and International Approaches (Boston MA: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996)  
7
 Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslavia 
War Crimes Trials (1996) 14 Dick. J.I.L 57 
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serious breaches of international humanitarian law namely war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and crimes against peace during the Second World War.  
 
Challenges were made to the independence and impartiality of the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.  The defence argued that there was a prima facie 
presumption of lack of independence on the part of the Tribunal as it was an 
exercise of “victor‟s justice”8 in that the Tribunal was set up by one side to the 
war and it prosecuted only the vanquished for violations of international 
humanitarian law whilst ignoring similar offences committed by the Allies.9 
Moreover, the judges were nationals of the victorious States. 10   Their 
appointments by these States raised doubts on their independence and 
impartiality. Other factors such as the roles and involvement of the judges in 
pre-trial proceedings such as the selection of the defendants, the drafting of 
the indictments and the supervision on the collation of evidence were 
criticised.11 These extrajudicial roles put the required objectivity of the judges 
in jeopardy as there was a real possibility for an apprehension that their 
impartiality would have been affected.12Corollary to the argument that the 
judges came from victorious nations were the criticisms that there were no 
judges from neutral States or national judges of Germany or Japan.13 Needless 
to say, these challenges failed. 
                                                 
8
 1 Morris & Scharf, supra n.2 9. Other criticisms included the application of ex post facto law, the 
status of the court as the first and last court of resort and procedural criticisms such as limited 
procedural rules for the defence, the misuse of affidavit evidence and inequality of arms between the 
prosecution and defence. See generally Michael Scharf Have We Really Learnt the Lessons of 
Nuremberg? (1995)1 Mil. L. Rev 49, 65-66.  Morris & Scharf, ibid and Otto Kranzbuhler, Eighteen 
Years Afterward (1964) 14 DePaul L. Rev 33,3 334, 336 on inequality of arms. On use of ex parte 
affidavits, see Taylor supra n.6, 240-244. See also Jonathan Turley Transformative Justice and Ethos 
of Nuremberg (2000) 33 AJIL 655,675. 
9
 The Soviets tried to accuse the Germans with the Katyn Forest Massacre for which they were largely 
responsible. Taylor ibid 117, 467- 472. 
10
 Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, The International Court for Rwanda (“The ICTR”) (Irvington-
on-Hudson: New York, Transnational Publishers 1998) 
11
Ibid 
12
IbidThe Soviet judge General Nikitchenko and the French  alternate, Robert Falco were involved in 
the drafting of the Charter and the indictments. Taylor, supra, n.6 627. Judge Jackson observed that 
some proprieties were abused when Nikitchenko, who was the Soviet Prosecutor, was appointed to the 
Tribunal. Tayloribid 134 Ironically Justice Jackson himself was rather imprudent in his conduct as a 
prosecutor with his ex parte communications with Judge Biddle. Ibid 
13
 See Chaney supra n.7, 73. Ehard, supra,n.6 , 243.For viewpoints of defence counsel of the 
Nuremberg accused, see Herbert Kraus, The Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals: Reflections 
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Whilst the standards of fair trial at the Nuremberg Tribunal would fall 
considerably short of the standards demanded and expected in contemporary 
times,14 it is generally accepted that the Tribunal conducted itself as a judicial 
organ under limiting circumstances.  The Trial itself was construed as 
essentially fair within the framework of the basic procedural guarantees 
provided. Even though there were no specific provisions in the Charter for 
the criteria for selection and qualifications of the judges to the Tribunal 
thereby setting out standards which the judges could be assessed by, they 
were generally considered to be highly-qualified and independent.15Despite 
the Prosecution‟s aim of securing convictions of all the twenty-two German 
accused, only nineteen were found guilty. The Tribunal acquitted the 
remaining three.16 
 
Lessons have been learnt through the experiences at Nuremberg. Both its 
strengths and weaknesses arising out of the trial were instructive to the 
creators of the present-day international criminal courts and tribunals. 
Despite its shortcomings, the Nuremberg Tribunal, its Charter and its 
Judgment (“Nuremberg”) have made significant contributions to the 
                                                                                                                                            
After Seventeen Years (1963) 13 DePaul L. Rev 233, Carl Haensel, The Nuremberg Trial Revisited 
(1963) 13 DePaul L. Rev 248,  Otto Pannenbeeker, The Nuremberg War-Crimes Trial (1964) 14 
DePaul L.Rev 348 and Kranzbuhler supra n.8 
14
 “The proceedings of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were far more summary than would be 
consistent with modern international human rights law” Patrick Robinson, judge of the ICTY: 
Ensuring Fair and Expeditious Trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia” 
(2000) 11 EJIL 569, 584. , The general consensus amongst legal experts and commentators however, is 
that the judges at the Nuremberg Tribunal ensured that the defendants did receive a fair trial in a 
procedural sense in most aspects. See also David Harris The Right to a Fair Trial in Criminal 
Proceedings as a Human Right  (1967) 16 ICLQ 352, 356, Kraus, supra n.13, 247 Haensel, supra n.13 
258 and Minear, supra n.67. 
15
 Bassiouni, supra, n.1, 33.  It does not mean however, that all of the judges were truly independent 
and highly-qualified. There were judges with pre-conceived notions of guilt, judges with language 
problems and judges with little or no experience or knowledge of international law. (Justice Pal of 
India was the only judge with knowledge and experience in international law amongst his colleagues of 
the Tokyo Tribunal). In fact, these problems are nothing new to the international criminal law observer, 
as these are the shortcomings that are complained of regarding the present-day international criminal 
judiciary, which are discussed in detail in following Chapters. Minear, supra n. 6 81. Today, one of the 
qualifications required of a judge of an international criminal tribunal or court is that he or she must 
possess some experience or knowledge of international criminal law and/or international humanitarian 
law. 
16
 1 Morris & Scharf supra n.2 8 
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development of international criminal law. The Tribunal must be judged by 
the standards of its time. 17 It cannot be denied that the contributions of 
Nuremberg to international criminal law have been both immense and 
significant. Nuremberg was responsible for creating legal innovations in 
international law, including laying the foundation for an international 
criminal process. The Judgment formalised the concept of individual criminal 
responsibility. The principles gleaned from the judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the Charter were codified by the General Assembly into 
fundamental principles of international law leading to the development of a 
concrete body of international criminal law, such as elements of international 
crimes. It established precedents for international criminal tribunals and 
criminal prosecution. There were a robust international criminal judiciary as 
well as a legal profession, institutions hitherto existing only in national 
systems, even if the Tribunal‟s jurisdiction was temporally limited. The 
Nuremberg Charter was the first formal document that established a set of 
minimum fair trial standards for a defendant in an international criminal 
trial.18 It also was the first legal instrument that explicitly provided for the 
prosecution of crimes against humanity distinct from war crimes.19 
 
The Judgment of the Tribunal was a point of reference for the Commission of 
Experts in preparing their report on situation in the former Yugoslavia.20 
Finally, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal, the trial proceedings and the 
legal principles arising thereto established the general principles of 
international criminal law and procedure. The Nuremberg Tribunal also 
demonstrated that insofar as international criminal jurisdiction is concerned, 
an international criminal court and an international criminal process are 
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 “But the Nuremberg Trials must be judged within the context of its epoch” Monroe Leigh, Evaluating 
Present Options For An International Criminal Court, (1995) 149 Mil. L. Rev 113 115 
18
 1 Morris & Scharf The ICTR, supra n.10, 14. For a comparative study of the fair trial standards at the 
International Military Tribunals and the ICTY, see Antonio Cassese The International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and Human Rights (1997) EHRLR 329, 330-331 
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 Bartram Brown: Primacy or Complimentarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction Of National Courts and 
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 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992) UN SCOR, Annex, UN Doc S/1994/674 (27
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possible.21Nuremberg is the prototypical precedent for the ad hoc tribunals and 
the international criminal court in aspects of procedural and substantive laws, 
rules and proceedings.  
 
 
2. POST-NUREMBERG: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AD HOC 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
The resurgence of activity in international criminal law and procedure arose 
out of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the two ad hoc tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia 22  and Rwanda 23  (collectively known as the 
“International Tribunals”) by the United Nations, and in particular the 
Security Council. Exercising its powers under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations in an innovative manner, the Security Council created 
these tribunals as (a) measures under Article 41to address the threats to 
international peace and security as envisaged by Article 39of the Charter and 
(b) as subsidiary organs with judicial powers. 24  These “measures” were 
adopted primarily to address the bloody conflicts in the Balkans area and in 
Rwanda as well as the areas surrounding it. Both Tribunals were given 
mandates to prosecute and punish persons responsible for serious violations 
                                                 
21
 1 Morris & Scharf  supra, n.2, 7. 1 Morris & Scharf  The ICTR, supra n. 10, 16 
22
 Established by Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) S/RES/827 (25 May 1993) reprinted in 
(1993).33 ILM 1203. For further reading, see 1 Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, supra n.2, D. 
Shraga and R. Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1994) 5 EJIL 
360, James O’Brien: The International Tribunal for Violations of International Humanitarian Law in  
the Former Yugoslavia (1993) 87 AJIL 639. Theodor Meron War Crimes Law Comes of Age (1998) 92 
AJIL 462 , . D. Sarooshi The Powers of the United Nations International Criminal Tribunals (1998) 2 
Max Planck Yearbook of U.N. Law 141, M. Cherif Bassiouni and Peter Manikas, The Law of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 1-63 (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: 
Transnational Publishers Inc, 1996)  
23
 Established by Security Council Resolution 955 (1994) S/RES/955(Nov 8 1994). Reprinted in (1994) 
33 ILM 1602 See generally 1 Morris & Scharf, the ICTR supra, n.10. 
23
 See also D. Shraga and R. Zacklin The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1996)7 EJIL 
501. It has been observed the ICTR was established because of the ICTY precedent.  Payam Akhavan 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of Punishment (1996)90 
AJIL 501. 
24
 For a discussion on the relationship between the Security Council and the ad hoc tribunals qua 
parent-subsidiary organs, see D. Sarooshi, The Legal Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary 
Organs (1996) 67 BYIL413 
7 
 
of international humanitarian law. The creation of these tribunals by the 
Security Council was unprecedented and did not go unchallenged.25 Despite 
scepticism and outright refusal to recognise their standing as judicial organs,26 
the International Tribunals have become properly functioning international 
criminal tribunals with an intense workload, making a substantial input into 
the field of international criminal law.27 
 
Completely unconnected to, but perhaps accelerated by the creation of the ad 
hoc tribunals, the project to establish a permanent international criminal court 
(„ICC”)28 with universal jurisdiction, having faded into the background, took 
a life of its own. 29  Triggered off by a request from a coalition of Latin-
American States to establish such a court to deal with narco-terrorism, the 
ICC today is a fully-established and functioning legal institution. As opposed 
to the Security Council created ad hoc tribunals, the ICC was established by a 
treaty.30 The ICC is a fully-fledged judicial organ and is functioning with 
investigations and prosecutions.31 
                                                 
25
 The first accused before the ICTY challenged the legitimacy of the Tribunal and its establishment. 
The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic Case No: IT-94-1 available at the ICTY website:< 
http://www.un.org/icty> 
26
 “You are not a judicial institution; you are a political tool!”Slobodan Milosevic’s address to the 
Trial Chamber.  Michael P. Scharf The Legacy of Milosevic Trial (2002-2003) 37 New Eng. L. Rev 
915. 
27
 This fact gives the impression that the International Tribunals enjoy a reputation par excellence in 
the arena of international criminal justice. A busy tribunal does not necessarily mean a successful court 
of law. 
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 See generally William A. Schabas, Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2
nd
 Ed), 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Hans-Peter Kaul Construction Site for More Justice: 
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, (2005) 99 AJIL 370, Mauro Politi and Giuseppe 
Nesi (Eds) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court - A Challenge to Impunity 
(Aldershot:Ashgate Publishing Ltd: 2001) Mahnoush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman The Law-
in-Action of The International Criminal Court (2005) 99 AJIL, 385, McGoldrick, Rowe and Donnelly 
(Eds) The Permanent International Criminal Court: Legal and Policy Issues (Oxford:Hart Publishers 
2004) 9, 20, Morten Bergsmo Occasional Remarks on Certain State Concerns about the Jurisdictional 
Reach of the International Criminal Court and Their Possible Implications for the Relationship 
between the Court and the Security Council (2000) 69 Nordic JIL 87, Phillipe Sands: International 
Law Transformed? From Pinochet to Congo….? (2003) 16 LJIL 37  
29
  Cristian deFrancia Due Process in International Criminal Matters: Why Procedure Matters (2001) 
87 Virginia Law Review 1381, 1389 Guillame supra n.4, 858 
30
 The Statute of the International Criminal Court (“the Rome Statute”) establishing the permanent 
criminal court entered into force on 1
st
 July 2002, being the first day of the month after the 60th day 
from the date of the deposit of the instrument of ratification by the 60
th
 State: Article 126. The 
ratification by Cook Islands on 18
th
 July 2008 has brought the number of ratifications to the Statute to 
108. There are 139 State signatories to the treaty. Available at <www.iccnow.org> State Parties to the 
ICC presently comprise of almost all countries from the European Union, 30 countries from Africa and 
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Other international criminal tribunals, with various characteristics have been 
established and are in existence. One of these is the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone (the “Special Court”).32 The Special Court is a hybrid court, established 
through an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone and is mandated to try persons who “bear the greatest 
responsibility” in committing serious violations of international humanitarian 
law and Sierra Leonean law. 33  The composition of the Special Court is 
different from the ICTY, ICTR and the ICC in that the judges come from both 
national and international jurisdictions. This is actually a common thread that 
runs through all hybrid courts established by or with the assistance of the 
United Nations.   
 
The United Nations Transitional Authority in East Timor (“UNTAET”) was 
yet another United Nations-sponsored institution and was established by 
Resolution 1272 of 1999 to, inter alia, “administer justice”.34 In pursuant of this 
task entrusted to it, the UNTAET established the Special Panels for Serious 
Crimes. The Special Panels have jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, genocide, and specific domestic crimes under the laws of East 
Timor committed in that region between 1 January and 25 October 1999. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
all but four countries from Latin America and a mere 14 States from Asia. The United States, an 
influential power is not a party to the Statute.  
31
On 14
th
 of July 2008, the Prosecutor of the ICC presented evidence to the judges of the court to indict 
President Omar Al Bashir of Sudan, a current Head of State, for crimes against humanity, genocide and 
war crimes in Darfur. He has also requested for a warrant of arrest. See <http://www.icc-
cpi.int/home.html&l=en> Interestingly, the Darfur situation is based on Article 13(b) referral to the 
ICC by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. 
32
 Established by an Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on 
the Establishment of a Special Court dated the 16
th
 of January 2002, initiated through Security Council 
Resolution 1315  dated 14
th
 August 2000, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000). Available at 
<http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/scsl-agreement.html>  See also  Laura A. Dickinson: The Promise of 
Hybrid Courts (2003) 97 AJIL 97 295, Michael Scharf: Special Court for Sierra Leone ASILInsights, 
October 2000. Accessible at:<http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh53.htm> Celina Schocken The Special 
Court for Sierra Leone : Overview and Recommendations (2002)20 Berkeley J. Int’l L 436  
33
 Article 1 of the Agreement.  ibid. 
34
 Resolution 1272 authorised UNTAET to prosecute those responsible for committing acts of violence 
that arose out of the referendum for Independence. See Mikhail Wladimiroff Milosevic & Hussein on 
Trial: PANEL 3: The Trial Process: Prosecution, Defense and Investigation: Former Heads of State on 
Trial (2005) 38 Cornell Int'l L.J. 949, 953 
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A United Nations hybrid court that has also made inroads in applying 
international and national criminal courts is the collective Special Panels in 
Kosovo. The United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(“UNMIK”) was established on 10th June 1999 by the Security Council 
exercising its Chapter VII powers.35Resolution 1244 gave UNMIK the power 
and authority to exercise legislative and administrative functions and to 
administer justice. In 2002, UNMIK, through a regulation,36 created courts of a 
hybrid nature that were composed of both international and national judges. 
These courts, called Special Panels were part and parcel of the domestic legal 
system and were entrusted with jurisdiction over war crimes and certain post-
conflict crimes such as inter-ethnic crimes, corruption and organized crime. 
The Special Panels apply local laws as well as regulations promulgated by the 
head of the mission which are considered legislative acts.   
 
The Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers (“CEC”) is another member of the 
growing circle of hybrid courts that the United Nations created to prosecute 
those who have committed serious violations of international humanitarian 
law. It was established pursuant to an agreement between the United Nations 
and the Government of Cambodia called Agreement between the United 
Nations and the Royal Government of Cambodia concerning the Prosecution 
under Cambodian Law of Crimes Committed during the period of 
Democratic Kampuchea, 6 June 2003. 37 
 
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon is a unique hybrid Tribunal. It was 
established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1664 (2000) and is 
mandated to try persons accused of the attack on Beirut on 14th February 2005 
                                                 
35
 For an overall discussion on the Kosovo courts, see Laura A. Dickinson The Relationship Between 
Hybrid Courts and International Courts: The Case of Kosovo (2003) 34 New Eng L. Rev 1059. The 
official website of UNMIK is at <http://www.unmik.org> 
36
 UNMIK Regulation 1991/1 Para 1.1: “All legislative and executive authority with respect to Kosovo 
is vested in UNMIK and is exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General”. See the 
official website. 
37
 UN Doc. A/RES57/228B (Annex) (13 May 2003). 
 Available at 
<http://www.cambodia.gov.kh/krt/pdfs/Agreement%20between%20UN%20and%20RGC.pdf > 
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in which the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others were 
killed. 38 There are several noteworthy issues. First, the hybrid court, 
comprising of national and international judges39 will apply the national law 
of Lebanon, in particular the Lebanese Criminal Code. However, the death 
penalty and forced labour, which are acceptable punishments under Lebanese 
law, are excluded from the sentences applicable in the hybrid courts.  This 
demonstrates a superseding of national law by international law.  Secondly, it 
was emphasised that the Tribunal would apply international standards and 
principles of due process of law as applied in “other international tribunals.” 
It would appear by this statement that standards of due process of law as 
applied by the ICTY, ICTR and ICC, amongst others would be applied to the 
Special Tribunal for Lebanon.40 
 
The establishment of these various special courts with various mandates and 
unique characteristics is a phenomenon that was hardly envisaged fifty years 
ago. The proliferation of these courts has brought about a parallel 
development of a burgeoning international criminal judiciary. 41  This 
particular aspect of the international criminal legal system poses new and 
interesting issues to academics, judges, lawyers, experts and commentators 
alike – the identification, clarification and the crystallisation of the principles 
relating to specific characteristics of the judicial organ as an institution and 
international criminal judges individually: that of judicial independence and 
impartiality. These characteristics of the international judiciary have become 
the focus of much academic research and debate.42 Indeed, there is a trend 
towards establishing a body of rules and principles governing the 
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 See <http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocus/lebanon/tribunal/docs.shtml> 
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Ibid 
40
Other courts include the Iraqi Special Tribunal to try Crimes Against Humanity that tried and 
sentenced many Iraqis accused of committing crimes against humanity, including Saddam Hussein. See 
Daniolo Zolo The Iraqi Special Tribunal: Back to the Nuremberg Paradigm? (2004) 2 JCIJ 313 
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 See for example, the work of the Project of the Independent Criminal Tribunals whose aims and 
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independence of the international judiciary and covering matters such as 
ethics, discipline and dismissal of international criminal judges.43 
 
 
3. THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: INDEPENDENCE, 
IMPARTIALITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUDICIARY. 
 
A vital principle in domestic legal systems is the right of the accused to a fair 
trial in criminal proceedings. That right, as is discussed in this thesis, has been 
extended to the international criminal justice system. The fair trial right, as 
observed from international and regional human rights instruments, is a 
multi-faceted right. One such facet is the right of the accused to have his case 
heard by an independent and impartial tribunal.44 
 
The right of an accused person to have his case heard by an independent and 
impartial tribunal at international criminal proceedings is a relatively new 
focal point for legal research and study. Numerous principles and non-
binding instruments have been passed by the United Nations and non-
governmental organisations on the issues of independence and impartiality of 
the judiciary. 45  With so much interest and activity in this aspect of 
international criminal law, a study on these issues is relevant. 
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  For example the Statute of the International Criminal Court: Part IV Composition and 
Administration of the Court: Articles 34-48. 
 Available at: <http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/Rome_Statute_English.pdf>. See 
also Code of Judicial Ethics, available at <http://www.icc-cpi.int/legaltools/> 
44
Certain human rights instruments, for example the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
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Draft Principles on the Independence of the Legal Profession (Noto Principles) 1982; The Rule of Law 
and Human Rights (Declaration of Delhi, Law of Lagos, Resolution of Rio Declaration of Bangkok), 
International Bar Association: Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence 1982; Latimer House 
Guidelines on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence (1998); the Bangalore Principles 
of Judicial Conduct  (2002), the Beirut Declaration of 1999 and the Cairo Declaration of 2003. 
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This work examines the independence and impartiality of the judiciary from 
the angle of the fair trial right. As the third arm of the Government, the 
judiciary has a very important role to play in upholding the law and 
dispensing justice in society in national systems. These characteristics of 
judicial independence and impartiality must be preserved and upheld if the 
judiciary is to carry out its functions and duties impeccably without fear or 
favour. The premise of this thesis is that independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary are legal canons that are essential to the broader right of the accused 
to receive a fair trial in criminal proceedings.46 
 
Two modes of approach to the dual issues of judicial independence and 
impartiality have been identified. The first approach is from the rule of law or 
the doctrine of the separation of powers perspective. This perspective 
examines judicial independence and impartiality as characteristics of the 
Judiciary as the third arm of Government. Threats to independence and 
impartiality in this perspective are usually from the other two arms of the 
Government, which are the Legislature and the Executive. This approach has 
also been called as the constitutional approach. 
 
The second approach is the fair trial perspective. This perspective examines 
these dual postulates  as corollaries to the right of the accused to a fair trial, 
their relevance and the role they play in ensuring that the accused does enjoy 
this right. The international and regional human rights instruments that 
would be referred to extensively in this thesis set out the independence and 
impartiality of the court explicitly as a requirement of fair trial. The stance 
adopted here is in support of that requirement, that an independent and 
impartial judiciary is an essential safeguard of the right of the accused to a fair 
trial. As stated earlier, the fair trial right has many component rights. The 
right to be heard by an independent and impartial judiciary is one of them. 
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The concepts of independence and impartiality are crucial to civil proceedings also. However, civil 
proceedings are outside the scope of this study. It is also to be noted that the male pronoun for judges 
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This thesis elaborates this provision and studies its relevance and application 
to international criminal proceedings and in particular, the proceedings at the 
International Tribunals.  
  
Chapter 1 examines the right of the accused to a fair trial generally and as is 
embodied in international and regional human rights instruments. It is an 
exposition of the fair trial right; and its recognition and application in 
international criminal proceedings. It is proposed to highlight and emphasise 
the particular provisions relating to fair trial rights and where required, 
reference is made to decisions of regional and international human rights 
adjudicating bodies. It sets up the groundwork or foundation for the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter 2 deals with general discussion of the provisions relating to judicial 
independence and impartiality as embodied in various human rights 
instruments. It is a general Chapter and sets out the necessary international 
and regional provisions relating to judicial independence and impartiality, 
their definitions and the different interpretations given to it. It also discusses 
the concepts of judicial independence and impartiality and the relationship 
between them. 
 
Chapter 3 focuses on the first pillar of the two concepts, which is that of 
judicial independence. There are many aspects and indeed interpretations of 
judicial independence. It is this issue that is tackled first, as it is the premise of 
this thesis that judicial independence is the overarching principle of the whole 
concept of independence and impartiality. It is argued that if there is no 
independence at all, then the issue of impartiality is also tainted. Also tackled 
in the same chapter are the many layers of judicial independence, including 
contemporary facets of judicial independence as well as its role, relevance and 
application in the international criminal court and tribunals. Both institutional 
and individual independence are discussed at length and other ancillary 
14 
 
issues relating to judicial independence such as ethics, discipline and codes of 
conduct applicable to the international criminal judiciary. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses judicial impartiality. Here, there is an in-depth discussion 
of judicial impartiality, the tests for judicial impartiality as applied in the 
domestic courts as well as the application of this concept at the international 
criminal courts and tribunals, with an examination of the jurisprudence of the 
courts. An examination of national decisions as well as decisions of the 
international criminal tribunals is also undertaken in this chapter to present a 
more holistic view of the issue of judicial impartiality. 
 
There are overlaps between judicial independence and impartiality as 
explained in Chapter 2. Therefore some arguments and observations are 
bound to be repeated in order to reinforce the relevance of that argument to 
that particular concept. For example, individual independence and judicial 
impartiality are intertwined. A judge who is not independent cannot be said 
to be impartial even if he does not show any obvious biasness in a particular 
case. Conversely, a judge who is not impartial cannot be said to be 
independent. Likewise, discussions on the case of The Prosecutor v Tadic (IT-
94-1) may be referred to in different Chapters, depending on the relevance of 
the legal principle espoused by the Appeals Chamber in that case. All cases, 
judgements, decisions and orders of the Trial Chambers and the Appeals 
Chamber of the ICTY, ICTR and the Special Court can be accessed at the 
official websites of the respective courts. 
 
The thesis concludes with several observations made from the case-law, 
Statutes and subsidiary legislation of the international criminal courts and 
tribunals as well as the various human rights instruments. An assessment of 
the international criminal tribunals as judicial organs, with particular focus on 
whether they had succeeded in living up to their reputation as a truly 
15 
 
independent and impartial judicial institution forms a crucial part of the 
conclusion. 
 
The methodology adopted here is research-based, including analysis of case-
law of various courts and tribunals involving judicial independence and 
impartiality. Empirical research has contributed to this thesis as well, through 
a fact-finding mission undertaken by the author to the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague in 2002. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A FAIR TRIAL: A 
GENERAL  APPRAISAL AND ANALYSIS 
 
“Whether there are convictions or whether there are acquittals will not be the 
yardstick [of the ICTY]. The measure is going to be the fairness of the proceedings” 
 
Judge Richard J.Goldstone1 
Former Chief Prosecutor  
International Criminal Tribunals 
for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This Chapter discusses the right of the accused to a fair trial generally and the 
application of that right at the international criminal tribunals specifically. 
The reasoning for this approach has already been mentioned briefly in the 
Prologue to this thesis.  Judicial independence and impartiality are 
components of the more complex right of an accused to a fair trial. It is 
therefore relevant to discuss the fair trial right issue first before embarking on 
the specific issues of judicial independence and impartiality. This is followed 
by an analysis of the application of the fair trial right at the International 
Tribunals. Such an analysis would ultimately lead to a discussion of the right 
of the accused to have his case heard by an independent and impartial 
tribunal and in particular, the relevance of that right at the International 
Tribunals.  
                                                 
1
Address Before the Supreme Court of the United States, 1996 CEELI Leadership Award Dinner 
(October 1996) quoted in Mark J. EllisAchieving Justice Before the International War Crimes Tribunal: 
Challenges for the Defence Counsel (1997) 7 Duke JCIL 519, 526 n.37 
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It is imperative that trials are presided over by judges who are both 
individually impartial, free from prejudice or bias and individually independent, 
devoid of any ties with any parties which may have a bearing on his 
objectivity. A court of law and its members therein should also, collectively as 
an organ, be independent from political, administrative and other forms of 
control, pressure or influence. It is therefore necessary that the right to have 
his case heard in those conditions be included in the accused‟s general right to 
a fair trial, otherwise his trial may be deemed “unfair”. 
 
The judiciary is the bulwark of fundamental freedoms and its independence 
and impartiality are arguably essential guarantees of fair trial. It is argued 
that these principles are so sacrosanct that any deviation, compromise or 
impingement, however slight they may be, would taint the proceedings 
before the court, even if the other fair trial rights are scrupulously observed. 
Extending that argument further, could it also be said that even if the 
judiciary was truly independent and impartial, the fact that they did not 
scrupulously observe the fair trial right could mar the proceedings against the 
accused? If they did not ensure that the fair trial right was not scrupulously 
observed, would this then reflect adversely on their independence and 
impartiality or merely their competence?2  This was the dilemma that the 
International Tribunals found themselves in as a result of several debatable 
decisions. Years later, the dust has still not settled on the controversial 
decisions. Unfortunately, these decisions have raised the perception that the 
justice meted by the International Tribunals is flawed justice. It is also 
unfortunate that such a perception is not ungrounded. 
 
A discussion on the different United Nations human rights texts as well as the 
regional texts and the provisions of the statutes of the international criminal 
                                                 
2
This though is a risky attribute as judges have no right to be at the International Tribunals if they were 
not competent. 
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tribunals and courts are also vital to this Chapter. The similarities between the 
contents of the provisions and the application of those provisions within the 
different  legal frameworks reinforces the underlying argument that the fair 
trial norm is a universal norm and that by extension, the concepts of judicial 
independence and impartiality enjoy the same universal status. Universality 
in this context is not limited to different national or regional jurisdictions but 
also includes the jurisdictions within which the international criminal 
tribunals and court operate. However, as observed from the various 
provisions of the human rights instruments, whilst the rights may be similar, 
the contents of those rights do vary.  
 
 
1.1 THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: GENERAL 
 
Article 10of the Universal Declaration on Human Rightsstates as follows: 
 
 “Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and obligations and of 
any criminal charge against him.”3 (Emphasis added) 
 
The right to a fair trial owes its origins to the Magna Carta.4 The genesis of 
this right centred on the initial premise that no person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property without the due process of law. 5   In the twenty-first 
century, however, this basic and rudimentary right has evolved into a 
complex and non-exhaustive set of rights.  Almost every constitution and 
legal systems of the world provide for the right to fair trial in varying 
                                                 
3
<http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html> 
4
 Salvatore Zappala Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press: 2003), 3.  Dinah Shelton Legal Norms to Promote the Independence and Accountability of  
International Tribunals (2003) 2 The Law and Practice of the International Tribunals 27  
5
Zappala, ibid 
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degrees.6 Such is its importance that the right to a fair trial has been touted as 
an important human right.7 
 
At the international criminal legal system, the fair trial right is a fairly recent 
phenomenon, going back a mere 60 years. From the bare right that was 
ensconced in the Charters of the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and for the Far East, the fair trial has become a sophisticated right 
in international criminal law, and has been accorded recognition by the 
International Tribunals through their Statutes and case-law.8 
 
A conviction which is obtained through a compromised or prejudiced legal 
process would be tainted as such process is not a fair process. It is axiomatic 
therefore that the right to a fair trial should be observed and respected by the 
courts so that justice is not only done, but manifestly seen to be done. In effect, 
establishing a court that does not ensure that the accused does not enjoy the 
right to a fair trial would defeat the very character of that court, which is that 
of an organ that dispenses justice fairly and judiciously. 
 
In this regard, it is incumbent upon the court or tribunal hearing a criminal 
trial to ensure that the accused person is given every opportunity to defend 
his case and provided with safeguards to ensure that his fair trial right is not 
curtailed as that right is “aimed at ensuring proper administration of justice”.9 The 
adjudicating authority bears the responsibility of ensuring that the trial the 
                                                 
6
 See generally M.Cherif Bassiouni Human Rights in the Context of International Justice: Identifying 
International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in National Constitutions (1992-1993) 
3 Duke JICL 235 
7
See generally Harris, supra Prologue n.14.   
8
Article 16 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg recognised that the 
right of the accused to a fair trial. Such was the consensus on the importance of this right that it was the 
only right that was crystallised as a Nuremberg Principle unanimously and without debate at the 
proceedings of the International Law Commission at the United Nations. Report of the International 
Law Commission (1950) 44 AJIL Supplement: Official Documents 105, 129. See also Yuen-LiLiang 
Notes on Legal Questions Concerning the United Nations (1951)  45 AJIL 509, 521. 
9
Report of the Human Rights Committee, General Assembly Official Records: Thirty-Ninth Session, 
Supplement No.40 (A/39/40), General Comment13/21, 143.  
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accused receives is fair.10Only then could it be said with certainty that the due 
process of law has been observed.11 There is a connection between the right to 
fair trial and an independent and impartial judiciary for it is the latter who is 
entrusted with ensuring that the accused enjoys all the other fair trial rights 
and are even called upon to rectify situations where such rights are 
compromised or omitted. The sub-right, that of an independent and impartial 
court, is the right which is relied on to ensure that the main  right or the 
“parent” right is protected. It must also be noted that the deprivation of a fair 
trial in itself is not a right to be used as a device to attack the substance of the 
verdict or the judgement but a guarantee of the safety of the proceedings.12 
Fair trial right is relevant only to  procedural safeguards, not to the 
correctness of the decision. 
 
The fair trial right itself is not defined per se in any specific convention or 
treaty.13 It is a general right, comprised of a myriad of numerous and complex 
standards. 14 This is the reason why there has been no attempt to formulate a 
definition of fair trial since it would be difficult to formulate a comprehensive 
definition.15 Whilst fair trial standards are explicitly set out in international 
and regional treaties as well as domestic law, they are by no means absolute 
                                                 
10
 Christoph Safferling Towards An International Criminal Procedure (Oxford; Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 20. Safferling also discurses the development of fair trial right as a human right: pp 21-31. 
11
Amnesty International:“Fair Rights Manual” Introduction, David Weissbrodt available at 
<www.amnesty.org> 
12
See also the decision of the Human Rights Committee in the case of B.d.B. v The Netherlands(273/88) 
of 30
th
 March 1989 where the Committee held that whilst the fair trial provision of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (relating to fair trial) guarantees procedural equality, it cannot 
be taken to mean as guaranteeing equality of results or absences of error on the part of the tribunal. S. 
Joseph, Schultz and Castan (Eds):  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Cases, 
Materials and Commentary  (2
nd
 Ed) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)  408.  
13
 It could be said however that the ICCPR, European Conventionand the ACHR “between them 
define the right to a fair trial in criminal proceedings in full and basically satisfactory terms”. Harris, 
supra, Prologue n.14, 352 
14
 The diversity in criminal practice between civil and common law jurisdictions has demonstrated that 
there are different fair trial guarantees in those systems. Michail Wladimiroff in Felde, Kitty, Mcdonald, 
G.K. et al The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (1997-1998) 12 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev 1441, 1449. 
15
 It has been held that the concept of fair trial should be interpreted as requiring a number of 
conditions, such as equality of arms, respect for the principle of adversary proceedings and expeditious 
procedure. Morael v France (207/86) D. McGoldrick: The Human Rights Committee, Its Role in the 
Development of the International Covenant and Political Rights (Harlow: Clarendon Press Oxford; 
1994) 417 
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or exhaustive. 16  In addition to the specific standards, there are residual 
standards, including those with “indefinable characteristics”,17 which are not 
necessarily set out or formulated but the non-observance of which could 
nonetheless render a trial unfair. The nature of the fair trial right is best 
explained thus:  
 
“The right to a fair hearing has an open-ended residual quality: It provides for an 
opportunity both for adding other specific rights not listed in Article 618 that are 
considered essential to a “fair hearing” and for deciding whether a „fair hearing‟ has 
occurred on the particular facts of a given case when the proceedings are looked at as a 
whole.”19 
 
The fair trial provisions in international and regional treaties are mere 
examples of what is termed as “minimum guarantees.” The purpose of 
                                                 
16
 Harris, supra Prologue, n.14, 369. 
17
The Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick (Eds) (London: 
Butterworths, 1995) 203 where the authors refer to the European Court decision of using the Barberá, 
Messegué and Jabardo v Spain [1988] ECHR  25as an example of breach of the right to a fair trial 
caused by the cumulative effect of breaches of several residual rights. Matters such as the distance 
travelled by the accused before the trial, the brevity of a complex trial, excessive judicial intervention, 
prejudicial summing-up, adverse inference on a right to silence could vitiate a trial, if when considered 
as a whole, the hearing was unfair. Condron v The United Kingdom (Application No. 35718/97), 2
nd
 
August 2000. The incident involving the “sleeping” judge of the ICTY could fall under these 
“indefinable characteristics”. That a judge must be alert and take proceedings seriously is not set out in 
any fair trial provisions. It is something so fundamental and prosaic that it is automatically assumed. 
However, if he loses concentration or, as in the case at hand, falls asleep, his conduct could render the 
trial unfair if, taking all the circumstances of the case, the accused did not get a full, fair and 
unequivocal hearing. The International Tribunals however held that the conduct of the judgedid not 
deprive the accused of a fair trial.Michael Bohlander The International Criminal Judiciary – Problems 
of Judicial Selection, Independence and Ethics 377-383 in Michael Bohlander (ed) International 
Criminal Justice – A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedures) (London;Cameron May; 2007). 
It is argued that the sleeping incident would be an example of “lack of seriousness on the part of the 
Court” when dealing with particularly significant allegations which arise in criminal proceedings, 
especially in a complex international criminal proceedings as those that take place at the International 
Tribunals. Harrissupra Prologue, n.14 357, 376. Harris argues that “seriousness” is a necessary 
characteristic of a court in the context of human rights. It would appear therefore that based on Harris’ 
argument, the fair trial right of the accused in the Celibici case has been compromised.  In a 
hypothetical scenario, assuming that an accused is being tried at the International Tribunal and is found 
guilty on votes of 2-1. Where did the vote of the sleeping judge go? If he was the only judge who voted 
against a finding of guilt, did he choose the easy way out, since he knew he was not paying attention to 
the proceedings? If he was one of the two who found the accused guilty, how assured is the accused 
that the finding of guilt was reached after a fair weighing of evidence? This scenario is regrettable but 
not impossible. 
18
Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950. (“European Convention”) discussed in detail below. 
19
Harris et al supra n.17, 202 
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guarantees and the obligations of State Parties in relation to them were 
explained in this manner:  
 
“Guarantees are designed to protect, to ensure or to assert the entitlement to a right 
or exercise thereof.  The State Parties not only have the obligation to recognize and to 
respect the rights and freedoms of all the persons, they also have the obligation to 
protect and ensure the exercise of such rights and freedoms by means of the respective 
guarantees…., that is through suitable measures that will in all circumstances ensure 
the effectiveness of those rights and freedoms.”20 
 
All international and regional human rights instruments contain minimum 
guarantees21 but as pointed out earlier, those guarantees may not necessarily 
be the same. Some instruments contain more and detailed standards than 
others.22 State Parties23 to an international or a regional treaty are obliged to 
ensure that their national laws attain those standards set out in those 
instruments at the very least. They could provide for higher standards in their 
national laws than those guaranteed by the instruments. However, it is the 
application of the “minimum guarantees” of the treaty to a particular trial that 
would be assessed against the international standards, and not the abstract 
provisions of domestic law.24 In other words, a fairness of a trial depends on 
whether the minimum guarantees applied in that particular trial measured up 
against the standards contained in the treaty. 
                                                 
20
 Advisory Opinion of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Habeas Corpus in Emergency 
Situations (Article 27(2,) 25 and Article 7(6) of the American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory 
Opinion OC-8/87, 30
th
 January 1987, Series A no.8, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.173 Paragraph 35.  
21
 “Minimum guarantees” are relevant to the proceedings of the International Tribunals as discussed 
below. 
22
 See discussion on the specific provisions in international and regional human rights instruments, 
infra text, 22 et seq. 
23
 State parties to a human rights instrument, whether international or regional, are bound to apply the 
fair trial provisions  in the instrument. The issue that is of interest here is what considerations, if any, 
would an international criminal tribunal give to such an instrument, as it is not a “State Party” and 
therefore is not bound by the provisions of the human rights instrument. However, could the 
International Tribunal ignore an important document such as the ICCPR? This is more so since both  
the entity and the instrument are “creatures” of the United Nations. 
24
 For example, a case referred to the European Court from a national jurisdiction would be based on 
alleged breaches of the provisions of the European Convention, even though the national proceedings 
of the case would have conformed to national standards. It should be noted that referrals to the 
European Court are not appeals against decisions of the national courts. 
23 
 
 
A point that needs to be stressed is that whether a trial is fair or not depends 
on the circumstances of the case. On one hand, the observation of all codified 
fair trial standards would not necessarily guarantee a fair trial.  On the other, 
not every breach of a fair trial standard would render a decision wrong or a 
conviction unsafe. Whilst a breach of a particular fair trial standard may put 
the fairness of the trial of the accused in doubt, it may not necessarily mean 
that the judgement was tainted or was made mala fides or indeed that the 
conviction was unsafe. Equally, a conviction should not be allowed to stand 
where the trial process has been vitiated by a grave breach of due process 
even if there is no doubt as to the guilt of the accused.25 It is for the court to 
decide, taking into consideration the breaches complained of in the context of 
the whole case, whether the fair trial standards were seriously breached to the 
extent that the guilty verdict and the conviction, arising from that verdict, 
were unsafe. 26   Applying these principles to the twin pillars of judicial 
independence and impartiality, it could very well be that the conviction of an 
accused could be rendered unsafe by virtue of partiality and dependence by 
the court shown either by the judges individually or the court as a whole.27 A 
truly independent and impartial court should decisively to guarantee the fair 
trial right as well as to remedy any breach that has occurred.28 
 
Insofar as the identification of fair trial standards is concerned, these may be 
gleaned from international and regional human rights instruments as well as 
                                                 
25
R v Davis, Rowe and Johnson [2000] JCL 366, 372.  R v Forbes [2001]1 All ER 686, 697. In the 
cases of R. v. Roohi (1997) EWCA Crim 1800, R. v. Frixou [1997] [1998] Crim LR 352, R. v. Roncoli  
[1997] [1998] Crim LR 584 and R. v. Kartal [1999] EWCA Crim 1987, the convictions of the 
appellants were set aside although there was convincing evidence against them. The appellate court 
examined the proceedings as a whole and came to the conclusion that the convictions were unsafe as a 
result of unfair trials caused by excessive intervention by the trial judges. These cases were referred to 
with approval by the European Court of Human Rights in C.G. v The United Kingdom (Application No: 
43373/98) [2001] ECHR (Rep) 870 
26
Edwards v United Kingdom (1992) 14 EHRR 417, 431. The court must decide whether the 
proceedings taken in entirety were fair. 
27
Whether the International Tribunals haveactually rendered a conviction unsafe on ground of unfair 
trial is another matter altogether. The discussions on fair trial rights at the international court and 
tribunals paint a pessimistic picture. See 1.2 infra 
28
An example would be where the court or tribunal acts independently and impartially by rectifyng an 
abuse of process. 
24 
 
national constitutions29 and legislation.  Whether these standards are binding 
or not depends on the status of the instruments and the obligations of the 
States arising therefrom and State practice. In certain instances, the standards 
may be of persuasive effect. Where the standards are not binding, they may 
acquire a binding status through legislation, treaties, practice, custom and 
judicial decisions. Otherwise, fair trial standards will have a binding effect on 
States when they are found in treaties, are rules of customary international 
law or are general principles of law. 
 
 
1.3 THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL AND 
REGIONAL APPROACH AND UNDERSTANDING 
  
Fair trial standards at the international forum have acquired recognition 
through various international and regional human rights instruments. 30 
However, the concept of fair trial standards in international criminal 
proceedings is rather problematic. International criminal tribunals and courts 
are dictated by their Statutes. The provisions of those Statutes are of 
paramount importance to the Tribunals. Any instrument other than the 
Statutes would have a lesser impact on the Tribunals. Where the Statutes are 
silent, the international judge must identify and apply standards to the 
proceedings before them to ensure a fair trial. 31  However, unlike their 
counterparts in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials whose resources were 
limited to national laws and practice, the international judge would be able to 
refer to standards which are now encompassed in treaties, conventions and 
other instruments.32 
                                                 
29
 Bassiouni, supra n. 6, 269.According to a survey undertaken by the author, the right to a fair trial in 
criminal proceedings has been guaranteed in at least thirty-eight national constitutions.  
30
The issue of fair trial right in customary international law, for the purposes of this section, will not be 
dealt with. 
31
See e.g. Michael Bohlander and Mark Findlay The Use of Domestic Sources as a Basis for 
International Criminal Law Principles (2002) 2 The Global Community Yearbook of International 
Law 3 
32
Harris supra, Prologue, n.14, 279. Safferling, supra n.10,  22-23 
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International and regional human rights instruments that contain the right to 
a fair trial include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,(“Universal 
Declaration”) the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights(“ICCPR”), theEuropean Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms(“European Convention”), theAmerican 
Convention on Human Rights (“ACHR”) and the African Charter on Human 
Rights. (“Af.CHR”)33 Each has its own conception of what a fair trial is – 
certain conventions such as European Convention have detailed provisions of 
fair trial rights whereas others such as the Arab Charter of Human Rights 
have very general provisions. 
 
The international fair trial standards are not limited to the conventions and 
treaties alone.34  They are now buffered with standards derived from the 
jurisprudence of international and regional tribunals such as the European 
Court of Human Rights (European Court), and lately, the decisions of the 
International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda as well as their 
respective Statutes. The decisions of European Court in particular are 
instructive to national courts of State Parties to the European Convention.35 
These decisions are significant in that they may also identify standards that 
are residual and which have not been set out explicitly in any instrument.  
 
 
                                                 
33
 Also includes the NATO Status of Forces Agreement 1951. Harris Prologue, supra n.14 352. Other 
important international instruments that contain provisions relating to fair trial include the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) and the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1984). 
34
Detailed discussions on these standards and measures of strengthening the right to a fair trial are set 
out in a report commissioned by the then-Commission on Human Rights. See Chernichenko S and 
Treat W:The Administration of Justice and the Human Rights of Detainees: The right to a fair trial: 
Current Recognition and Measures Necessary for its Strengthening dated 3
rd
 June 1994, 
E./CN.4/Sub.2/1994/24. 
35
 For example, Section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 of the United Kingdom obligates the 
national court, when determining a question that involves a European Convention on Human Rights 
right, to take into account decisions and opinions of the European Court and Commission of Human 
Rights and the Council of Ministers. It has been held that Section 2 does not create a binding status for 
European Court decisions.  
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1.3.1 THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
 
1.3.1.a . UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The Universal Declaration is the foremost United Nations text on human 
rights in general and the right to a fair trial specifically. A consequence of a 
shocked and grieving world suffering the aftermath of the war, the Universal 
Declaration36 was framed by the United Nations as an instrument that would 
both reflect the avowal of the world community to avoid such a catastrophe 
in the future as well as prevention of human rights abuses on such a 
devastating and widespread scale again. The Universal Declarationincluded 
for the first time a universal37 definition of human rights. It was hailed as “an 
authoritative interpretation of the human rights obligations of the Member States of 
the United Nations”.38 The right to a fair trial was included in that definition of 
human rights.  
 
However, the Universal Declarationper se is limited in its application as it is a 
declaratory instrument and is therefore not binding on member States of the 
United Nations.39 Whilst references to the Universal Declaration have been 
made in the preambles to all international and regional human rights 
                                                 
36
Resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948reprinted in Malcolm Evans, Blackstone’s International 
Law Documents 5
th
 Ed (London: Blackstone Press Ltd, 2001) 39, 40. The Charter of the United Nations 
did not define “human rights” but presupposed it. The Human Rights Commission established in 1946 
had a three stage plan to develop a universally accepted definition of human rights. The first stage was 
to pronounce a non-binding declaration, which was to be the basis of the second stage, a convention 
and finally, to create international implementation mechanism. Manfred Nowak Introduction to the 
International Human Rights Regime (Leiden; Boston; Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 75 
37
 In the past decade, this definition has been disputed by several Asian countries who argued that the 
universal definition of human rights is a western definition and is not compatible with “Asian values”, 
particularly political and civil rights and passed the Bangkok Declaration of 1993: see Christian 
Tomuschat : Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism (Oxford: Oxford University Press2003) 76 
38
 David Weissbrodt: The Right to a Fair Trial under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001) 
1. The Universal Declaration could be indirectly considered as constituting international treaty law. 
Nowak, supran. 36, 76. 
39
 Malcolm Shaw International Law, 5
th
 Edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) 259. 
However, it is now recognised as a normative instrument, setting out human rights obligations of 
Member States of the United Nations. Thomas Buergenthal Centennial Essay: The Evolving 
International Human Rights System (2006) 100 ASIL Proc 783, 787. Together with the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Universal Declaration spells out the general human rights of all Member States of 
the United Nations. Buergenthal, ibid. 
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instruments,40 not all of the provisions of the Universal Declarationhave been 
replicated in them. The content of some Universal Declarationprinciples have 
been explicated in various binding instruments such as the ICCPR, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 
(“ICESCR”), the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination of 1963 and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Discrimination Against Women of 1979. However, all the relevant 
international and regional human rights treaties contain wider fair trial 
provisions which are more detailed than the provisions of the Universal 
Declaration. An example of this is Article 10 aforesaid, the contents of which 
has been replicated and expanded in Article 14 of the ICCPR.  The 
importance of the Universal Declarationshould not be undermined by the 
non-binding status of the instrument as the Universal Declaration provisions 
“specify with great precision the obligations of member nations under the Charter.”41  
It was observed that the Universal Declaration “is an authoritative statement of 
the international community” and is considered in toto as part of binding 
customary international law. 
 
Article 10 is now generally interpreted as part of customary international law 
or general principles of law.42 Hence it is a source of law as identified by the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. This goes without saying as 
Article 10 contains very fundamental principles that are needed to ensure the 
protection of an individual against arbitrary conduct by a State, the 
Establishment and/or an organisation, including the International Tribunals. 
                                                 
40
 The regional human rights instruments refer to theUniversal Declarationin affirmative language; the 
weight given to the Universal Declaration is seemingly  considerable. Bassiouni has identified forty 
national constitutions that quote or reproduce the Universal Declaration. Supra n.6, 237  
41
Filartiga v Pena-Irala (1990) 19 ILM 966, 973,974. 
42
Ibid. See also J. Rehman, International Human Rights Law: A Practical Approach (Harlow: 
Longmans, 2003)  57-59. Whether States actually adhere to the principles in the Universal Declaration, 
or indeed the ICCPR, is of course in reality, highly debatable. The country-by-country reports by Non-
Governmental Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch as well as the Annual 
Reports and Country Visits submitted by the Special Rapporteur for the Independence of the Judiciary 
paint a bleak and a less idealistic picture altogether. The Annual Reports of the Special Rapporteur can  
be accessed at  
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/judiciary/annual.htm>  and the Country Visits at < 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/judiciary/visits.htm> 
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It is manifest therefore that Article 10 should enjoy the status of customary 
international law and/or general principle of law as its provisions are 
fundamental to mankind and the due process of law. 
 
1.3.1.b THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND 
POLITICAL RIGHTS 196643 
 
The ICCPR44 is the detailed treaty that the Universal Declaration was not. It 
acted on the original premise of the Universal Declaration and went further 
by expanding the basic provisions contained therein. It is the most prominent 
international human rights treaty and contains comprehensive provisions on 
civil and political rights of citizens of Member States. The provisions of the 
ICCPR are binding on the State Parties. Article 2(1) sets out the obligations of 
States Parties and compels them to immediately implement and ensure that 
the substantive rights within the Covenant are respected and observed in 
their jurisdictions. 45  The general Covenant obligations and the specific 
obligation under Article 2 to give effect to the provisions are binding on every 
State Party.46Article 2(1) imposes a duty on State Parties to adopt domestic 
legislation or other measures to give effect to the Covenant rights unless such 
                                                 
43
 For a detailed exposition of the ICCPR, see Joseph et al n.12. The ICCPR was adopted together with 
the ICESR. These two principal human rights documents relate to different set of rights, evolved from 
the Universal Declaration. As the ICESCR suggests, this instrument is designed to protect the 
economic, social and cultural rights of the individual. The ICESCR came into force on the 3
rd
 of 
January 1976. The rights that fall within this Covenant include the right to work, the right to adequate 
housing, the right to social security and so forth. The ICESCR, together with the ICCPR and the 
Universal Declaration form the International Bill of Human Rights. 
44
 Reprinted in 6 ILM 368 (1967). The ICCPR was adopted by the General Assembly on 16
th
 
December 1966 and came into force on 23
rd
 March 1976 when it had thirty-five ratifications. Joseph, 
op cit, 8. As of May 2006, there are 156 State Parties to the ICCPR. 
Available at <http://www.ohchr.org/english/countries/ratification/4.htm> 
45
General Comment No. 31[80]: Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to 
the Covenant, 26
th
 May 2004, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, Paragraph 3. Substantive rights are 
those contained in Part III of the ICCPR (Article 1 is also considered a substantive right). Part III is 
comprised of Articles 6 to 50. These rights include, inter alia, the right to life, freedom from torture, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, and punishment, the rights to liberty and security of the person, the 
right to a fair trial and the right to equality before the law and rights of non-discrimination.  Joseph, 
supra n.12, 9. Manfred Nowak U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: 
Engel, 1993) 36,37 
46
 General Comment ibid Paragraph 4. Joseph, ibid  9, 10 
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rights are already part of national law.47 The requirement on the State to take 
measures to give effect to the rights is unequivocal and is to take effect 
immediately. A State cannot justify its failure to comply with Article 2 (1) by 
relying on national, political, social, cultural or economic considerations.48 
 
Article 14(1)49 is the general fair trial guarantee provision in the ICCPR and 
states as follows:  
 
All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, 
everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law.50 (Emphasis added) 
 
Article 14(1) avers the general guarantee of the accused to receive a fair trial, 
which is to have his case heard by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.  
 
The phrase “equality before the law”51in Article 14 (1) needs a little explanation. 
It is a guarantee that the judges and judicial officers should apply the law 
without discrimination.52 The law itself should not be discriminatory in that it 
should be applicable to all accused, regardless of their status.53 This would 
therefore mean that immunity from prosecution on grounds such as Head of 
State is incompatible with Article 14(1).54 
 
                                                 
47
General Comment, supra n.45, Paragraph 13. Joseph, supra n.12 
48
Ibid Paragraph 14 
49
Article 14 applies to both civil and criminal proceedings. See decision of Human Rights Committee 
in Morael v. France  supra, n.15. Joseph, supra n.12 409 
50
See<http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm> 
51
 The ICCPR is the only human rights instrument that contains the “equality before the law” provision. 
Nowak supra n.43 238 
52
 Joseph et al, supra n.12, 282 
53
 Discriminatory application of the law is incompatible with Article 14. Joseph et al,ibid. See the 
discussion of the Human Rights Committee on this issue. See McGoldrick, supra n.15  397  
54
Joseph et al, supra n.12, 395. The equality provision was also considered to be breached in a case 
where the prosecution was able to appeal against a decision whilst the defendant was not availed of the 
same right. Weiss v Austria (1086/02). Joseph et al, ibid 
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Article 14(1) should be read together with Article 14(3) of the ICCPR. The 
sub-section sets out in detail the rights of the accused to a fair trial in criminal 
proceedings. Its structure is fairly complex and includes a variety of 
independent and complementary component rights.55 These are inter alia, the 
right to be informed promptly and in detail and in a language that the 
accused understands the nature of the charge that he faces and the reasons 
therein,56 to be tried without undue delay,57 to be defended by himself or by 
his legal counsel, to receive legal aid58 and so forth. These rights are specific 
and minimum guarantees, the observance of which is expected at the very 
least of State Parties. 59  The importance of judicial independence and 
impartiality is crucial and apparent here – for these rights could only be 
enjoyed if they are respected by a judiciary that has both these postulates. 
 
The Human Rights Committee60 made the following observation of Article 
14(3): 
 
“Paragraph 3 of the article elaborates on the requirements of a “fair hearing” in 
regard to the determination of criminal charges. However, the requirements of 
Paragraph 3 are minimum guarantees, the observance of which is not always 
sufficient to ensure the fairness of a hearing as required by Paragraph 1.”61 
 
The comment by the Human Rights Committee is of relevant application to 
the right to a fair trial generally. Article 14(1) is a general fair trial 
requirement provision whilst Article 14(3) sets out the specific guarantees.62 It 
                                                 
55
 Safferling calls it a “kaleidoscope of rights”. Supra n.10, 30. Ultimately the purpose of all these 
various rights, duties and obligations is to ensure that the trial is fair. 
56
 Article 14(3)(a) 
57
 Article 14(3)(c) 
58
 Article 14(3)(d) 
59
General Comment13/21, supra n.9, Paragraph 4.  Joseph et al, supra, n.12, 279 
60
 The Human Rights Committee is established pursuant to Article 28 of the ICCPR and is a panel of 
eighteen human rights experts who are nationals of States Parties. They are elected by a ballot for a 
four-year term. Joseph et al, ibid 16. 
61
General Comment 13/21 supran.9, 144, Paragraph 6. See McGoldrick, supra n.15 405.  
62
 See the Separate Opinion of Bertil Wennergren in Karttunen v Finland (Communication 387/89) for 
clarification of the two sections. Also McGoldrick, ibid for the discussion by the Human Rights 
Committee on each and every of the seven provisions of Article 14(3), 405 et seq 
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reiterates the tenet that the specific rights set out in Article 14(3) are not 
exhaustive and that the observance of all the specific rights therein may not 
necessarily guarantee the accused a fair trial.   
 
Most of the content of the fair trial provisions of Article 14 of the ICCPRare 
also set out for in the regional human rights instruments. Article 6 of the 
European Convention 63 , Article 8 of the ACHR and Article 7 of the 
AfCHRcontain similar content of the minimum guarantees of Article 14(3). 
 
1.3.2  REGIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 
 
There are several prominent regional human rights instruments. The 
provisions of these instruments are considered to be binding on States that are 
members of that particular regional organisation. 
 
Foremost of these instruments is the European Convention. Like the ICCPR, 
the European Convention provides protection for civil and political rights of 
individuals and protects the very rights that the Universal Declarationwas 
formulated to protect. The European Convention64 is arguably one of the most 
developed human rights instruments with a substantial jurisprudence of its 
provisions.65 
 
Article 6 (1) of the European Convention states as follows:  
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”66 
                                                 
63
 The Englishversion of the European Convention can be accessed at  
<http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/D5CC24A7-DC13-4318-B457-
5C9014916D7A/0/EnglishAnglais.pdf> 
64
 87 UNTS 103. Evans, supra , n.36, 43. For a general exposition on the European Convention, see 
Harris et al supra n. 17 1-36 and Rosalyn Higgins The  European Convention on Human Rights 495in 
2 Human Rights in International Law: Legal and Policy Issues, Meron (Ed) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1994). 
65
 Colin Warbrick  International Criminal Courts and Fair Trial (1998) 3 JACL 45, 47 
66
Evans, supra, n.36, 44. For a detailed discussion on Article 6, see Harris et al supra n.17202. 
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The right to a fair trial is a paramount right in the European Convention. Not 
only has Article 6 attracted a great volume of applications, the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights (“European Court”) on fair trial 
rights is ample and comprehensive. The European Conventionas well as the 
decisions of the European Court have been referred to in different contexts at 
the International Tribunals.67 
 
Other regional instruments that contain similar provisions are the American 
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man,68the American Convention of 
Human Rights 1969, 69 and the African (Banjul) Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights1981. 70 
 
Articles XVIII and XXVIof theAmerican Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Manread together assure the accused of the right to a fair trial and to due 
process of the law. Article XXXVI in particular states that an accused person 
has the right to an impartial hearing. Like the Universal Declaration, the 
American Declarationis declaratory and was not intended to be legally 
binding.71 However, the principles in this instrument have been cemented 
and elaborated in theACHR. 
                                                 
67
 See for example the approach of the Trial Chamber in its Decision on the Motions by the Prosecution 
for Protective Measures for the Prosecution Witnesses Pseudonymed “B” Through To “M”, The 
Prosecutor v Delalic Case No. IT-96-21-T, Paragraph 27. 
Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/trialc2/decision-e/70428PM2.htm>  It is also arguable 
whether such decisions were applied because the judges of the ICTY considered the jurisprudence of 
the European Court illuminating or because many of them were from Member States of the European 
Union. Whilst they did not consider these decisions binding, which is the right approach, the decisions 
were used as highly-persuasive authority for the legal principles that they were espousing. However, 
judges in the same panel have adopted contradictory approaches  to the same legal issue that is being 
argued before them by interpreting differently the same decision of the European Court. See the Tadic 
(Protective Measures) Decision infran.111this Chapter. It is also interesting to note that some of the 
judges came from countries who are neither State Parties to the ICCPR nor to any regional instrument 
on human rights, e.g Malaysia and Pakistan. 
68
 9 ILM 673 (1970) 
69
 Evans , supra, n.36 141 
70
 21 ILM 58 (1982), also reprinted in Evans, supra,n.36, 200. The Charter was promulgated in 1981 
and entered into force in 1986. 53 States have ratified the Charter. Available at the official website: 
<http://www.africa-union.org/> 
71
 Scott Davidson The Civil and Political Rights Protected in the Inter-American Human Rights System 
in David Harris and Stephen Livingstone in The Inter-American System of Human Rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1998) 213 
33 
 
The ACHR72  took cognisance of the principles set forth in the Universal 
Declarationand the American Declaration. It also dealt primarily with civil 
and political rights. Article 1of the ACHR imposes a duty on the State Parties 
to ensure that the Charter rights are respected and that all persons under their 
jurisdiction are entitled to full and free exercise of those rights, including the 
right of the accused to a fair trial.73Article 8 is the  equivalent provision to 
Article 6 of European Convention and relates to fair trial.74 In a decision 
against Argentina, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights held 
that Article 8 is a fundamental right in the ACHRand the enforcement of the 
principles of judicial guarantees in Article 8 cannot be confined to a mere 
formal verification of procedural requirements. The requirements of the fair 
trial provision must actually be exercised and met.75 
 
Article 1of theAfCHR creates a primary duty on State Parties to recognise and 
give effect to the rights under the Charter, including the right to a fair trial 
under Article 7(1). Article 7 (1)contains very few fair trial rights and has been 
criticised as inadequate, although it does includ the right to be tried within a 
reasonable time by an impartial tribunal.76 
 
A lesser-known regional human rights instrument is the Arab Charter on 
Human Rights, 1994.77Article 7 of theArab Charterstates merely that:  
 
“The accused shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty at a lawful trial in 
which he has enjoyed the guarantees necessary for his defence”.78   It does not 
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Evans, supra, n.36, 141. The American Convention was adopted on 22
nd
 of November 1969 and came 
into force on 18
th
 July 1978. It has 25 state parties. .Available at the official website: 
< http://www.oas.org.> 
73
 See the Preamble to the Convention 
74
 Scott Davidson: The Inter-American Human Rights System (Aldershot; Dartmouth Publishing Co, 
1997), 290 
75
Case 9850 (Argentina) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1990-1991 Annual Report, 
Paragraph 4. 
76
 Christof Henys Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter in Malcolm Evans and Murray The 
African Charter on Human Rights (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 2002) 137, 145 
77
Available at <www.1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/arabhrcharter.html> 
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contain any detailed provisions as to what these necessary guarantees are and 
the provision “which he has enjoyed” is vague and imprecise. 
 
There are however two main instruments from the Arab region that should be 
considered together with Article 7 as these elaborate and elucidate Article 7. 
The first is the Beirut Declaration of Justice of 1999.79  Although the Beirut 
Declaration does not make any reference to the Arab Charter, the intentions 
of both these instruments are similar – the upholding of the due process of 
law by respecting the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
 
The Declaration was signed by representatives from 13 States in the Arab 
region and contain provisions relating to the right of the accused to a fair 
trial 80  including specific provisions relating to the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary.81 The second relevant instrument is the Cairo 
Declaration of Independence of Justice 2003 reaffirmed the principles of 
Beirut Declarationalthough it did not make any specific reference to fair 
trial.82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
78
 Reprinted 18 Hum.Rts L.J. 151(1997). However, almost every constitution in the Arab region 
guarantees judicial independence. For example, Article 65 of the Egyptian Constitution  provides “The 
independence and immunity of the judiciary are two basic guarantees to safeguard rights and liberties”. 
See The Importance of Judicial Independence  Remarks by Sandra Day O’Connor, Associate Justice, 
Supreme Court of the United States before the Arab Judicial Forum, Manama, Bahrain, Sept 15
th
 2003, 
available at  
79
 Available at <http://www.pogar.org/activities/justice/beirut.pdf> 
80
 Articles 22-30. Ibid 
81
Articles 1-22 ibid  
82
See 
<http://www.abanet.org/rol/docs/judicial_reform_cairo_declaration_judicial_independence_2003_engli
sh.pdf> 
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1.4 THE RIGHT TO FAIR TRIAL: ITS SIGNIFICANCE AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 
 
Amongst the very many duties that is entrusted to the International Tribunals 
is the role of the watchdog of protection of fundamental rights.83 The question 
of fair trial and the duty of the International Tribunals to respect and observe 
the right of the accused is imperative. The heavy mantle on their shoulders of 
being the first international criminal tribunals since Nuremberg and Tokyo 
carries with it the task of ensuring that they do not attract similar criticisms 
that the post-Second World War Tribunals did, primarily that of not 
according the accused the full might of the right to a fair trial.84 
 
It has been averred by the Secretary-General and legal commentators that an 
international tribunal such as the ICTY, which is charged with the prosecution 
and punishment of individuals guilty for the commission of the most heinous 
crimes, must scrupulously (emphasis added) observe the rights of the 
accused. 85  There is an expectation that the international tribunals should 
aspire to the highest standards set by international human rights treaties, 
customary international law and general principles of law.86 The legitimacy of 
the International Tribunals would face a barrage of criticisms 87  if those 
individuals found guilty are not afforded full fair trial guarantees to the extent 
                                                 
83
Sara Stapleton Ensuring Fair Trial at the International Criminal Court: Statutory Interpretation and 
the Impermissibility of Derogation (1998-1999) 35 N.Y.U. J Int’L L & Politics 535 
84
 1 Morris & Scharf supra Prologue n.2, 9.  
85
 See for example, James Sloan: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
Fair Trial Rights: A Closer Look (1996) 10 LJIL 479 and Antonio Cassese Opinion: The International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1997)5 EHRLR 329, 300. Cf  Warbrick, supra n.65 
where it is argued that the international human rights standard of fair trial should be “fair enough” 
rather than “aspiring to an exemplary or superior level of “fairest of all”. 54,55 
86
 Jacob Katz Cogan International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials: Difficulties and Prospects (2002) 
27 Yale LJIL 111, 117.  See also decision of the Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic 
Case No. 99-IT-37-PT Decision on Preliminary Motions (Kosovo) dated 8
th
 November 2001, 
Paragraph 38. The Court referred to Art 9 of the ICCPR which allows a detained individual to apply 
for habeas corpus. Although there is no similar provision in the Statute of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber 
held that the spirit of that Article is applicable to the Tribunal as it is one of the fundamental rights of 
an accused person under customary international law. 
 Available at< http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision-e/1110873516829.htm> 
87
Such criticisms have already emerged. See for example the criticisms and comments on the decision 
of the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in Tadic (Protective Measures)discussed in detail in Section 1.3.1.b 
of this Chapter. 
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that the trials are unfair or perceived to be unfair. The onus on the 
International Tribunals to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial is more 
stringent than the national courts. Being pioneers of international criminal 
judicial institutions set up by exceptional methods in exceptional 
circumstances, the Tribunals need to show that they are as effective, if not 
more, than national judicial institutions. States who have had their sovereign 
power over their national legal proceedings circumscribed in favour of 
international legal proceedings at the Tribunals have an expectation that the 
International Tribunals comply with international standards of fair trial.88 
Further, the accused before an international criminal tribunal is there because 
he is charged with the most heinous and egregious of crimes.  The onus on 
the International Tribunals to ensure fair trial for him is weighty. 
 
That fair trial standards are applicable to international criminal proceedings 
was not an issue that evoked debate at the preparatory stages to the Report of 
the Secretary-General. The complexities arise when identifying what those 
standards are, the sources of the standards and whether those standards from 
those sources are applicable to the International Tribunals. Which human right 
instrument should they give prominence to? The European Convention or the 
ACHR?  
 
Thus, the issue of the degree of significance that the International Tribunals 
should attribute to those standards is also important. Should or would they 
consider themselves bound to apply the fair trial provisions of the United 
Nations instruments? Or are they highly-persuasive only and could be 
circumvented by the International Tribunals to fit the functional purpose and 
proceedings of the Tribunals, which are significantly different in many 
aspects from the purpose and proceedings of national courts? The difficulty is 
                                                 
88
 Cogan, supra n.86115. “There is an expectation for extraordinary trial procedures, at least from the 
perspective of domestic legal norms.” [to be applied at the international tribunals] Also since the 
International Tribunals are Chapter VII creations, States are bound to give preference and priority to 
them. 
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that there has been no procedural application of fair trial proceedings at an 
international forum which could be of instructive significance to the Tribunals. 
The precedential value of international fair trial rights of Nuremberg and 
Tokyo are limited since first, the rights were rudimentary and secondly, 
international human rights have developed to a vast and sophisticated corpus 
of legal principles since 1945. 89   Whatever standards the International 
Tribunals choose to apply to the proceedings before them, it is submitted that 
those standards applied should not be what the Tribunals perceive them to be, 
but rather objective standards which would lead to the satisfied observation 
amongst the accused, his counsel and legal commentators alike that the 
accused did have the benefit of a fair trial. 90   It is unfortunate that the 
International Tribunals have not delivered decisions to the satisfaction of the 
international community vis-à-vis the fair trial rights generally, and Article 14 
of the ICCPR in particular. This is even more perplexing in light of the 
averments in the Report of the Secretary-General. The particular paragraph 
that is of relevance is Paragraph 106 which stated as follows:  
 
“It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally 
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of the 
proceedings. In the view of the Secretary-General, such internationally  recognised 
standards, are in particular, mentioned in article 14 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights.”91 (emphasis added) 
 
The very tenor of Paragraph 106connotes an obligation on the Tribunals to 
observe the fair trial rights of the accused and in particular, the provisions of 
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 Warbrick supra n.65 46, 47. 
90
 Analogous to the opinion of the defence counsel of the accused at Nuremberg that their clients, did 
overall, receive a fair trial. supra Prologue n.14 
91
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of the Security Council Resolution 
808(1993) S/25704, 3 May 1993 and Corrigendum S/25704/Corr.1, 30 July 1993 reprinted in  2  
Virginia Morris & Michael Scharf, An Insider’s Guide to the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia, (Irvington-on-Hudson, NY: Transnational Publishers, 1995)  3-38 and D. Shraga 
and R. Zacklin, The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (1994)5 EJIL 360, 362-
380.  It was accepted that the ICC would follow the same premise as the International Tribunals. 
Warbrick supra n.65 46 
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Article 14. 92 Paragraph 106 suggests that the Tribunals must conform to 
Article 14 at the very least and that they should aspire for higher fair trial 
standards than the minimum content of Article 14.93 
 
Prima facie, the obligation of the International Tribunals is similar to that of 
State Parties to the ICCPRand their national courts, that being the obligation 
to observe standards nothing less than the minimum guarantees of Article 14. 
Therefore, the International Tribunals are bound to observe standards greater 
than those that are contained in Article 14. However, whether this was the 
actual practice at the International Tribunals is another matter altogether, as 
was observed at the proceedings of the first case before the ICTY. 
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 Whether a directive of the Secretary-General is binding on a judicial organ is another matter 
altogether. The Secretary-General is the head of the Secretariat of the United Nations which is the 
executive organ and the Tribunal is the subsidiary organ of the Security Council, which is a principal 
organ of the United Nations. See the discussion of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone on the position of the Secretary-General in the United Nations in theProsecutor v Sam Hinga 
Norman (SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Decision on the Constitutionality and Lack of Jurisdiction dated 13
th
 
March 2004, 64. Available at: 
<http://www.sc-sl.org/Documents/SCSL-04-15-PT-059-I.pdf> However, since the Report was 
accepted by the Security Council in toto, the presumption would be that the International Tribunals 
would give importance to the observations in the Report. There is also the perception that the Security 
Council, being the creator of the International Tribunals would have expected nothing less from the 
Tribunals vis-à-vis their treatment of the rights of the accused.  Adherence to the United Nations texts 
on the right to a fair trial would be one of them. 
93
 Sloan, supra, n.85 481 
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1.4.1 THE PROSECUTOR v DUSKO TADIC94 
 
Tadic has the dubious distinction of being the first person charged with and 
convicted of serious violations of international humanitarian law since the 
accused at Nuremberg and Tokyo. More importantly, the case of the 
Prosecutor v Tadic is significant, for the case has churned out decisions on 
many legal principles,95 relating to both procedural and substantive matters 
and applicable in an international criminal setting. Not all of the decisions of 
the Tribunals however have been unanimously welcomed or accepted by 
legal commentators. 
 
There are several decisions arising from Tadic that are relevant to the  
discussion at hand. The first decision, a substantive issue, relates to an 
application by the accused challenging the jurisdiction of the ICTY (“Tadic 
Jurisdiction ”). The significance of this Decision is remarkable, for it discusses 
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Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/ind-e.htm>. There is a vast body of literature on Tadic’s case. 
These include but not limited to Natasha A. Affolder, Tadic, The Anonymous Witness and the Sources 
of International Procedural Law (1998) 19 Michigan J. Int’l L. 445, George H. Aldrich: Jurisdiction of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (1996) 90 AJIL64.Jose E. Alvarez The Likely 
Legacies of Tadic (1997) 3 ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L 358, Jose E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure: Lessons of 
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597, Kitty Felde et al., The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic (1998)13 American U. Int’l L. Rev. 1441, Paul 
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since Nuremberg (1997) 60 Albany L. Rev. 861, Deborah L. Ungar, The Tadic War Crimes Trial: The 
First Criminal Conviction since Nuremberg Exposes the Need for a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal 
(1999) 20 Whittier L. Rev. 677, Colin Warbrick & Peter Rowe: The International Criminal Tribunal 
for Yugoslavia: The Decision of the Appeals ChamberOn the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in 
the Tadic Case (1996) 45 ICLQ 691. Geoffrey R. Watson, The Humanitarian Law of the Yugoslavia 
War Crimes Tribunal (1996), 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 687), Mark S. Zaid, Trial of the Century? (1997)3 ILSA 
J. Int’L & Comp. L. 589. Similar challenges were launched against the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda in the case of the Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi. Available at 
<http://69.94.11.53/default.htm> under Cases. In the Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction 
dated the 18
th
 July 1997, the Trial Chamber dismissed the challenges by the defendant on its 
jurisdiction. There was no appeal against that decision. Virginia Morris The Prosecutor v Joseph 
Kanyabashi (1998) 92 AJIL 66. 
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 See for example Michal Bohlander Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic: Waiting to Exhale (2000) 11 Crim. L. 
F 217 where the author discusses other decisions arising from Tadic relating to matters as diverse as 
factual disputes, equality of arms, factual disputes, “protected persons” under Article 2 of the Statute of 
the ICTY, accomplices and common purpose under Article 7 and other issues. Tadic is also significant 
for it produced decisions on contempt of court matters in international criminal courts.  The power to 
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discussions. By the same author, International Criminal Tribumals and their Power to Punish 
Contempt and False Testimony (2001) 12:1 Crim L.F. 
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many issues relating to the consitutionality and legitimacy of the Tribunal, 
including its establishment. The issue that is of particular relevance here is the 
pronouncement of the Tribunal on its duty to respect and observe the right of 
the accused to a fair trial. The second decision relates to the procedural law of 
the Tribunal and arose out of an interlocutory application made by the 
Prosecution for protective measures in the form of confidential and 
anonymity orders for the witnesses in the trial proceedings against the 
accused (“Protective Measures Decision”). The Protective MeasuresDecision is 
of particular significance for it relates to the right of the accused to a fair trial 
vis-à-vis the interests of the victims and witnesses. An analysis is then 
embarked on a reconciliation between the two decisions and queries whether 
the International Tribunal has adhered to its duty as a court in upholding and 
respecting the right of the accused to a fair trial. It should be noted that whilst 
the decision of the Trial Chamber on the jurisdiction issue was appealed, the 
decision of the Trial Chamber on the protective measures was not. 96 
 
THE FACTS IN BRIEF: 
 
Dusko Tadic, a Bosnian Serb, was charged with gross violations of 
international humanitarian law including grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions under Article 2, violations of laws and customs of war under 
Article 3 and crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute of the 
ICTY. 97 
 
 
                                                 
96
This could perhaps be attributed to Rule 72(B) of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Tribunal 
which stated, as at 2
nd
 of October 1995 that : "The Trial Chamber shall dispose of preliminary motions 
in limine litis and without interlocutory appeal, save in the case of dismissal of an objection based on 
lack of jurisdiction."Rule 72(B) as at 1
st
 February 2008 is more detailed. See 
<http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev41eb.pdf> Also Cogan,supra n. 86 484 
97
 Tadic was charged with 34 offences. Paragraphs 36-51 of Opinion and Judgement of the Trial 
Chamber dated the 7
th
 May 1999. The judgement can be accessed at 
< http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm> 
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1.4.1.a  THE JURISDICTION DECISION98 
 
By an interlocutory motion filed through his counsel, Tadic challenged the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It was a three-pronged challenge, aimed at the 
very foundation of the Tribunal as well as its subject-matter jurisdiction.  
These were pigeon-holed as the illegal foundation or unlawful establishment 
of the Tribunal, the wrongful primacy over national courts and finally the lack 
ratione materiae or subject-matter juridiction. 
 
Tadic‟s first ground of challenge is an issue that is germane to the issue of 
independence and competence of the Tribunal. 99  He contended that the 
establishment of the Tribunal was invalid as it was contrary to the general 
principle that courts must be “established by law”.100 Tadic‟s argument basically 
centred on the premise that the Tribunal was not be established by law since it 
was created by Security Council and that such creation was ultra vires its 
powers.101 
 
The Tribunal held that  “established by law” connotes different interpretations 
and the interpretation relied on by Tadic102, contained in the international and 
regional human rights instruments applied to national courts and not 
international courts.103 The Appeals Chamber held that the interpretation of 
the phrase “established by law” as established by a legislature could not apply 
                                                 
98
  See Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Decision of the 
Appeals Chamber dated 2
nd
 October 1995 
available at <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-e/51002.htm> (“Appeal Decision”) Unless 
otherwise stated, the Decision referred to in the discussion hereinafter is that of the Appeals Chamber. 
The Decision of the Trial Chamber may be referred to whenever it is deemed necessary and shall be 
acknowledged thus. 
99Another issue relating to this case but which emerged at the appellate proceedings is the Tribunal’s 
competence to decide on its own establishment. This issue is dealt with in the chapter relating to 
judicial impartiality. 
100
Article 14 provides for this characteristic of a court but there is no equivalent provision in Article 21 
of the Statute of the ICTY. 
101
For the Defence it is said that it is a basic human right of an accused to have a fair and public 
hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Decision of the Trial 
Chamber supra n.97 Paragraph 8. 
102
Tadic referred to Articles 14, 6 and 8 of the ICCPR, European Convention and ACHR respectively. 
Appeal Decision supra n.98 Paragraph 41.  
103
Appeal DecisionibidParagraph 42 
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to international courts as there is no doctrine of separation of powers and the 
three arms of Government as traditionally understood in national law.104 
Therefore, the proper interpretation of “established by law” with regards to 
Tribunal is whether it was established in accordance with the rule of law.105 
(Emphasis added). This means that the establishment must be in accordance 
with the proper international standards; it must provide all the guarantees of 
fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full conformity with internationally 
recognized human rights instruments.106 
 
The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber in this regard, that the 
important consideration, when weighing the question of “established by law”  
was not whether it was “pre-established” or established for a specific situation 
or purpose, but whether it was established by a competent organ in 
accordance with the relevant legal procedures and that whether it has observe 
the requirements international standards of fair trial guarantees and the 
requirements of procedural fairness. 107  The Appeals Chambers further 
averred that the provisions of the Statute of the Tribunal relating to fair trial 
guarantees in Article 21, supplemented by its Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure demonstrated that such requirements of procedural fairness have 
been fulfilled by the Tribunal and is therefore established by law.108 This 
ground of challenge was dismissed by the Trial Chamber and Tadic‟s appeal 
to the Appeals Chamber also failed. 
 
Thus the phrase “established by law” was interpreted by the judges to mean a 
court that which has an onus to “…. provide all the guarantees of fairness, justice 
and even-handedness, in full conformity with internationally recognized human 
rights instruments” as opposed to established by a legislature as 
                                                 
104
See also Colin Warbrick The United Nations System: A Place for Criminal Courts? (1995) 5 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 237 
105
Appeal Decision, supra n.98Paragraph 43 
106
Ibid, Paragraph 45 
107
Ibid. 
108
Appeal Decision supra n.98Paragraphs 46 and 47  
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conventionally accepted and practised in national legal systems. This dictum  
presents a compelling impression that the Tribunal is under a mandatory 
duty to ensure a fair trial by applying standards which has to conform to the 
international human rights instruments.109 
 
The International Tribunal seemed to be mindful of this duty when the 
Appeal Chambers said in the Tadic (Jurisdiction) decision: 
 
“An examination of the Statute of the International Tribunal, and of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence adopted pursuant to that Statute leads to the conclusion that 
it has been established in accordance with the rule of law. The fair trial guarantees in 
Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been 
adopted almost verbatim in Article 21 of the Statute. Other fair trial guarantees 
appear in the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”110 
 
The initial approach of the International Tribunal towards this essential issue 
did not live up to what was pronounced with judicial gusto in the above 
paragraph. Subsequent dicta of the Tribunal led legal commentators to 
believe that the Tribunal had failed to live up to its responsibilities in 
upholding the provisions of either Article 14 of the ICCPR or Article 21 of the 
Statute.  If the above paragraph was accepted verbatim, it would appear, that 
following the controversial decision in the Protective Measures application, that 
the ICTY was not established in accordance with the rule of law! 
 
 
                                                 
109
The Trial Chamber described the ICTY as a structure appropriate to the conduct of fair trials.” 
Tadic  Jurisdiction Trial Chamber Decision dated 10
th
 August 1995, Paragraph 8.  Accessible at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895.htm> 
110
Appeal Decision, supran.98, Paragraph 46. See also the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the 
ICTR in Jean-Paul Barayagwiza Case No: ICTR-97-19-AR72. Decision dated 3
rd
 November 1999. 
Judicial Supplement No.9, November 1999 Paragraph 40 where the Appeals Chamber observed that 
the Report of the Secretary-General had identified sources of law for the Tribunal and that the 
ICCPRis part of general international law and is applied on that basis. Regional human rights 
instruments such as the European Convention and the ACHR are persuasive and may be of assistance 
in applying and interpreting the ICTR’s applicable law. Although they are not binding on the Tribunal, 
they are authoritative as evidence of international custom. 
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1.4.1.b THE PROTECTIVE MEASURES DECISION (“Tadic (Protective 
Measures) Decision”)111 
 
Proof that a court is independent and impartial is best gleaned from the 
appraisal as to whether the court and by extension, its members uphold the 
fair trial rights of the accused. The Trial Chamber was put to test in this 
regard when it had to rule on a motion filed by the Prosecutor requesting 
protective measures for its witnesses. Before discussing the proceedings and 
judgment, it would be  helpful if the relevant statutory provisions are 
highlighted. 
 
Article 20of the Statute of the ICTY,112 which relates to the commencement of 
the trial and the conduct of its proceedings, contains a fair trial provision with 
a limited effect. This itself shows that Article 20 is not an uequivocal 
declaration of the duty and responsibility of the Trial Chamber to protect the 
right of the accused to a fair trial. Sub-article (1) states as follows: 
 
“The Trial Chamber shall ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that the 
proceedings are conducted in full accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence, 
with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the 
protection of victims and witnesses.” (Emphasis added) 
 
The dichotomy between the rights of the accused and due regard for the 
protection of victims and witnesses is unique to the proceedings of the 
Tribunals. Nowhere in any of the international and human rights instruments 
                                                 
111Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses in 
The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic Case No: IT-94-1 “Tadic (Protective Measures)” Paragraph 36. 
Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/100895pm.htm> 
112
 The Judges have drafted Rules which are wider than the Statute and contain more fair trial 
provisions, such as respect for the privilege against self-incrimination and the prohibition of coerced 
confessions, the right to be questioned in the presence of his counsel after being informed of his right to 
remain silent and the right to be warned of the possible use of any incriminating evidence against him. 
1 Morris & Scharf supra Prologue, n.2 223-227. Warbrick, supra n.65, 48 
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is there any mention of a qualification to the right of the accused to a fair trial 
in this manner.  
 
Article 20 should be read together with Article 21 which is the fair trial 
provision. Article 21(4) repeats almost verbatim the seven specific fair trial 
rights of Article14(3).113Article 21(3)contains minimum guarantees of fair trial, 
and applying the general principle of minimum guarantees, the fair trial 
standards of this provision is not exhaustive. The main difference is that 
Article 21, is subject to a limitation which is not included in Article 14. The 
limitation contained in Article 20 (1)is repeated in Article 22(1). Article 
21(2)states that: 
 
In determination of charges against him, the accused shall be entitled to a fair and 
public hearing, subject to article 22 of the Statute. (Emphasis added) 
 
Article 22: 
 
“The International Tribunal shall provide in its rules of procedure and evidence for 
the protection of victims and witnesses. Such protection measures shall include, but 
not shall not be limited to, the conduct of in camera proceedings and the protection of 
the victim‟s identity.”114 
 
 The measures to be taken by the Tribunal are presumably left to its discretion. 
Article 22does not list those measures except setting out examples of some of 
the measures that the Tribunal may take such as holding the proceedings in 
camera and protecting the victim‟s identity. 
 
                                                 
113
The seven rights include, inter alia,to be informed promptly and in detail the charge against him, to 
have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence, to be tried without undue delay, to 
be tried in his presence, to be legally represented and legally-aided and  to examine, or have examined, 
the witnesses against him.  
114
 Note also Paragraph 108 of the Report of the Secretary-General which observed that it is necessary 
for the International Tribunal to provide protective measures for victims and witnesses. Protective 
Measures Decision, supra n.111 Paragraph 36.  
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Both Articles 21and 22show conflicting interests. One is a qualified Article 
that purportedly ensures that the accused enjoys fair trial rights subject to the 
interests of victins and witnesses which are protected by the other.  The 
following discussion shows how the Trial Chamber dealt with this “conflict”.  
 
Briefly, the Prosecutor in Tadic filed an interlocutory procedural motion 
requesting protective measures for witnesses for the prosecution. The 
protective measures requested for were, inter alia confidentiality and 
anonymity measures115  in the form of withholding of the identities of some of 
the witnesses from the public and the media, the withholding of identities of 
witnesses from the accused and his counsel and certain parts of the hearing to 
be held in closed session.116 The Decision on the Prosecutor’s Motion for 
Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses117 attracted much comment as 
it discussed several vital issues relating to fair trial rights at the International 
Tribunals. Amongst these were sources of law for those rights and the 
relationship between the ICCPRand the ICTY, in particular whether the Trial 
Chamber was bound by the international standards of fair trial as contained 
in that international instrument. Further, the Tribunal had to consider, in the 
event of a conflict between the fair trial right of the accused and the interests 
of victims and witnesses, which should prevail and the factors that need to be 
taken into consideration in deciding the issue. The Tribunal was faced with 
the task of reconciling of these two opposite interests.  
 
                                                 
115
 Confidentiality measures are those which involves non-disclosure to the public whereas anonymity 
measures relate to non-disclosure of any particulars of the witnesses against him, including identities 
and addresses, not just to the accused but in some cases, to his counsel .  Vincent Creta The Search for 
Justice In The Former Yugoslavia And Beyond: Analyzing the Rights of the Accused Under the Statute 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (1997-1998) 20 Hous JIL 381, 395 
116
Tadic (Protective Measures)supra n.111, Paragraph 3. 
117
  There was no appeal against the decision of the Trial Chamber as an appeal on a preliminary 
motion is not allowed under Rule 72(B) unless such appeal is based on a question of jurisdiction. The 
Rules were subsequently amended in 1996 to allow appeals on interlocutory matters where the Trial 
Chamber had certified that matter could be appealed on. The Tadic (Witness) Decision was issued on 
10
th
 August 1995. See also Monroe Leigh The Yugoslav Tribunal: The Use of Unnamed Witnesses 
(1996) 90 AJIL 235 
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The arguments put forward by the defence in resisting some of the requests of 
the Prosecutor are quite relevant in the context of the fair trial rights of the 
accused at the International Tribunals. The defence averred that the right to a 
fair trial as envisaged by Article 20 invoked certain minimum standards 
which could only be understood by reference to jurisprudence from other 
judicial organs from other jurisdictions, in particular, the European Court.118 
This approach was relevant as the Statute was silent on these non-specific 
rights. As one of the minimum standards is the right of the accused to cross-
examine the witnesses against him, the effect of the granting of the requests 
by the Prosecutor would have circumvented that fair trial standard.119 The 
measures requested were against the notion of the right of the accused to the 
fair trial as guaranteed by Article 14 of the ICCPRand Articles 20and21of the 
Statute. It was argued further that the International Tribunal was bound by 
international standards, as provided for by the ICCPR. 
 
The Trial Chamber granted some of the confidentiality and anonymity 
requests by the Prosecutor. The anonymity measures granted included 
blanket withholding of the identity of the witnesses from both the accused as 
well as his counsel. 120 
 
A preliminary but crucial issue relating to the interpretation of fair trial 
provisions in the Statute was the sources of law applicable to the Tribunals. 
Of particular importance was the impact, if any, of the ICCPR on the ICTY. 
The question was whether the International Tribunal was bound by decisions 
of other international judicial bodies or whether it could adapt those rulings 
to suit its own special proceedings.121 It was this issue that compelled the 
majority of the Trial Chamber to grant some of the requests made by the 
                                                 
118
Cf the approach of the Trial Chamber in the considering a similar motion by the Prosecutor 
requesting protective measures in The Prosecutor v Delalic et al supra n.67 
119
 Paragraph 7. Tadic (Protective Measures) Decision supra n.111. Sloan, supra n.85 484, 485 
120
 Rules 69 and 75 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY read together allow the 
prosecution to withhold identities of certain witnesses.  
121
Tadic (Protective Measures) Decision supra n.111Paragraph 17 
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Prosecutor, including the blanket withholding of the identities of some of the 
witnesses for the Prosecution.  
 
The majority was “troubled” by the lack of guidance from the Report of the 
Secretary-General as to the applicable sources of law in the construction and 
application of the Statute and the Rules and in particular the relevance of 
interpretations by international judicial organs of the provisions of the human 
rights instruments on which the relevant provisions of Statute and the Rules 
were formulated.122 Unlike other pieces of legislation, such as the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice 123  and the Statute of the International 
Criminal Court,124 there are no provisions in the Statutes of the International 
Tribunals that provide for sources of law for them. In any event, the issue of 
lack of guidance from the Secretary-General may be vexing but should not be 
debilitating. There is a certain latitude given to judges generally to apply the 
law, to do legal research and seek “guidance” from other jurisdictions and 
jurisprudence.125 It is argued that international criminal judges would have 
had a greater latitude than domestic judges since the sources of law for them 
are rather limited and uncertain. 
 
Having decided that Article 14 is indeed relevant to the International Tribunal, 
the Trial Chamber deliberated on the interpretation of the provisions of the 
ICCPRwithin the context of the object and the purpose and unique 
characteristics of the Statute.126 The Tribunal is statutorily bound to consider 
the interests of the victims and witnesses, a consideration not included in 
Article 14.  That distinction was the basis for the Trial Chamber‟s reasoning 
that the decisions of the Human Rights Committee were only of limited 
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ibid 
123
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice 
124
 Article 21 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
125
Under Section 3 of the Civil Law Act 1957 of Malaysia, for example, the judges can refer to English 
common law and equity and apply such legal principles to domestic situations,  where such principles 
are applicable and relevant to the domestic legal system. 
126
Ibid Paragraph 26 
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relevance to its proceedings.127 The Tribunal adopted a teleological approach 
in interpreting the fair trial right. 
 
The majority concluded that the International Tribunal must interpret its 
provisions within its own context and determine the balance between the 
right of the accused to a fair and public trial and the protection of the victims 
and witnesses. The jurisprudence of the other judicial bodies are relevant 
when examining concepts such as “fair trial” but the achievement of that 
balance depends on the context of the legal system, i.e. the international 
criminal proceedings of the Tribunal, in which the concepts are applied.128 
 
The majority decision was paradoxical with accepted meaning of fair trial, in 
particular, the right of the accused to cross-examine witnesses against him.  
The judges sought to justify the granting of the anonymity requests by 
averring that the balance of these two interests is inherent in the notion of 
“fair trial”, which was taken to mean not only fair treatment to the defendant 
but also to the prosecution and to the witnesses.129 The court found that the 
fair trial standard under Article 21(4)of the right to cross-examine will not be 
infringed by the anonymity orders. This justification is wholly unacceptable, 
for fair trial rights do not include “fair treatment to the prosecution and to the 
witnesses”, and such a proviso is not provided for in any of the international 
or regional human rights instruments. Extension of that fair trial right, the 
                                                 
127
supra n.111Paragraph 27. The Trial Chamber viewed its framework, in certain aspects, comparable 
to a military tribunal to justify its “limited rights of due process and more lenient rules of evidence”. 
Paragraph 28. The judgement to this effect is disconcerting as military tribunals have always had a 
controversial status where international human rights and in particular, fair trial, is concerned. The 
Human Rights Committee have stressed the need for military tribunals to apply Article 14 provisions to 
their proceedings. General Comment 13, supra Chapter One, n.9 Paragraph 4. Sloan, supra n. 85, 487. 
Note also McGoldrick supra Chapter One n. 15 400. 
128
Tadic (Protective Measures) Decision ,supra n.111, Paragraph 30. 
129
Ibid Paragraph 55. The Trial Chamber relied on an obscure decision of a domestic court of Australia. 
Unfortunately, the Judgement did not elaborate under what circumstances the judge discussed the 
balancing requirement “inherent” in the fair trial concept. Judge Stephen, in his Dissenting Opinion, 
construed the Australian decision differently. There the Court held that the true names of the witnesses 
may be withheld. It was not, as the majority of the Trial Chamber stated, authority for blanket 
anonymity. See Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen on the Prosecutor’s Motion Requesting Protective 
Measures for Victims and Witnesses dated 10
th
 August 1995 
 Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decision-e/50810pmn.htm> 
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purpose and intention of which has always been to respect the rights of the 
accused, to victims and witnesses is an interpretation that was and is not 
envisaged by any of the human rights instruments. 
 
Judge Stephen‟s very robust Minority Decision was at odds with his 
colleagues.130  The judge was of the view that the category of anonymity 
orders in the form requested by the Prosecutor was not a measure 
contemplated by the Statute since they were likely to substantially 
disadvantage the defendant.131 Judge Stephen concluded that the Statute did 
not authorise measures such as the anonymity orders where this would in 
real sense affect the rights of the accused under Article 21.132 The proviso 
“subject to Article 22” clause in Article 22applies only to the “public hearing” 
antecedent and not to the right to a fair trial.  
 
The decision of Judge Stephen is more relevant to the international criminal 
proceedings than the decision of the majority. The decision of the majority 
was drastic and gave preferential consideration to the victims and witnesses 
at the expense of the accused‟s fair trial rights.133 What is even more worrying 
was the Trial Chamber‟s view that the notion of fair trial meant fair to the 
prosecution and witnesses. This interpretation does not make sense for the 
very concept of fair trial was aimed for the protection of the accused, not the 
prosecution. If this interpretation is applied to national court proceedings, it 
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Separate Opinion of Judge Stephen, supra n.129 
131
Ibid 
132
Ibid  (The paragraphs of the Separate Opinion are unnumbered) 
133
For a commentary that supported the decision of the Majority, see Y.M.O. Featherstone The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia: Recent Developments in Witness Protection 
(1997) 10 LJIL 197. The article discusses the facts that were the basis of the motion in detail, including 
the number of witnesses who obtained anonymity orders and confidential orders, the criteria applied by 
the Trial Chambers for granting such orders and the reasons those orders were sought, e.g some 
witnesses were particpants, other witnesses were chance observers. See also Olivia Swaak-Goldman 
The ICTY and the Right to a Fair Trial: A Critique of the Critics (1997)10 LJIL 215. But see the view 
of the then Deputy Prosecutor Graham Blewitt who confessed that he was “personally uncomfortable 
with the notion of going forward with witnesses whose identities are not disclosed to the accused.” 
Interview with Graham Blewitt, Deputy Prosecutor in the Tadic Trial in The Hague, Netherlands, July 
12 1996. Michael Scharf in The Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic, supra n.94 871 
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would be a notion that would be open to abuse by unscrupulous Government 
machinery. The fair trial doctrine is lost if this interpretation is accepted. 
 
Stephen J summed it up succinctly when he said: 
 
“Of course, the Statute clearly mandates the protection of victims and witnesses, 
including protection of their identity. But this is not to say that it mandates 
unqualified anonymity.”134 
 
It is true that the proceedings of the Tribunal are unique to the extent that 
measures are needed to be taken for protection of the categories of people 
aforementioned. However, simple protection of identity would have sufficed, 
as could be observed from national practice. The Secretary-General‟s request 
that the International Tribunals “fully respect” the rights of the defendant 
carries a stronger sense of expectation from the International Tribunals than a 
mere “due regard” to protection of victims and witnesses. 135   Neither the 
nature nor the suitability of the protective measures caused the controversy. It 
was the extent of those measures which were considered far-reaching and 
contrary to the right of fair trial as envisaged by the international and regional 
human rights instruments. In fact Rule 75of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence of the ICTY states that protective measures in the form of privacy 
and protection of witnesses may be granted, provided that such measures are 
consistent with the rights of the accused. The Tribunal should therefore give 
prominence to the fair trial rights of the accused, which must be used as the 
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Ibid 
135
 Monroe Leigh Witness Anonymity is Inconsistent With Due Process (1997) 91 AJIL 80. The Tadic 
(Witness) decision sparked a debate between the late Professor Leigh and Professor C. Chinkin. See 
Leigh in The Yugoslav Tribunal: The Use of Unnamed Witnesses (1996) 90 AJIL 235 followed by a 
reply by Chinkin in Due Process and Witness Anonymity (1997) 91 75and then Leigh again in Witness 
Anonymity is Inconsistent With Due Process , ibid. Professor Chinkin submitted an amicus curiae brief 
in support of the Prosecutor’s motion whereby she argues that the nature of the offences committed and 
the concerns on the welfare of the rape victims/witnesses justify the veil of anonymity for the witnesses. 
Professor Chinkin also justified the majority decision of the Trial Chamber. Professor Leigh was 
against the anonymity orders as they were against the due process of law and that the majority had no 
authority to make the blanket anonymity orders: Witness Anonymity, ibid ,80. It is submitted that 
Professor Leigh’s views are more in line with the notion and intention of the right of the accused to a 
fair trial. 
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gauging factor in deciding the extent of the protective measures for the victims 
and witnesses. It is a short-sighted approach, as the accused has much more at 
risk if he was found guilty.136 
 
A factual issue that showed a crack in the justification of the Trial Chambers 
in granting the protective measures to the witnesses as requested by the 
Prosecutor was the discovery that one of the witnesses was subsequently 
discovered to be blatantly lying.137 When confronted with this fact, he said 
that he was told by the Government of Bosnia to lie.138 Whatever the reason 
may be, the purpose of the protective measures was defeated. Not only that, it 
laid bare the unpalatable fact that protective measures could be abused. This 
clearly showed the disadvantage of not allowing the accused the right to 
confront witnesses against him. It appeared that the Prosecutor himself 
discovered the discrepancies and upon further investigations, found that the 
witness was unreliable and misleading.  The Prosecutor was ethical to bring 
this matter to the attention of the court but an unscrupulous prosecutor could 
very well hide this fact from the court. The Court in turn would have 
inadvertently be party to the abuse of the fair trial rights of the accused, thus 
compromising its independence and impartiality. 
 
Further, by agreeing to grant the measures requested by the Prosecutor, the 
Court could raise a perception of lack of impartiality, as it would appear that 
it had favoured one party, the Prosecutor against another, the accused. 
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 The charges of rape were withdrawn before the full trial of Tadic began.  Leigh:, Witness Anonymity, 
ibid, 82, n.10 
137
 See also Featherstone, supra n. 133, 195. There are however conflicting reports as to who 
discovered that Witness L was lying. Certain quarters argue that it was the defence who discovered that 
the witness was lying. William Walker The Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal: Recent Developments 
(1997) Whittier L. Rev 303. In the same volume Paul Hoffman Dusko Tadic Trial and Due Process 
Issues 313, 315 
138
Some commentators were of the view that the Witness L fiasco was an attempt by certain States to 
manipulate the ICTY. If this view was indeed proven true, then the vulnerability of the independence 
of the International Tribunals is exposed. The Tribunals should therefore be careful that they do not 
become tools of States. Cogan, supra n.86 128. 
53 
 
A subsequent Trial Chamber decision on similar issues followed the 
dissenting opinion of Judge Stephen rather than the majority. In the Decision 
on the Motions by the Prosecution for Protective Measures for the Prosecution 
Witnesses Pseudonymed “B” Through “M” in The Prosecutor v Delalic et al Case 
No. IT-96-21-T dated 28th April 1997, a differently constituted Trial Chamber 
quoted another Trial Chamber decision with approval: 
 
“The philosophy which imbues the Statute and the Rules of the Tribunal appears clear: 
the victims and witnesses merit protection, even from the accused, during the 
preliminary proceedings and continuing until a reasonable time before the start of the 
trial itself; from that time forth, however, the right of the accused to an equitable trial 
must take precedence and require that the veil of anonymity be lifted in his favour, 
even if the veil must continue to obstruct the view of the public and the media.”139 
 
 The Trial Chamber decision reaffirmed the fair trial norm that the accused 
has the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him and that his 
right must take precedence and the veil of anonymity must be lifted in his 
favour as it goes against the notion of fair trial. The Trial Chamber was careful 
to point out that protective measures can be given to victims and witnesses 
until before trial. Once trial starts, the veil of anonymity will be lifted in 
favour of the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
 
That is not to say that there will not be or should not be any protection for 
witnesses and victims. Aside from the relevance of the measures to that 
particular trial, it is the degree of the measures that should be given 
significant consideration. The Tribunal would and should ensure that such 
protection does not flagrantly compromise the fair trial rights of the accused. 
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 Paragraph 59. Quoting the decision of Trial Chamber in Decision on the Application of the 
Prosecution dated 17
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 October 1996 Requesting Protective Measures for Victims and Witnesses in The 
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supra n.65. 
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Insofar as the application of law is concerned, notwithstanding the Protective 
Measures decision, the general approach of the International Tribunals 
towards interpretation of legal principles has been to refer to the practice of 
national and regional courts when seeking to apply fair trial standards to their 
proceedings, especially the jurisprudence arising from the ICCPRand the 
ECHR which the Tribunal considers as “authoritative and applicable”.140 There is 
no hard rule but generally the International Tribunals have consistently used 
this approach when interpreting international fair trial rights. 
 
The Tadic Case made an impact in the international law field, at times for the 
wrong reasons. In one decision, the ICTY stressed the requirement that it 
must fully respect the right of the accused to a fair trial. In another decision, it 
stated that such a right is neither unequivocal nor unqualified.141 It seems 
difficult to reconcile these two decisions. In its defence however, it could be 
argued that the ICTY found itself in that situation due to the drafting of the 
statutory provisions. By including provisions relating to the victims and 
accused, in particular the protective measures, the Tribunal was put in a 
position where it could not very well ignore the position of the victims and 
witnesses. The confusion lies in two areas: one, the interpretation of Article 21. 
The Majority took the Article in toto and held that the right to fair trial is 
subject to the interests of victims and witnesses. The dissenting opinion of 
Stephen J held otherwise, that the “subject to” clause in Article 21 was to be 
applied to public hearing. Secondly, the granting of blanket anonymity was 
                                                 
140
Delalic (Protective Measures),ibid Paragraph 27. See also the Judgment of the Trial Chamber in the 
case of The Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T where the Tribunal held that such practice is 
necessary since both substantive and procedural criminal laws are at a rudimentary stage in 
international law.  National practice, and presumably by extension, regional practice, may be referred 
to in order to fill in the lacunae of the Statute and customary international law. Paragraphs 537-542.  
Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/index.htm> Cogan supra n.86 117. 
See also the Declaration of Judge Mohammed Shahabuddeen in The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija 
Case No: IT-95-17/1 on the approach of the International Tribunals to the question of applying hitherto 
national legal principles to international criminal proceedings. The Declaration envisaged that there 
may be value in consulting the jurisprudence and practice of other judicial bodies as a guidance to see 
how a legal principle is applied in the particular circumstances before the Tribunal. Paragraph 258. 
Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/index.htm> 
141
 It could perhaps be argued that the latter decision should prevail simply because it was issued by the 
Appeals Chamber compared to the latter decision which was that of a Trial Chamber. 
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also repugnant to the right of the accused to cross-examine the witnesses 
against him. Anonymity such as holding back the true names of the witnesses 
is acceptable, but it should stop there. Overall therefore, the Majority Decision 
circumscribed the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
 
The position of the International Tribunals is best summed-up by a former 
serving Judge of the ICTY: 
 
“…..overly liberal grants of witness protection measures, including ….even 
pseudonyms, threaten the goals of the Tribunal – accurate historical records of terrible 
events and fair treatment of the accused war criminals who need to know the identity 
of witnesses in advance to prepare properly for trial.”142 
 
One of the issues that was of interest whilst research was undertaken for this 
thesis is the nationalities of the judges of the ICTY and whether the State 
which they are nationals of were parties to the ICCPR or any of the regional 
human rights instruments. The table compiled below identifies the States and 
also which human rights instrument the country had signed or ratified. 
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 Patricia Wald Dealing with Witnesses in War Crimes Tribunal: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal  
(2002) 5 Yale Hum.Rts & Dev L.J.217 
56 
 
                                                 
143
 Declarations and reservations were considered as immaterial to this study. 
144
<www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/arabhrcharter.html> 
145
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf 
146
<http://www.africa-union.org/> 
147
<http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/About_Coe/Member_states/default.asp> 
148
Resigned shortly after the judges convened in The Hague. Antonio Cassese The ICTY: A Living and 
Vital Reality (2004) 2 JCIJ 585 
149
The People’s Republic of China signed the ICCPR 
150
 Judge Nieto-Navia also served as President and judge of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights 
prior to his appointment to the ICTY. 
 
 
NAME  
 
 
NATIONALITY 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENT 
SIGNED OR 
RATIFIED BY 
JUDGE’S STATE143 
Abi-Saab 
Elmahdi 
Egypt Arab Charter on 
Human Rights; 144 
ICCPR;145 AfCHR146 
Agius Malta ICCPR; European 
Convention147 
Bennouna 
Fassi-Fahri 
Morocco Arab Charter on 
Human Rights; ICCPR 
Cassesse 
Pocar 
Italy ICCPR; European 
Convention 
Deschenes Canada ICCPR 
Hunt 
Stephen 
 
Australia 
ICCPR. 
Jorda 
Le Foyer de Costil148 
France ICCPR; European 
Convention 
Karibi-Whyte Nigeria ICCPR; AfChR 
Kwon Korea ICCPR 
Li 
Liu 
Tieya 
China149 ICCPR 
May United Kingdom ICCPR; European 
Convention 
McDonald 
Meron 
Wald 
 
United States of 
America 
 
ICCPR; ACHR 
Mumba Zambia ICCPR; AfChR 
Nieto-Navia150 Colombia ICCPR; ACHR 
Odio Benito Costa Rica ICCPR; ACHR 
Orie Netherlands ICCPR; European 
Convention 
Riad Syria ICCPR 
Robinson Jamaica ICCPR; ACHR 
Schomburg Germany ICCPR; European 
 Judges at the ICTY as at 2001 
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The table above includes judges who had sat on the Tadic (Jurisdiction) 
decisions, both at the first instance and at the appellate proceedings as well as 
the Protective Measures Decision. Also included in the list are the judges who 
sat in the Appeals Chamber in the case of the Prosecutor v Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza,  a case involving the abuse of process doctrine which is 
discussed in the following chapter.  
 
It can be seen from the table above that all but two judges are nationals of 
States which are member parties to the ICCPR and a regional human rights 
instrument. Therefore judges come from jurisdictions that should know the 
importance of adherence to the right of the accused to a fair trial. It appears 
surreal, for example, that a judge who has to apply the provisions of Article 
14 strictly in his own domestic court, could compromise it at an international 
setting. 
 
 
1.5 MISCELLEANOUS ISSUES OF FAIR TRIAL AT THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
 
Concern over the rights of the accused, in particular his fair trial rights have 
been expressed in relation to the Completion Strategies of the International 
Tribunals.151 The dissenting opinion of Judge David Hunt in the case of the 
Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko et al., Decision re Proceedings Under Rule 15 bis(D), 
No. ICTR-98-42-A15bis,  (Sept. 24, 2003) raised the issue of the danger of 
compromising fair trial rights under the pretext of meeting the deadlines 
imposed by the Completion Strategies. 
                                                 
151
 See for example  Daryl Mundis The Judicial Effects Of The “Completion Strategies” On The Ad 
Hoc International Criminal  Tribunals (2005) 99 AJIL 142.  The Completion Strategies are discussed 
in detail in Chapter 3 in relation to the institutional independence of the International Tribunals. 
Convention 
Sidhwa Pakistan - 
Vohrah Malaysia - 
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The judge said: 
“……very proper endorsement by the Security Council "in the strongest terms" of 
the Completion Strategy of the Yugoslav Tribunal, and its urging of the Rwanda 
Tribunal to formalise a similar strategy to complete its work within a particular time, 
should not be interpreted as an encouragement by the Security Council to either 
Tribunal to conduct its trials so that they would be other than fair trials.”152 
 
This misgiving was reiterated by Judge Hunt in an Appeals Chamber decision 
in another interlocutory motion in the Prosecutor v Milosevic153 case. In the 
Decision on the Interlocutory Appeal on the Admissibility of Evidence-in-Chief in the 
form of Written Statements,154 the majority of the Chamber received a rebuke 
from the Judge who was of the view that the decision of the majority on the 
interpretation of application of Rule 92bis was a capitulation to the 
Completion Strategy.155 
 
“The Majority Appeals Chamber Decision drives a horse and cart through the 
previous interpretation of Rule 92bis, and it seriously prejudices the accused in the 
ways already pointed out. I recently stated, in an appeal from the Rwanda Tribunal, 
156that the very proper endorsement by the Security Council “in the strongest terms” 
of the Completion Strategy of the Yugoslav Tribunal should not be interpreted as an 
encouragement by the Security Council to the Tribunal to conduct its trials so that 
they would be other than fair trials. It is necessary to repeat that statement in the 
present case in order to apply it directly to the Majority Appeals Chamber Decision. 
                                                 
152
 Paragraph 17. Available at < http://69.94.11.53/default.htm> 
153
supra n.86 
154
 The appeal was on the application of Rule92bis (“Proof of Facts Other than by Oral 
Evidence”).Rule 92bis relates to admissibility of written statements of prospective witnesses prior to 
the witness giving evidence viva voce. The Appeals Chamber was asked to consider whether a written 
statement had to comply with the requirements set out in the Rule if the witness was present in court 
and was willing to attest to the written statement. The majority in the Appeals Chamber held that in 
such a case the requirements of Rule 92bis do not apply. Rule 92bis was meant to apply for 
admissibility of written statement in lieu of oral testimony. The separate opinion of Judge Mohammed 
Shahabuddeen disagreed with his fellow judge and asserted that the Completion Strategy was not 
mentioned in the decisions. However, although there was no outright reference to the Completion 
Strategy, the Chamber did discuss issues such as “economic management of trials”. Mundis, supra 
n.140, 161 
155
James UpcherPolitics, Justice and the ICTY  (Book Review) (2005) 10 Deakin L Rev 813  
156
 The Nyiramasuhuko et al Decision. supra n.125 
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That Decision unfortunately follows the trend of other recent decisions of the Appeals 
Chamber which reverse or ignore its previously carefully considered interpretations of 
the law or of the procedural rules, with a consequential destruction of the rights of the 
accused enshrined in the Tribunal‟s Statute and in customary international law. The 
only reasonable explanation for these decisions appears to be a desire to assist the 
prosecution to bring the Completion Strategy to a speedy conclusion.” 157 
 
The compromise of the fair trial rights of the accused by the Completion 
Strategy is a serious matter of concern that should be avoided. The Tribunals 
have a duty to ensure that the trial management or the Completion Strategy 
should not impinge the fairness of the trials and due process, invoking the 
maxim that “justice hurried is justice buried” with regrettable implications as to 
its credibility. 
 
1.6 FAIR TRIAL AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
The judges of the ICC would not be troubled with problematic questions 
involving fair trial standards like their colleagues at the International 
Tribunals. Article21of the Rome Statute allows the judges of the ICC a greater 
flexibility in applying legal principles to the proceedings before them.  
Besides the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Court is 
statutorily authorised to refer to international treaties, national law and 
decisions as long as these principles and decisions are not inconsistent with 
the Statute and with international law and internationally recognised norms 
and standards.158 
 
Applying this principle to the fair trial right, the ICC will have a wider 
jurisprudence for guidelines to their own approach to a complex fair trial 
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Dissenting Opinion of Judge David Hunt on the Admissibility of Evidence in Chief Oct 21 2003, 
Paragraph 20. Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/appeal/decision-e/031021.thm> 
158
 International human rights instruments do not offer guidance in the determination of the scope of the 
fair trial rights. It is the national legal systems that develop the rules and procedures to substantiate the 
international provisions.  Warbrick supra n.65, 46, 47 
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issue when considering Article 67.159  It would be of particular assistance 
when the Court has to decide on residual rights.  
 
Paragraph 1of Article 67, the chapeau provision contains an amalgam of 
norms contained in Article 14 (1)and (3)of theICCPR.160 
 
Article 67 repeats almost all of the content of Article 14 of the ICCPR.161 The 
provision has nine fair trial standards specified, the minimum guarantees that 
must be observed at the ICC. The provision of “fair hearing” in Article 67(1) 
allows the accused to go beyond the parameters of the Statute.162 The residual 
right to a fair hearing would be useful in filling in the lacuna in the more 
specific fair trial provisions.163 Breaches of Article 67specific rights may not, 
on their own, amount to a violation of the provision but a cumulative effect of 
minor or insignificant breaches may cause a breach of fair trial.164 
 
 
1.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The right to a fair trial is crucial to the due process of law. It is applicable to all 
proceedings, whether civil or criminal, whether at a national judicial forum or 
an international one. The difference lies in the variety of the standards applied 
and the degree of application of those standards in these forums. Special 
attention is required when applying the standards to international criminal 
courts and tribunals as these institutions exist in an incomplete legal 
environment. 
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 Article 67 provides several specific fair trial rights to the accused. It reflects the fair trial tenets of 
the International Tribunals. The fair trial rights are not absolute; they are subject to victims’ and 
witnesses’ rights. 
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 William A. Schabas : Article 67: Rights of the Accused in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court O.Triftterer (Ed) ( Baden-Baden; Nomos, 1999) 845. See also Kevin R 
Gray Evidence Before the ICC in McGoldrick et alsupra  n.15, 287, 301 
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 Schabas, ibid, 845. 
162
Ibid851 
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Ibid 852 
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Fair trial rights include rights which are minimum guarantees that are set out 
in the specific fair trial provisions, rights which are not minimum guarantees, 
which have not been set out in any provisions, but have been crystallised 
through judgements and rights which are neither specific nor crystallised but 
fall under the generic “residual” category. In certain cases, the breach of the 
fair trial rights may vitiate the fairness of a trial, whereas in others, it may not 
be of sufficient gravity to render the case unfair. The premise is that each case 
will be decided on its peculiar facts and circumstances when deciding that the 
trial of the accused was fair and ergo, the conviction safe. This is the general 
practice at national and regional courts as well as the Human Rights 
Committee.  
 
The obligations on the International Tribunals to conform with the ICCPR  
arise from more of an expectation rather than compulsory binding 
obligations, even though the Report of the Secretary-General  has stressed the 
importance of Article 14 in the context of international criminal proceedings 
at the Tribunals. Extending the premise of Article 14, a failure to meet any of 
these guarantees may breach the rights of the accused. The Protective Measures 
Decision was a setback to the notion that the International Tribunals had 
scrupulously observed at least the international provisions of the 
international and regional human rights instruments. However, the decisions 
of other Trial Chambers seem to have corrected the imbalance created by the 
majority decision.  The International Tribunals have reverted to the spirit of 
Article 21(4)(d) which was to ensure that an accused could  cross-examine 
witnesses against him. 
 
The Trial Chamber in the Decision on Preliminary Motions (“Kosovo”)165 in the 
case of the Prosecutor v Slobodan Milosevic, for example, referring to Article 
                                                 
165
Decision dated 8
th
 November 2001. 
Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/milosevic/trialc/decision/111087351829> 
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9(4) of the ICCPRwhich affords the accused the right to challenge the validity 
of his detention, incorporated it into the criminal proceedings before the 
Tribunals. 
 
The right of the accused to a fair trial at the International Tribunals faces two 
main difficulties. The first difficulty is the dichotomy between the fair trial 
rights of the accused and the rights of the victims and the accused. It is a 
difficult balancing act that the International Tribunals have to deal with but it 
cannot be refuted that the rights of witnesses and victims are important in a 
criminal trial of this nature. The Tribunals have taken genuine efforts to 
ensure the implementation of international human rights in their substantive 
and procedural laws166  but the controversy that arose from the Protective 
Measuresdecision was unsettling especially to the reputation of the ICTY as a 
prominent international criminal tribunal that is a fierce safeguard of the right 
of the accused to a fair trial.   
 
The International Tribunals must dispel any perceived impression that its 
proceedings in reality are more constricted than the Statute provides for and 
the expectations of the international community. Fair trial rights have been 
evolved since 1945 and should be improved on, not derogated from.  
 
As the Trial Chamber itself said in the Protective Measures Decision, 
 
The drafters of the Report recognised that ensuring that the proceedings before the 
International Tribunal were conducted in accordance with international standards of 
fair trial and due process was important not only to ensure respect for the individual 
rights of the accused but also to ensure legitimacy of the proceedings and set a 
standard for proceedings before other ad hoc tribunals or a permanent international 
criminal court of the future.167 
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 Sloan, supra n. 85, 501 
167
Decision supra n.111 Paragraph 156. 
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The Tribunals, and by extension, the International Criminal Court, could well 
be guided by the decisions of the European Court which have declared that 
the right to a fair trial has a prominent place in a democratic society within 
the European Convention 168  and that it should not be construed 
restrictively.169 The fair trial standards that the International Tribunals should 
apply should be as good as those applied at national proceedings. Otherwise 
the primacy of the International Tribunals over national courts would have 
served no purpose whatsoever when the practice of the Tribunals would not 
have measured up to the standards in national courts.  
 
Indeed, it appears that the ICTY has now adopted a more sensible and 
practical approach in identifying fair trial standards.  
 
The divergent approaches to the interpretation of fair trial rights as 
demonstrated by the Majority decision and the decision of Stephen J in the 
Tadic (Protective Measures)decision have been resolved in the decisions of 
the Trial Chamber in the Delalic and Kupreskic.  The Delalic decision is 
illuminating in particular, where the Trial Chamber said: 
 
“Similarly, decisions on the provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights ("ICCPR") and the European Convention on Human Rights 
("ECHR") have been found to be authoritative and applicable. This approach is 
consistent with the view of the Secretary-General that many of the provisions in the 
Statute are formulations based upon provisions found in existing international 
Instruments (See paragraph 17 of the Report).”170 
 
The approach of the ICTY as advocated in this case was to look at the practice 
of national courts and regional human rights as a starting-point in 
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interpreting international fair trial rights.171 This approach is commendable, 
as it indicates a pioneering international criminal court that is willing to be 
guided by established legal principles in regional and international 
jurisprudence in guaranteeing a very fundamental human right of an 
individual. Only then an international court can live up to the expectations 
and aspirations of being independent, a fundamental characteristic of a court.  
 
The opportunities for manipulation of the interpretation of the elements of 
fair trial against the interest of the defendants by unscrupulous, partial and 
dependent tribunals are obvious. The need for independent and impartial 
tribunals to conduct criminal trials and to assure the protection of fair trial 
standards is imperative. Given that the application of some of those standards 
during the course of a trial itself can be difficult to the point of impossibility, it 
is highly desirable that there be an effective and accessible appellate process. 
The superintendence of national laws and proceedings by international 
human rights bodies is a further guarantee that the minimum standards of 
human rights law have been complied with. Achieving independent and 
impartial tribunals is one of the most intractable of constitutional puzzles in 
international law but all the more necessary because, while all the 
international tribunals have an appellate process, none of their final decisions 
are subject to the jurisdiction of any international human rights body. 
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  In the main Judgement in the case of the Prosecutor v Kupreskic, Case No.IT-95-16-T, the Trial 
Chamber opined that  judicial decisions may prove to be of invaluable importance in determination of 
existing law. Paragraph 541. 
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CHAPTER 2 
____________________ 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY 
: AN OVERVIEW 
 
 
“The principles of impartiality and independence are the hallmarks of the rationale 
and legitimacy of the judicial function in every State. The concepts of the impartiality 
and independence of the judiciary postulate individual attributes as well as 
institutional conditions. These are not mere vague nebulous ideas but fairly precise 
concepts in municipal and international laws. Their absence leads to a denial of 
justice and makes the credibility of the judicial process dubious. It needs to be stressed 
that impartiality and independence of the judiciary is more a human right of the 
consumers of justice than a privilege of the judiciary for its own sake.” 
 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary and 
the Legal Profession 
6th February 19951 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The following Chapter is a prelude to the main Chapters relating to judicial 
independence and impartiality discussions in the following Chapters. It is 
intended to provide an overview of the whole umbrella of judicial 
independence and impartiality. It embarks on a general discussion of the 
formal standards of these two concepts.  Issues relating to the content of 
                                                 
1
Report of the Special Rapporteur on Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors, Assessors 
and the Independence of Lawyers dated 6
th
 of February 1995E/CN.4/1995/39, Paragraph 34.  
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judicial independence and impartiality and the relevant provisions in the 
international and regional human rights instruments are the primary focus of 
this Chapter. Restating the provisions may be superfluous if taken on their 
own, but there is a connection between what the law says in this Chapter and 
how it is applied in the following Chapters. A discourse is undertaken on the 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary as that is the most 
foremost of the United Nations instrument on independence and impartiality 
of the judiciary. There are questions to be asked about its status and 
enforceability in international law but it is argued that the Principles are 
restating general principles of law which are already contained in national 
laws and judgements, and as would be demonstrated, it is also a very 
significant United Nations instrument.2 References to the Principles in case-
law of the International Tribunals and in different declarations of various 
international and regional3 organisations may not necessarily give them the 
legal efficacy that an international treaty would have, but the importance of 
this instrument cannot be understated. The contents of the Basic Principles 
are fairly detailed which would assist members of the judiciary and the 
administrative authority in assessing the standards that exist in their own 
                                                 
2
 The creation of the position of the Special Rapporteur for the Rapporteur for the Independence of the 
Judiciary and the mechanisms to encourage States to incorporate the Principles in toto into national 
laws are two United Nations initiatives in this regard. 
3
 Such as the Cairo Declaration, the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary in the LAWASIA region and the Burgh House Principles on the Independence of the 
International Judiciary.  The Beijing Statement was adopted by the Sixth Conference of Chief Justices 
of Asia and the Pacific.  
Available at <http://wwwlaw.murdoch.edu.au/icjwa/beijst.htm>. There are 32 State signatures to the 
instrument in the Asia-Pacific region. LAWASIA is the acronym for Law Associations of Asia and the 
Pacific. It was founded in 1966 and is an influential association of law societies, bar councils and 
judiciaries.  It enjoys consultative status with Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The 
signatories to this instrument are heads of judiciaries of Member States who represent different and 
diverse legal systems such as the common law systems such as Malaysia and Australia and civil law 
systems such as Vietnam. The People’s Republic of China is also a party to the Beijing Statement. 
Mention should also be made of The Burgh House Principles, an innovative instrument formulated by 
the Study Group of the International Law Association on the Practice and Procedure of International 
Courts and Tribunals intended to apply to members of the international judiciary. The Study Group is 
made up of legal experts and commentators including judges from national, international and regional 
systems, leading academics, heads of national prosecution bodies and international lawyers from the 
United Nations and its agencies. The Burgh House Principles are 
available at <www.ucl.ac.uk/laws/cict/docs/burgh_final_21204.pdf.> 
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national systems.4 They could also come useful when assessing the standards 
applied at the international criminal court and tribunals. 
 
It must be stressed that the references to national practice are general and 
succinct, the purpose of which is to reiterate the argument that judicial 
independence and impartiality are principles that already exist in States. It is 
not within the scope of this thesis to investigate and critically analyse the 
defects and weaknesses of State practice 
 
 
2.2 GENERAL  
 
Amnesty International stated in its Fair Rights Manual: 
 
“A fundamental principle and prerequisite of fair trial is that the tribunal charged 
with the responsibility of making decisions in a case must be established by law, and 
must be competent, independent and impartial.”5 
 
The independent and impartiality standards are part of the fair trial rights of 
the accused as elaborated in the preceding Chapter. These standards apply to 
the panel6 of judges both as an institution and as individuals. There will 
bound to be a certain degree of overlap between these two standards as there 
is a close connection between the guarantees of “independence” and 
“impartiality”.7 However, each standard has to be observed in its own right as 
                                                 
4
 It has been argued that the Basic Principles, together with the other United Nations sponsored 
instruments on lawyers and prosecutors and “are today the acknowledged yardstick by which the 
international community measures that independence.” See P.Cumaraswamy, US Special Rapporteur 
on the Independence of the Judiciary  “The UN Basic Principles and the work of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers”, paper delivered to ICJ Conference on The 
Rule of Law in a Changing World, Cape Town, South Africa, 20-22 July, 1998 quoted in D.C. 
Prefontaine and J Lee The Rule of Law And the Independence of  the Judiciary 
 available at <http://www.icclr.law.ubc.ca/Publications/Reports/RuleofLaw.pdf> 
5
 Chapter 12.<http://www.amnesty.org/torture/resource/Thematic> . 
6
 “Panel” in this discussion refer to the coram of judges sitting to try criminal cases. The members of 
military tribunals, administrative tribunals and other judicial and quasi-judicial bodies fall outside the 
scope of this thesis.  
7
 Harris et al supra Chapter One, n. 17 234.  
68 
 
they have separate characteristics to them even if their aim is a common one 
in ensuring the protection of fair trial rights for the accused. 
 
 
2.3 THE STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
IMPARTIALITY 
 
The two United Nations texts as well as the European Convention8 contain 
provisions as guarantees of both the institutional framework of the character 
of the court as well as the individual judges who make up the court. Such 
guarantees are necessary to ensure the fair trial rights of the accused. It is not 
enough that the accused should have a fair trial; that fair trial must be 
guaranteed by an independent and impartial tribunal. It could be argued that 
the observation of these guarantees of independence and impartiality is 
necessary to ensure that the other fair trial standards are protected. 
The character of the court would have an effect on the fairness of a trial if its 
quality is impaired in any manner, whether direct or indirect. One example of 
this situation would be where a breach of the fair trial rights of the accused 
has occurred, such as the right to be informed of the charge against him in a 
language he could understand, and that breach is not corrected by the court 
as it is not independent of the prosecuting authority or the State. A tribunal 
that is not independent of the Executive will not be able to show that it was 
impartial in matters where the Executive is a party. An individual member of 
the tribunal will not be independent or impartial if there is a connection with 
him and a party to the case that he is adjudicating.9 
 
                                                 
8
 Neither the ACHR nor the AfCHR contain any provision that entitles the accused to have his case 
heard by an independent and impartial judiciary. There is a qualification on the ACHR but other than 
that, there is no reference to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. See Harris, supra 
Prologue, n.47 354. However, the Arab Region has had two instruments in the form of Declarations on 
judicial independence. The Beirut Declaration of Independence of 1999 and the Cairo Declaration of 
Justice of 2003have extensive articles on aspects of judicial independence.Supra Prologue, n.45. 
9
 Harris et al supra Chapter One n.17, 234 
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Although the concepts of judicial independence and impartiality are distinct 
and separate, infringement of one concept could negate the due process 
principle even if the other remains intact. The difference between the two was 
stated thus: 
 
“The often fine distinction between independence and impartiality turns mainly, it 
seems, on that between the status of the tribunal determinable largely by objective 
tests and the subjective attitudes of its members, lay or legal. Independence is 
primarily freedom from control by, or subordination to, the executive power 
in the State; impartiality is rather absence in the members of the tribunal of 
personal interest in the issues to be determined by it, or some form of 
prejudice.”10(emphasis added) 
 
However, it may be that the consequences of the breach of the characteristics 
of judicial independence and impartiality will not be grave enough to vitiate 
the trial or render the conviction unsafe.  The approach is similar to the 
general approach to fair trials. When deciding whether the trial was an unfair 
as a result of a lack of independence or impartiality on the part of the court, 
the proceedings of a trial should be gauged in entirety. The two issues of fair 
trial and the character of court are thus intertwined.  The court might have 
ensured that the minimum guarantees of a fair trial were protected, and 
indeed proffered additional safeguards to the accused. But the conviction 
could be set aside if it was discovered that the court as a whole or the 
members as individuals were not independent or impartial and that lack of 
independence, impartiality or both was of sufficient gravity so as to vitiate the 
fairness of the trial. National, regional and international courts have devised 
legal tests on independence and impartiality, which have provided guidelines 
in assessing whether a trial has been fair.  
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 J.E.S Fawcett The Application of the European Convention Of Human Rights (Oxford;Clarendon 
Press, 1987) 156 
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The concepts of judicial independence and impartiality are both abstract and 
complex. They have not been spelt out in the human right treaties11 although 
they are included in many principles, declarations, reports and guidelines, 
both at international, regional and at national levels. Although there are no 
legally-binding instruments specifically on these issues, the United Nations 
and various international non-governmental bodies have formulated 
principles and guidelines that are aimed at States and their organs. The 
initiative of the United Nations on the two postulates of judicial 
independence and impartiality, in particular, serves as a directive to Member 
States to take into account the principles formulated. Most national legal 
systems provide guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality but the 
content of those standards and the manner in which they are guaranteed may 
vary from State to State. An exact definition of the principles and the 
parameters of the scope of their application may be difficult as they may vary 
within the diverse legal systems based on different cultures that exist. 
Differences might arise between national practice and the standards provided 
for in the United Nations instrument.12 Even a detailed binding human rights 
instrument, whether international or regional, may not cover all and every 
aspect and content of this pluralism. The standards in principles should 
therefore be regarded as minimum standards which the States must attain. 
Much also depends on the binding effect of those United Nations and 
regional instruments. 
 
Another problematic issue regarding the identification of specific 
internationally-recognised and accepted standards is the attitude of States to 
such standards. States may object to such standards being used as yardstick 
                                                 
11
 The concepts have been developed through jurisprudence of the adjudicating organs and monitoring 
bodies authorised by those instruments. E.g. the Human Rights Committee hears complaints on 
breaches of the provisions of ICCPR. 
12
 There may be differences between actual national practice and the jurisprudence of regional courts 
and the Human Rights Committee. 
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by which their standards are measured against as they may not wish to admit 
their standards are lacking.13 
 
Two major steps taken by the United Nations are of particular relevance to 
this study. One was the drafting and the adoption of the Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary and the other was the creation of the 
position of the Special Rapporteur for the Independence of the Judiciary and 
Lawyers.  
 
 
2.4 ASPECTS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND 
IMPARTIALITY 
 
Judicial independence is a traditional constitutional value. It connotes not 
merely a state of mind or attitude in the actual exercise of judicial functions 
but also in the traditional legal system, a status or relationship with other 
organs of the Government and of the parties. Independence rests on objective 
conditions or guarantees and may be examined in two different contexts – 
with regards to a specific case, or with regards to the overall institutional 
structure of the tribunal. The state of mind aspect relates to individual 
independence, which could overlap with judicial impartiality since that 
concept also involves the state of mind. The objective guarantees of personal 
independence of a judge include matters such as manner of appointment, 
duration of his term in office and the existence of guarantees against outside 
pressures. 
 
Impartiality indicates a lack of prejudice or bias. In order to satisfy that 
requirement, the tribunal must comply with a test that has both objective and 
subjective aspects to it. The subjective test applies to the personal convictions 
                                                 
13
 See generally Giovanni E.Longo The Human Right to an Independent Judiciary: International 
Norms and Denied Application Before A Domestic Jurisdiction (1996) 70 St. John L. Rev 111 on the 
problems faced in the process of adopting the Basic Principles. 
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of the judge whereas the objective test relates to the overall issue of whether 
the judge has given sufficient guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate 
doubt in this context. The subjective test has a high threshold to achieve as it 
has to be shown that the judge showed actual bias. Cases where breaches of 
the subjective test were proved are rare.14 All that needs to be shown for the 
objective guarantee is that there is a “legitimate doubt”. The standard of 
proving this element is obviously less burdensome than proving actual bias. 
The objective test is best summed up with the legal doctrine that justice must 
not only be done but seen to be done. 
 
The objective test will be particularly relevant in international proceedings 
where a judge had taken part in various international activities prior to his 
appointment. It is for the judge to offer objective guarantees as to his 
impartiality. This issue came up for discussion at the ICTY when the 
impartiality and consequently, the independence of certain judges were 
challenged due to their activities prior to their appointments to the Tribunal.15 
 
These aspects of independence and impartiality are dealt with in detail in the 
chapters on judicial independence and impartiality respectively. 
 
 
2.5 THE BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
JUDICIARY 16(“the Basic Principles”) 
 
Recognising the importance of the role and the power of judges and the 
failure in upholding judicial impartiality and independence by some States at 
national level, the United Nations formulated a set of provisions on judicial 
independence and impartiality in a document called the Basic Principles on 
                                                 
14
 Harris et al supra Chapter One, n.17, 234, 235 
15
The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija infra n.21 
16
 UN Doc A/CONF 121/22/Rev.1 at 59(1983). Annexed herewith. 
available at <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp50.htm> 
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the Independence of the Judiciary. The content of these provisions is in greater 
detail than the general and rather abstract reference to judicial independence 
and impartiality contained in the UDHRand the ICCPR. The Basic Principles 
were adopted unanimously by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the 
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (“the Congress”)and 
subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly through two 
Resolutions. 17 Resolution 40/146in particular “invites Governments to respect 
them (the Principles) and to take them into account within the framework of their 
national legislation and practice” 18  Thus the functional significance of these 
principles is to offer guidance to Member States in respecting and maintaining 
national standards of judicial independence and impartiality and ensuring 
that they are in conformity with the international standards.  
 
The Basic Principles were endorsed twice, unanimously and without debate. 
On paper, it appears that the lack of debate or dispute reflected a unanimous 
acceptance of the Principles and that such was the legitimacy of these 
Principles that they needed no debate, comparable to the status of the fair trial 
right in the Nuremberg Principles.19 However, events revealed that the Basic 
Principles were resisted and the final result was a watered down version of 
the original proposal.20 
 
The task of formulating the Basic Principles was entrusted to the U.N. 
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control by the Sixth United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders. 21 
Originally 100 articles were drafted. These were then reduced to forty-four 
                                                 
17
 Resolution 40/32 of 29
th
 November 1985: A/Res/40/32 and Resolution 40/146 of 13
th
 December 
1985: A/Res/40/146: see <http://www.un.org/Depts/dhl/res/resa40.htm>. (Annexedherewith). The 
Basic Principles were drafted and presented for adoption by the Committee on Crime Prevention and 
Control. 
18
 http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r146.htm 
19
 Prologue n.2 
20
 Longo, supra n.11 
21
Ibid 113-114 
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articles as delegates raised objections to them.22 Finally the forty-four articles 
were reduced to a mere 20.23 
 
It would be convenient to write off the Basic Principlesas idealistic norms 
which States sign up to earnestly but have no intention of conforming to them 
or making half-hearted attempts to incorporate them into their national legal 
systems. However, the United Nations has taken steps to show that it is 
serious about implementing them. In 1989, the General Assembly approved 
certain implementation mechanisms of the Basic Principles. The Secretary-
General was duty-bound to compile a report every five years which would 
monitor whether the Principlesare observed by Member States.24 Secondly, 
the General Assembly passed the Implementation of the United Nations 
Standards to Norms in Criminal Justice where the United Nations is authorised 
to assist States to incorporate United Nations instruments, including the Basic 
Principles into the national legal systems.25 
 
There are two modes of approach to the Basic Principles. First, that it is a 
United Nations instrument which does not carry much weight. Regardless of 
the intentions of the United Nations and any effort taken by the organs to 
implement them, the Basic Principles do not have binding effect on Member 
States. The second approach would be to examine the Basic Principles as 
general principles of law as recognised by civilised nations. 
 
Unlike domestic jurisdictions, it is rather challenging to trace a particular law 
in the international arena since there is no Government or a similar structure 
of a domestic system. In order to ensure whether the Basic Principleshas 
binding legal effect, it is important to determine its legal status. This 
                                                 
22
Ibid.  The author, a judge from Italy, was a member of the Committee that was involved in the 
drafting of the Principles. Delegates at the Congress meeting in Milan were either indifferent or 
objected strenuously to the articles as “long-winded”. op cit 114. 
23
Ibid. 
24
Ibid 116. Those Reports are now made annually by the Special Rapporteur. 
25
Ibid n.20. 
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determination can be made through reference to Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
the International Court of Justice which has been hailed as being “widely-
recognised as the most authoritative statement as to the sources of international 
law.”26 
 
Article 38(1)is a provision that deals with sources of international law 
generally. It states that the International Court of Justice shall apply various 
sources of law to the disputes that is before it, including 
(a)..... 
(b)...... 
(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilised nations.27 
 
Identifying a general principle of international law recognised by civilised 
nations is an inductive process by which legal principles and norms are 
gleaned from domestic systems.28 It is this method that is being adopted in 
this Chapter. 
 
Contents of judicial independence and impartiality provided for in the 
Constitutions29 or legislation or case-law of many States are usually rather 
detailed. 30  It needs to be emphasised that the standards of these two 
postulates are not necessarily the same from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For 
example, elements of judicial independence such as security of tenure may be 
different from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Some States may fix retirement age 
of judges at 65, whereas some may fix it at 70 and yet others would fix life 
tenureship. Certainly the qualifications requirement for a candidate to be 
                                                 
26
 Shaw supra Chapter One, n.39 
27
 See <http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II> 
28
 Bassiouni supra Chapter One n.6 234. 
29
 Bassiouni identifies fifty-four national constitutions that provide for an independent judiciary. 
Bassiouni ibid 271 
30
 The purpose of this survey is to show that States provide for standards of judicial independence and 
impartiality. These are theoretical assumptions and the reality may not be what exactly is contemplated 
in the legal documents.  
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appointed to judicial office will vary.31 However, it is submitted that whilst 
the details of such standards may vary, the basic premise is the same which is 
to provide safeguards for the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.  
 
It is argued that the Basic Principles is an international instrument that 
reflects widely-enacted and applied legal principles in national legal system.  
A survey of State law and practice, as well as the existence of national judicial 
decisions shows that the embodiment of much that is propounded by the 
Basic Principles originates from national legal systems.32 The following is a 
sample of an exposition of State practice on the core issues relating to judicial 
independence and impartiality.33 
 
 
2.6 VALENTE v THE QUEEN34AND STATE PRACTICE ON JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE. 
 
The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the Commonwealth 
jurisprudence is very instructive in discussing the issue of judicial 
independence. It would be helpful to discuss its judgement as a starting point 
of reference. This case involved a constitutional issue on the interpretation of 
S. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms.35 
 
                                                 
31
 For a study on various State practice in the appointment of the judiciary and the problems arising 
therein, see Appointing Judges in an Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the 
World Kate Malleson and Peter H. Russell (eds) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press; 2006). 
32
 See the Report of the Special Rapporteur on Independence and Impartiality of the Judiciary, Jurors, 
Assessors and the Independence of Lawyers dated 6
th
 of February 1995E/CN.4/1995/39. Paragraph 34 
of the Report refers to an earlier report (the “Singhvi Report”) whereby it was averred that “Historical 
analysis and contemporary profiles of the judicial functions and machinery of justice shows worldwide 
recognition of the role of the judiciary.” 
33
 For detailed case study of national decisions relating to judicial impartiality, refer to Chapter Four of 
this thesis. 
34
 (1985) 2 S.C.R 673. Available at <http://csc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1985/1985rcs2-673/1985rcs2-
673.pdf> 
35
 Section 11 insofar as relevant provides that “ Any person charged with an offence has the right to be 
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent 
and impartial tribunal.”. 
Accessible at <http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/charter_digest/s-11-d.html> 
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The Supreme Court, whilst discussing the issue of judicial independence 
stated in its judgement: 
“The test for independence for purposes of s. 11(d) of the Charter should be, as for 
impartiality, whether the tribunal may be reasonably perceived as independent. This 
perception must be a perception of whether the tribunal enjoys the essential objective 
conditions or guarantees of judicial independence and not a perception of how it 
will in fact act regardless of whether it enjoys such conditions or guarantees.” 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court identified the first essential condition of judicial independence. This 
was  
“Security of tenure, because of the importance traditionally attached to it, is the first of 
the essential conditions of judicial independence for purposes of s. 11(d) of the Charter. 
The essentials of such security are that a judge be removable only for cause, and that 
cause be subject to independent review and determination by a process at which the 
judge affected is afforded a full opportunity to be heard. The essence of security of tenure 
for purposes of s. 11(d) is a tenure, whether until an age of retirement, for a fixed term, 
or for a specific adjudicative task, that is secure against interference by the Executive or 
other appointing authority in a discretionary or arbitrary manner.”36 
Therefore security of tenure includes removal of judges in exceptional cases and 
that such removal should be subject to review. Such removal can only be done 
after the judge is given an opportunity to be heard – the audi alteram partem rule. 
Interestingly, security of tenure, according to the judgement applies not only to 
permanent judges but also judges appointed on an ad hoc basis. This, it is 
submitted, is the correct interpretation of security of tenure as a judge should be 
able to carry out his duties independently, regardless of the period of his 
appointment. 
 
                                                 
36
 Judgement, supra n.34, per Le Dain J at Paragraph 31. 
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The next guarantee of judicial independence is as follows: 
“The second essential condition of judicial independence for purposes of s. 11(d) of the 
Charter is, in my opinion, what may be referred to as financial security. That means 
security of salary or other remuneration, and, where appropriate, security of pension. 
The essence of such security is that the right to salary and pension should be established 
by law and not be subject to arbitrary interference by the Executive in a manner that 
could affect judicial independence. In the case of pension, the essential distinction is 
between a right to a pension and a pension that depends on the grace or favour of the 
Executive.”37 
Finally, the third condition of judicial independence is that of financial 
security. On this issue the court said as follows: 
“The third essential condition of judicial independence for purposes of s. 11(d) is in my 
opinion the institutional independence of the tribunal with respect to matters of 
administration bearing directly on the exercise of its judicial function.”38 
The three core characteristics should exist before judicial independence can be 
ascertained. States do provide for these characteristics as can be seen below. 
 
2.6.1. The United Kingdom  
 
 The Act of Settlement of 1701 is the oldest piece of legislation that provided 
for the security of tenure and financial security of judges.39 
 
Appointments of judges were shrouded in secrecy and posed a problem for 
many commentators who preferred a transparent process.40  However, the 
United Kingdom now enjoys several pieces of legislation which cover judicial 
                                                 
37
Judgment supra n.29 40 
38
Ibid Paragraph 47 
39
 US v Will 449 US 200 (1980). See the Appeals Chamber in the (Lack of Jurisdiction) Judgment  in 
the Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman SCSL NO: 2004-14-PT-034-I       Paragraph 15. 
40
 See Bohlander The International Criminal Judiciary Chapter One, n.17, 358. 
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independence. The Constitutional Reform Act of 2005,41 and the Tribunals, 
Courts and Enforcement Act 200742 read together, deal with qualifications, 
appointments and security of tenure of the judges in the United Kingdom, 
matters relating to the office of the judge. 
 
A series of decisions relating to judicial impartiality has established the rule 
against bias. The Basic Principle on bias in this regard is similar to the law in 
the United Kingdom.43 
 
2.6.2. Federal Republic of Germany44 
 
In Germany, the principle of judicial independence is set down in its 
Constitution,45 the Grundgestetz, as well as the constitution of the different 
States. There are different pieces of legislation that covers judicial 
independence in Germany. One of these is the Judiciary Actwhich covers 
various issues such as independence of the judiciary, qualifications, security 
of tenure, incompatible duties between the office of the judge and his extra-
judicial activities relating to federal judges.46 There are machinations for the 
judges to lodge complaints if there is threat to their independence by the 
Executive or any other party.47 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41
<http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=1974190>  Bohlander ibid 360. 
42
<http://www.statutelaw.gov.uk/content.aspx?activeTextDocId=3388262> 
43
 National decisions on judicial impartiality are discussed in Chapter 4. 
44
 Peter Schlosser and Walther Habscheid  Federal Republic of Germany in S. Shetreet and J. 
Deschenes: Judicial Independence: The Contemporary Debate , 78. On appointments, see Christine 
Landfried The Selection Process of Constitutional Court Judges in Germany in Malleson and Russell 
(Eds) supra n.31, 196 
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 Matters relating to security of tenure, transfer and independence of the judges are provided for in the 
Constitution. Articles 92,97. See also German Judges Law 1961,  Schlosser and Walther Habscheid, 
supra n.23, 79 
46
 Michael Bohlander and Christian Latour The German Judiciary in the Nineties: A study of the 
recruitment, promotion and remuneration of judges in Germany (Aachen: Shaker Verlag: 1998) 23,24 
47
 Schlosser and Walther Habscheid, ,supra n.43 
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2.6.3. Canada  
 
Judicial independence in Canada is provided for in its Constitution, namely 
Sections 96 to 100 of the Constitution Act, 1867. These provisions provide for 
matters such as appointment and security of tenure of judges. Valente v 
Queen is the leading authority for the need to ensure judicial independence 
and the standards required to secure such independence. The Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms48guarantee judicial independence as set out 
in its Section 11, discussed above. 
 
Section 101provides for the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court, 
Federal Court and Tax Court. Provincial court judges are appointed pursuant 
Section 92. 49 
 
 
2.6.4. India 
 
The Constitution of India provides for the independence of the judiciary from 
the other two arms of the Government. 50 Article 124 provides for the 
appointment of the judges, security of tenure and removal of judges.51Article 
125 and the Supreme Court Judges (Conditions of Service) Act 1958 provide 
for the financial security of the judges by providing that salaries of judges 
should only be reviewed upwards and not “downwards”.52 
 
 
                                                 
48
 The Charter is annexed as Schedule B to the Constitution Act 1980. See Prefontaine &Lee, supra n. 
2 
49
 For a general discussion on judicial appointments in Canada see Judicial Appointments in Post-
Charter Canada: A System in Transition  in Malleson and Russell (eds) supra n.31, 56, 57-58 
50
 Article 50. See also decision of the Indian Supreme Court in S.C. Advocates-on-Record v Union of 
India A.I.R 1994 S.C.268. M.P.Singh Securing the Independence of the Indian Judiciary  (1999-2000) 
10 Indian Int’l L & Comp Rev 252 
51
Ibid 252 
52
 Article 360 of the Constitution however states that the salaries of judges may be reduced in times of 
financial emergency. Ibid 253 
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2.6.5. United States 
Article 111 of the US Constitution sets out judicial independence and security 
of tenure for the federal judges of the country. It further provides that the 
salaries of judges shall not be reduced. The Constitution also provides for the 
removal of judges.  
Matters relating to ethics, discipline and code of conduct for judges are 
contained in Code of Conduct that federal and state judges should adhere to. 
Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for federal judges, for example, thrusts the 
duty to "uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary" on the 
judges. The importance of judicial independence is emphasised in the Code of 
Conduct which states that "[a]n independent and honorable judiciary is 
indispensable to justice in our society."53 
The Code of Conduct controls and restrains the conduct of judges, including 
prohibiting them from deciding a case in which the judge has a personal 
interest. The Code of Conduct recognizes the importance of perceptions of the 
judiciary which should not be clouded by apprehension of bias. 
 
 
2.6.6 South Africa54 
 
The independence and impartiality of the judiciary in South Africa is 
protected by Section 165 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 
108 of 1998. Section 174 deals with the appointment and qualifications of 
judges, such appointments, promotions, transfers and dismissals to be made 
“without favour or prejudice.”55 
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 Sandra Day O’Connor, supra Chapter One n.78 
54
 Gretchen Carpenter Without fear or favour: Ensuring the independence and credibility of the” 
weakest and least dangerous branch of Government” (2005) SALJ 499, 500. 
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 Carpenter, supra n.54, 501. 
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2.6.7 Malaysia 
 
Articles 121 to 131A of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia cover the 
Judiciary. The Articles cover matters such as appointment of judges, transfer, 
qualifications, tenure of office, remuneration and other matters relating to the 
personal independence of the judiciary. The Constitution also includes Code 
of Ethics for the judges. 
 
 
2.6.8 The International Tribunals 
 
It is pertinent to discuss the practice at the International Tribunals and courts 
regarding judicial independence and impartiality. The Basic Principles have 
been specifically referred to in judgements but what is of interest for this 
particular research is the application of the concepts at the proceedings before 
them.  
 
In the case of Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza v the Prosecutor, the International 
Tribunal recognised that as a judicial organ, its independence is paramount. 
Judge Nieto-Navia said: 
 
“The concept of "the separation of powers" plays a central role in national 
jurisdictions. This concept ensures that a clear division is maintained between the 
functions of the legislature, judiciary and executive and provides that "one branch is 
not permitted to encroach on the domain or exercise the powers of another branch". It 
ensures that the judiciary maintains a role apart from political considerations and 
safeguards its independence.”56 
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 Paragraph 9. Declaration of Judge Nieto-Navia dated 31
st
 March 2000.See Decision (Prosecutor’s 
Request for Review or Reconsideration) in The Prosecutor v Jean Bosco Barayagwiza. Available at < 
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Judge Shahabuddeen added in his Declaration; 
 
...the Security Council chose a judicial method in preference to other possible methods. 
The choice recalls the General Assembly‟s support for the 1985 Milan Resolution on 
Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, paragraph 2 of which reads: 
"The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and 
in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, 
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter 
or for any reason". 57 
 
The provisions of the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR make it imperative 
that the accused shall be tried by an independent tribunal. 58   The Basic 
Principles do nothing more than reinforce these statutory requirements and 
add details to the bare provisions. 
 
 
2.6.8.a  Sierra Leone 
 
The Special Court in The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman was asked to 
consider the issue of judicial independence and impartiality vis-a-vis the 
independence of the Special Court. 59  In the course of its judgement, the 
Appeals Chamber traced the concept of judicial independence to the 
Constitution of the Sierra Leone. Sections 138(1) and 138(3) guarantee judicial 
remuneration of the judges of Sierra Leone60 whereas Sections 135,136 and 
137 are safeguards for their appointment and tenure.61 
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Ibid.  Separate Opinion of Judge Mohammed Shahabuddeen, Paragraph 72. 
58
 Articles 20 and 21 of the Statute of the ICTR and ICTY respectively. See the following Chapters. 
59
supra n.39 
60
Ibid Paragraph 26. 
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 An issue arising out of this proceedings that may be of interest is whether the rulings and judgements 
of the hybrid courts on judicial independence and impartiality will also be applicable and binding to 
those members of the judiciary  who are national judges, such as Sierra Leone. 
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2.6.8.b  Kosovo 
 
Pillar 1 of UNMIK is responsible for “police” and “judiciary”62in Kosovo. 
UNMIK Regulation 2000/5963 imposed a duty on any person holding public 
office or undertaking public duties to observe the internationally recognised 
human rights standards which are provided for, inter alia by the UDHR, 
ICCPR and European Convention. These standards therefore include the right 
to be heard by an independent an impartial judiciary. 
 
2.6.8.c  Cambodia 
 
Article 128 of the Constitution of Cambodia states that the judiciary shall be 
independent and is entrusted to guarantee and uphold impartiality and protect the 
rights and freedoms of citizens”.64 
 
What is remarkable about the Cambodia situation is that the United Nations 
Transnational Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) Code has incorporated the 
Basic Principles into domestic law of Cambodia.65 Thus that which has been 
touted as a non-binding instrument has now gained binding status under 
national law.66 
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 There are four pillars that comprise the UNMIK. Besides Pillar I, Pillar II is in charge of Civil 
Administration, Pillar III is in charge of Democratization and Institution Building and finally Pillar IV 
is in charge of Reconstruction and Economic Development. For an overview of the collapse of the 
judicial system in Kosovo and its subsequent reconstruction see Hansjorg Strohmeyer Collapse and 
Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor (2001) 95 
AJIL 46, Gylbehare Murati  The Independence of the Judiciary and Its Role in the Protection of 
Human Rights under UN Administration Using the case of Kosovo European Society of International 
Law, ESIL , available on : http://www.esil-sedi.org/english/papers.html  
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 Suzannah Linton Safeguarding the Independence and Impartiality of the Cambodian Extraordinary 
Chambers (2006) 4 JCIJ 327, 328, 329. 
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The position of the Basic Principles in international law could therefore be 
construed as general principle of law recognised by civilised nations67 and may be 
acknowledged as a source of international law under Article 38(1) of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice. This finding is based on the 
number of domestic laws and judicial decisions as well as a combination of 
both that have been promulgated and issued. The declarations of the concepts 
in this manner have demonstrated the existence of a general principle of law.  
 
The Special Rapporteur had concluded that the “... principles of judicial 
independence and impartiality are reflected in the legal systems of the world by 
constitutional and legislative means supported by an overwhelming practice”. 68 
However, the contents of the standards that maintain judicial independence, 
such as financial security, security of tenure, administrative independence 
may vary from State to State and from the content of the Principles 
themselves. It is argued, that even so, following a helpful dictum of Lord 
McNair in a decision of the International Court of Justice, that Basic 
Principles are accepted general principles of law in any event.69 
 
“ ........it is not the concrete manifestation of the principle in different national 
systems--which are anyhow likely to vary--but the general concept of law underlying 
them that the international judge is entitled to apply under paragraph (c)."  70 
                                                 
67
 This view is confirmed by the Special Rapporteur for the Independence and Impartiality of the 
Judiciary, Jurors and the Independence of Lawyers who “asserts the underlying concepts of judicial 
independence and impartiality are general principles of law recognised by civilised nations in the sense 
of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice”. See Report, supra n.20 
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Insofar as the International Tribunals are concerned, the Declaration of Judge 
Rafael Nieto-Navia is of interest: 
 
……I note the importance accorded to the principle [of judicial independence] by 
the United Nations, in appointing a Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers and by the General Assembly, in the promulgation of the 1985 
UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary. The Principles as a whole 
are of utmost importance…71 
 
That declaration was in reference to the implication in the Prosecutor‟s 
submissions that the cooperation of the Government of Rwanda is important 
to ensure that the ICTR functions and continues to operate as judicial organ.72 
 
Judge Nieto-Navia said in connection with the Basic Principles: 
"1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and enshrined 
in the Constitution or the laws of the country. It is the duty of all government and 
other institutions to respect and observe the independence of the judiciary; 
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before it impartially, on the basis of facts and in 
accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper influences, inducements, 
pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any 
reason."73 
 The judgment of the Appeals Chamber recognised the application of the 
Basic Principles to its proceedings and jurisprudence. It is reiterated that the 
Basic Principles are not creating anything new or remarkable. It is merely 
reiterating what many national courts practice and in certain cases, 
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elaborating and clarifying in detail certain principles of independence and 
impartiality. 
Another approach to State practice vis-a-vis Article 38(1) of the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice is to have regard to decisions of the 
international and regional human rights monitoring bodies. Thus, a member 
State who falls under the jurisdiction of the European Court would be 
compelled to comply with decisions of the court such as Belilos v 
Switzerland74(on judicial independence)and a Member State to the ICCPR 
should adhere to the decisions of the Human Rights Committee such as 
Gonzalez del Rio v Peru.75 
 
The Basic Principles contain minimum standards of judicial independence and 
impartiality. 76  National legal systems are expected to conform to the 
minimum standards.77 The Principles are comprehensive and there will be 
bound to be situations in which national practice does not live up to the 
standards of the Basic Principles. 78  The dilemma arises where national 
systems do not provide for the minimum standards contained in the Basic 
Principles. The issue is whether the States consider themselves bound by the 
Basic Principles or at least give cognisance to that instrument by either 
ensuring that their national legal practice achieves the standards set by the 
Basic Principles or by incorporating them into national legislation or practice. 
Although it is not as significant as the UDHR or the ICCPR, Member States 
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should give importance to the Basic Principles since it is the expression of the 
intention of the international community.79Also, the adoption of the Basic 
Principles into the national systems would provide a comprehensive set of 
standards as they are fairly detailed and cover a wide-ranging of issues as 
stated above. The Principles are considered influential in practice as they 
have been adopted by the Special Rapporteur as the main point of reference 
source in carrying out his duties and responsibilities under the mandate 
granted to him.80 It is argued that the incorporation of Basic Principles into 
both national law and international law as practised at the international 
criminal court and tribunals would ensure the details of adherence to the 
principles of judicial independence and impartiality. At present, the 
principles of law in State practice and State Constitutions relating to these 
postulates are embodied in substance rather than details. 
 
 
2.7 SUMMARY OF THE BASIC PRINCIPLES 
 
An overall picture of the provisions of the Principles and a mention in brief of 
their contents and scope of application is necessary for completeness of this 
study. 
 
The relevant principles can best be summed up in this particular manner.   
Principles 1-7 cover the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.  
Principle 1 ascribes a positive duty on States to guarantee judicial 
independence through taking necessary measures through Constitutions or 
                                                 
79
 The Special Rapporteur’s duties include examining State practice and addressing various complaints 
by individuals, agencies and non-governmental organisations.  The Special Rapporteur’s work has 
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legislation. The duty to respect and observe judicial independence is not 
limited to Governments alone. It is also expected of other institutions. This 
would include national judiciaries themselves who are expected to ensure 
that their independence is not compromised.  
 
Principle 2is of wide application. This Principle is aimed at national 
judiciaries and individual judges in particular. Basically it requires that judges 
be free to decide matters before them impartially, without being adversely 
affected by any extraneous factors that may influence their judgements. The 
range of those factors is very wide and includes improper influences, 
inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or indirect from any 
quarter and for any reason. The Principle recognises the possibility that a 
threat or influence that may affect the impartiality of a judge may come from 
a party other than the State. Principle 3 bestows the judiciary the sole 
competence to decide on its jurisdiction. This would mean that States are not 
entitled to prevent a judicial organ from validly exercising its jurisdiction.  
 
Principle 4 extends the application of Principle 2 to prevent any inappropriate 
and unwarranted interference with the judicial process, including revision of 
those decisions by non-judicial parties. Principle 5 obligates the courts to use 
established trial procedures.  
 
Principle 6 embodies the spirit of the right of fair trial. It states that the 
purpose of the principle of independence of judiciary is to ensure that the 
rights of the parties are respected and that the trial is fair. Principle 7 requires 
Member States to provide adequate resources, which would include financing 
and qualified personnel to ensure that the judiciary would be able to perform 
its duties properly. 
 
Principles 8and9 encompass certain freedoms to which judges are entitled. 
Principle 8 is relevant insofar as it caters for situations where the 
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independence and impartiality of judges may be affected by their extrajudicial 
activities. Whilst judges have a right to the various freedoms of expression, 
association, belief and assembly, they must ensure that these freedoms do not 
adversely affect the dignity of their office. 
 
Principle 10 deals with aspects of qualifications, selection and training of 
judges. It calls for a careful mode for selection of judges, without improper 
motives.  It emphasises that not only the candidates for judicial offices have 
the integrity but they should also have appropriate training and qualifications 
in law. This Principle aims to ensure that the mode of selection and 
appointment of judges are not vulnerable to criticisms on judicial 
independence.  
 
Principles 11-14 on the other hand cover conditions of service and tenure.  As 
will be discussed below, these are core elements that guarantee judicial 
independence. They are personal to the office of the judge and have an effect 
on both the individual and personal aspects of judicial independence.  Finally, 
Principles 17 to 20 encompass the discipline, removal and suspension of 
judges. They provide that procedural guarantees must be in place for the fair 
and expeditious investigation and that they have the right to a fair hearing. 
Judges can be suspended or removed only based on grounds of incapacity 
and “behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties” (Principle 18) 
 
In sum, the Basic Principles is a useful international instrument. It reflects 
State practice generally and contains principles of law that are common to 
many national jurisdictions. Reference to this instrument is relevant when 
measuring existing standards of practice. 
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2.8 THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR FOR THE INDEPENDENCE 
OF THE JUDICIARY AND LAWYERS 
 
An important step taken by the United Nations in relation to the judiciary 
was the creation of the position of the Special Rapporteur for the 
Independence of the Judiciary and Lawyers. This step was seen as a 
mechanism of monitoring the implementation of the Basic Principles81as well 
as investigating complaints at the national level on breaches of the Principles. 
The Special Rapporteur for this area joins the list of other Special Rapporteurs 
appointed by the United Nations as a monitoring mechanism whose 
mandates focus on the examination of various areas of human rights 
identified by the then-Commission of Human Rights. They are part of what is 
known as thematic mechanisms of the United Nations. They are usually 
appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and are 
mandated to look into various human rights violations. Their mandates are 
decided by the Commission.82 The Special Rapporteurs make findings on 
their allocated themes and present annual reports to the General Assembly. 
 
The position of the Special Rapporteur for Independence of the Judiciary 
was created by the Commission on Human Rights in 1994. In Resolution 
1994/41 dated 4th March 1994, the Commission voiced its concerns on “the 
increasing frequency of attacks on the independence of judges, lawyers and court 
officials”.83 It also observed that there was a link between what it perceived to 
be “the weakening of safeguards for the judiciary and lawyers” and the gravity and 
frequency of violations of human rights.84 The Commission requested the 
Chairman to appoint a Special Rapporteur for the purposes of looking into 
the question of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary, and the 
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nature of the problems that would be liable to affect their independence and 
impartiality. At its 42nd plenary meeting on 22nd July 1994, the Economic and 
Social Council considered the Resolution of the Commission as aforesaid and 
endorsed the creation and the appointment of a monitoring mechanism in the 
form of a Special Rapporteur.85 The Special Rapporteur was mandated to 
inquire into any complaints pertaining to his thematic responsibility, to 
identify the positive steps taken to preserve judicial independence in States as 
well as to investigate into attacks on judicial independence.86 
 
The Special Rapporteur‟s duties not only include investigations into the 
affairs of the judiciary but also matters affecting the legal profession. His 
mandate is very wide and has been summed-up as incorporating 
investigatory, advisory, legislative and promotional activities.87 
 
The Annual Reports of the Special Rapporteur set out the work undertaken by 
the Special Rapporteur that includes the investigation of complaints against 
attacks on the judges and the judicial systems of States. The Special 
Rapporteur has produced various mission reports as well as general reports 
detailing complaints received and measures taken to investigate these 
complaints. His activities include advising States on ways to improve 
structural weaknesses in their judicial systems.88 
 
The terms of reference adopted by the Special Rapporteur include the treaty 
standards of the ICCPRand the other non-treaty standards contained in 
instruments such as the Basic Principles, the Basic Principles on the Role of 
Lawyers89 and the Guidelines on the Role of Prosecutors.90  The latter two 
instruments were adopted by the 8th Congress on the Prevention of Crime and 
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the Treatment of Offenders in 1990. However, only the Basic Principles for 
the Independence of the Judiciaryhas been endorsed by the General Assembly. 
 
Notwithstanding the lack of binding effect of these instruments, they are 
important in at least providing guidelines for the work of the Special 
Rapporteur.  In assessing the quality of the independence and impartiality of 
the judiciary in member States, the Special Rapporteur will use the standards 
contained in the Basic Principles to decide whether the States have succeeded 
or failed in measuring up to the standards in those instruments.91 
 
Although the mandate of the Special Rapporteur focuses on national practice, 
he has also been monitoring the activities at the ICC. There are two issues that 
he is interested in – the ratification of the Rome Statute by States and Article 
16 of the Rome Statute and the potential threat to the independence of the 
court by the Security Council.  However, his current comments on these 
issues are couched in general terms with no serious implications on the 
independence and impartiality of the Court. It would be interesting to see 
whether the Special Rapporteur would be mandated to examine any 
complaints arising out of judicial independence at the ICC.  
 
It would have been also relevant and appropriate to have included the 
proceedings at the International Tribunals in the scope and mandate of the 
work of the Special Rapporteur. Having an independent assessor of their 
work could be helpful to the judges and allay doubts amongst members of the 
international community as to the independence and impartiality of the 
Tribunals‟ judges. Both are creatures of the United Nations and who better to 
assess the work of the courts than someone who has a strong and long legal 
background? Unfortunately this is not the case and the prevalent view is that 
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the judges at the International Tribunals are powerful figures with no 
obligations of accountability.92 
 
 
2.9 CONCLUSION 
 
Standards of judicial independence and impartiality are inherent in many 
national justice systems. As fair trial standards, they are protected by specific 
rules and practices, derived from established legal sources such as, 
constitutions, statutes and precedents.  
 
There are no significant special attributes93 to the international standards of 
judicial independence and impartiality that distinguish them from the 
standards applied in domestic legal systems. As in the domestic systems, the 
dual requirements of judicial independence and impartiality are crucial 
towards ensuring that the right of the accused to receive a fair trial is 
guaranteed. They are important to the rule of law and due process. The 
concerns about international judicial independence and impartiality are no 
different than those at national level – that judges should be free from bias 
and that both they and the tribunal as a whole should be able to exercise their 
functions free from pressure from political organs and other parties. 
 
 The main and obvious differences between the international and national 
standards are the evolution, the effectiveness and the enforcement of the 
international standards. Unlike the national standards which derive their 
legal authority from statutes and binding case-law, the international 
standards lack a legally-binding foundation. However, international norms of 
impartiality and independence as recognised at present have evolved from 
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general provisions in the human rights instruments and United Nations 
documents to specific provisions in the Statutes of the international courts 
and tribunals, as well as principles of law from judgements of the ad hoc 
tribunals. There is no real functional difference in these norms and standards 
as their very purpose is to ensure that the rights of the accused are 
safeguarded and affirm public confidence in the administration of justice.94 
 
In sum, the function of the international criminal courts is the same as that of 
a domestic criminal court, which is to ensure that the right of the accused to a 
fair trial is guaranteed, and this includes the right to have his case heard by an 
independent and impartial tribunal. The principles of independence and 
impartiality in international law are applicable to international criminal 
proceedings through transference from domestic systems, 95  from the 
judgements of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the regional and human 
rights instruments and as general principles of international law and the 
provisions of the Statutes of the Tribunals. Added to these instruments is the 
Basic Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary. 
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CHAPTER 3 
_________________________ 
 
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENDENCE 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 10) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 14(1)) proclaim that everyone should be 
entitled to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. An independent judiciary is indispensable to the 
implementation of this right.  
 
Beijing Statement of the Principles of the Judiciary 
 in the LAWASIA region 
Principle 21 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
An independent court and its members are bulwarks against abuse of due 
process and the breach of the right of the accused to a fair trial. It is this role of 
the International Tribunals that is the focus of this Chapter. In doing so, the 
issues of institutional independence of the international criminal tribunals 
and court and the individual independence of their judges are examined.   
The position of the International Tribunals is unique from that of the national 
courts. Whilst in the conventional framework, threats to the independence of 
the judiciary can emanate from the other two arms of the Government, in the 
international framework, threats can emanate from various parties such as 
States, members of international organisations and the organisations 
themselves. 
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 Specific incidents where threats were posed to the independence of the 
International Tribunals by the Security Council, the Government of Rwanda 
and the Non-Alliance Treaty Organisation (NATO) are discussed.  
 
Of particular interest to this study is the Completion Strategy which has 
arguably become an unintentional tool for trading justice for expediency. 
Another issue that is cause for concern is the financing of the Tribunals. Both 
these issues are key threats to the judicial independence of the International 
Tribunals and by extension, to the impartiality of its judges. 
 
It is axiomatic that the individual independence of the judges should be 
secured and guaranteed. How this security or guarantee is protected at the 
international courts and tribunals is a germane issue to the topic under 
discussion. Again, the Completion Strategy has had an unexpected impact on 
this issue and this is highlighted in this Chapter. 
 
Before a detailed discussion is embarked on the judicial independence of the 
International Tribunals, it is proposed to discuss judicial independence 
generally and how it is traditionally interpreted in domestic and regional 
courts. Reference is also made to provisions of international and regional 
human rights instruments as well as case-law that propound the principle. 
The discussion then forays into a discussion on the application of this 
principle to the international criminal courts and tribunals. 
 
 
3.2 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: GENERAL 
 
Judicial independence is vital in upholding the due process of law and in 
ensuring that the fair trial right of the accused is observed. There is an 
expectation, both by the individual accused and society as a whole, that the 
judiciary would serve as a bastion against abuse or arbitrary action by the 
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State in relation to the rights of the accused. It is instrumental in the 
protection of the rights of the individual.2 
 
The European Courtof Human Rightshas given a broad definition of an 
independent and impartial tribunal in the case of Belilos v Switzerland,3 The 
Court defined the meaning of a “tribunal” within the context of Article 6(1) of 
the European Convention meant: 
 
“…..a “tribunal” is characterised in the substantive sense of the term by its judicial 
function, that is to say determining matters within its competence on the basis of 
rules of law and after proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner…..It must also 
satisfy a series of further requirements – independence, in particular of the executive; 
impartiality; duration of its members‟ terms of office; guarantees afforded by its 
procedure…” 
 
According to this definition, independence (and impartiality) is inherent in 
the word “tribunal” and contains organisational and procedural elements.4 It 
is a comprehensive definition and is helpful to have in consideration when 
assessing the independence of a particular tribunal.5 Judicial independence is 
crucial to safeguard the functional considerations as well as procedural 
guarantees of a fair trial right. 
 
The concept of judicial independence itself demands a detailed consideration. 
Like the fair trial it serves to protect, it is a complex right. As briefly 
mentioned in Chapter Two, the standards required to protect judicial 
independence itself are numerous and differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 
Much depends on State practice. State Parties to the ICCPRwill be guided in 
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structuring their domestic practice by the comments of the Human Rights 
Committee and its decisions. 
 
The Committee expects the States to specify the  
 
“relevant constitutional and legislative texts which provide for the establishment of 
the courts and ensure that they are independent, impartial and competent, in 
particular to the manner in which judges are appointed, with qualifications for 
appointment, and the duration of their terms of office; the conditions governing 
promotion, transfer and cessation of their function and the actual independence of the 
judiciary from the executive branch and the legislative.” 6 
 
Even so, the content of the standards themselves could be similar and yet 
different in State practice. 7  Identifying the standards could therefore be 
difficult and even problematic. There is however a minimum content, other 
than the above aspects suggested by the Committee in the General Comment, 
which should be satisfied for judicial independence to be guaranteed. The 
minimum content or standards have been identified in the international and 
regional instruments. 8  Further standards could be gleaned through 
jurisprudence of national courts and regional courts such as theEuropean 
Court. 
 
The problem of a lack of any binding definitions or guidelines in the 
international and regional human rights instruments on judicial 
independence could make it particularly difficult to gauge whether State 
practice is in conformity with the comprehensive international standards9 on 
judicial independence contained in the international and regional instruments 
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such as the Basic Principlesand the Beijing Statement on Principles of the 
Independence of the Judiciary.  
 
The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciaryand 
Lawyers is useful in identifying the different aspects of the judicial 
independence. These could largely be classified under the dual postulates of 
institutional and individual independence.10  State of mind and relationship 
to third parties are key elements which are inherently relevant to these two 
postulates.  
 
Institutional independence emphasises the requirement that the judicial 
institution itself, as an organ, should be free of control and pressures. This 
requirement is not just addressed to the whole judicial organ as an institution, 
but also to a specific panel hearing a matter. Threats to the institutional 
independence through control, pressure or any form of improper influence 
could emanate from external as well as internal sources.  
 
Personal independence or individual independence on the other hand, rests 
on the individual judge who should be able to exercise his judicial functions 
without fear or favour of any control or pressure from any party. Personal 
independence may have an effect on the impartiality of the judge. If it could 
be shown that a judge is not independent by virtue of his connection to a 
party to the action, whether a private party or the State, there would be 
doubts as to his impartiality 11  and consequently, the correctness of his 
decision, even if he did ensure that the proceedings were fair in every other 
aspect.  
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Both postulates of judicial independence have a bearing on each other. A 
judge may be individually independent but if the tribunal, of which he is a 
member, is not independent, then, any convictions issued by the tribunal 
could be rendered unsafe by virtue of that dependence. This would adversely 
affect the decisions of the tribunal even if the convictions were arrived at after 
observation of other standards of fair trial.  
 
Lack of judicial independence would also have an effect on the legitimacy and 
credibility of the judicial institution even if the personal matters relating to the 
office of the judge, such as the appointment, methods of selection, security of 
tenure, dismissal matters are scrupulously observed.12 Conversely, if all the 
personal matters are not guaranteed, there could be a lack of independence on 
the part of the court if there could be shown a connection between these 
omissions and the actions of the court. The court may be said to lack 
independence in respect of any case which it hears. 13 This would mean that 
the objective guarantees of independence have not been secured. 
 
On the other hand, the lack of independence of an individual judge may have 
an affect only on decisions or convictions of which the judge was part of. It 
does not mean that the decision would be automatically adversely affected or 
overruled on appeal. Again, that depends on the trial proceedings as a whole. 
Of course, the chances of finding a conviction unsafe are much stronger if the 
judge sat alone. On the other hand, if the trial was presided by a panel of 
three judges, as is the practice at the International Tribunals,14 the chances of 
finding the conviction unsafe depends on the overall proceedings of the 
tribunal and whether the tests for independence and impartiality have been 
fulfilled. 
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In this aspect, it is argued that the international courts are no different from 
domestic or regional courts. Judicial independence is sacrosanct to these 
courts, whether it is a court with civil jurisdiction such as the International 
Court of Justice or whether a court with criminal jurisdiction such as the ICTY.  
Tied in with the institutional independence of the International Tribunals is 
the personal independence of the judges that make up the Tribunals‟ 
composition.  
 
 
3.3  INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
The independent character of the adjudicating tribunal is an essential 
component of the fair trial rights. It is a requirement that is provided for in the 
major human rights instruments.15 
 
The traditional definition of the institutional aspect of judicial independence 
in relation to State practice involves the relationship between the Judiciary 
and the other arms of the Government, namely the Legislature and the 
Executive.16 The administration and funding of the courts are usually within 
the purview of the Executive and that gives the Executive considerable power 
and control over the judiciary.17 The interference by the Executive can take 
many forms, such as cutting down budgetary allocation to the courts and 
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removal of the jurisdiction of the courts on matters relating to the State.18 
Matters such as the selection and qualification of judges may also fall under 
the purview of the Executive and these in turn could have an adverse effect 
on the independence of the judiciary and open to abuse.  
 
 
3.3.1 INSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 
 
The trite principles that a judicial organ must be independent and that such 
independence is at the root of the principle of fair trial are equally applicable 
to international criminal courts. The international criminal judicial system 
does not have the benefit of the Government structure that a national system 
has, and gauging as well as preserving independence from the creators of the 
international judicial systems are hard tasks to achieve. Nevertheless, it 
cannot be denied that whatever weaknesses there may be in an international 
legal system lacking a proper Legislature and Executive, the international 
criminal courts must be independent, even if no traditional form of checks 
and balances exist. Further, the lack of a specific provision for the requirement 
of institutional independence in the Statutes of the International Tribunals 
and the ICC does not mean that such a requirement could be dispensed with. 
In fact, a strong show of independence is necessary, particularly where the 
International Tribunals are concerned, to show that they are independent of 
their highly-political creators, the Security Council and powerful 
States. 19 There are other possible sources of threats to the International 
Tribunals as well. 
                                                 
18
For example, the African Commission found that the Government of Nigeria had undermined the 
independence of the courts when the Government issued decrees to remove the jurisdiction of the 
courts over challenges to government decrees. See Civil Liberties Organization v Nigeria (129/93) 8
th
 
Annual Report of the African Commission 1994-1995. 
19
 For example, the late Slobodan Milosevic argued vehemently that the ICTY was a political tool of 
the United States and NATO members. Michael Scharf The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial (2002-2003) 
37 New Eng L. Rev 915, 919. Of course, it is also possible that Milosevic’s challenge was not altruistic 
as his conduct prior to his own arrest and presence in court indicated that he had accepted the 
legitimacy of the ICTY, such as the signing of the Dayton Accords in 1995.  57% of over 1 000 Serbs 
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3.3.1.a  THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
 
One of the major tasks faced by the International Tribunals faced was 
establishing themselves as an independent judicial institution, 
notwithstanding the nature of the organ creating the courts and the manner 
by which they were created. The independence of the tribunal as an 
institution and of the judges as individuals from the Security Council and the 
General Assembly is central to the other duties and responsibilities that they 
bear. Whether they have succeeded in doing so will be assessed below. 
 
The potential threat to the independence of the International Tribunals could 
emanate, inter alia, from the relationship they have with the Security Council 
as its subsidiary organs. This issue is particularly relevant when considering 
two aspects of the principal organ-subsidiary organ relationship that the 
Security Council has with the International Tribunals.. First, three permanent 
members of the Security Council are also members of the Non-Alliance Treaty 
Organisation, an organisation that the ICTY relies heavily on for various 
issues, such as producing the accused in court, carrying out the enforcements 
and other matters to ensure that the Tribunal runs and functions smoothly. 
Secondly, the role of the Security Council in the endorsement of the 
Completion Strategy has highlighted its culpability as demanding the 
International Tribunals to wind-up its proceedings resulting in the 
unfortunate consequence of compromising the right of the accused to a fair 
trial. The parent-subsidiary organs relationship is therefore very relevant to 
judicial independence and the right of the accused to a fair trial. 
                                                                                                                                            
interviewed harboured a perception that the ICTY was not independent. Scharf  op cit 920, 921,923.  
Also see Letter dated 19
th
 May 1993 from the Charge d’Affaires A.I.(sic) of the Permanent Mission of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General, 
A/48/170, S/25802, 21
st
 May 1993, questioning the independence and impartiality of the ICTY, 
reprinted in 2 Morris & Scharf supra Chapter One n.92479-480. The Letter was actually sent by the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
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3.3.1.b THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS AS SUBSIDIARY 
ORGANS 
 
The relationship between a principal organ and its subsidiary in the 
framework of the United Nations is characterised by many factors other than 
the authority derived from the Charter. Definitional issues, mandates, 
functional limitations, relationship factors, such as the degree of 
independence between the entities, the control and authority of one entity 
over the other and the discretionary powers of the parent body to terminate 
the lifespan of the subsidiary organ are significant considerations in assessing 
the independence of the International Tribunals.20 
 
The Charter does not define what a subsidiary organ is and what it can do, 
other than assist in the performance of the functions of the principal organ. 
An accepted definition, gleaned from documents of the United Nations, 
invokes the following criteria. The definitional issues would assist in gauging 
the overall independence of the Tribunals.  These issues have been identified 
as follows: 
 
(a) A subsidiary organ is created by, or under the authority of, a principal 
organ of the United Nations; 
(b) The membership, structure and terms of reference of a subsidiary 
organ are determined, and may be modified by, or under the authority 
of, a principal organ. 
(c) A subsidiary organ may be terminated by, or under the authority of, a 
principal organ.21 
                                                 
20
 For a detailed study on the United Nations subsidiary organs, see Danesh Sarooshi,The Legal 
Framework Governing United Nations Subsidiary Organs(1996) 67 BYIL413 
21
  These have been classified as “common features” between the subsidiary organs of the United 
Nations despite wide differences between them. See Repertory of Practice of the United Nations 
Organs’s commentary on Article 7(2), 228 at paragraph 21.  
 Available at  
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art7/english/rep_orig_vol1- art7_e.pdf#pagemode=none > 
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These characteristics denote crucial matters of dependence by the subsidiary 
organ on the principal organ: its establishment, its structure, membership and 
scope of work and its termination are all within the discretion of the principal 
organ.  
 
The general rule relating to the issue of principal organs and their subsidiaries 
in the United Nations is that it is essential for the subsidiary organ to establish 
a degree of independence from the principal organ.22 This requirement is 
necessary, first for ensuring that the subsidiary organ is not simply a part of 
the principal organ and secondly, to distinguish it from another entity which 
is an integral part of a principal organ.23 
 
However, independence in this context does not apply to the International 
Tribunals as they are not exercising the same powers and functions of their 
creator in the sense that they are not directly responsible in maintaining 
international peace and security but are rather measures in the form of a 
subsidiary organ employed to that end. Hence the International Tribunals, as 
judicial organs, are undoubtedly distinguishable from the Security Council.24 
A further factor that would distinguish the International Tribunals is that they 
do not form an integral part of the Council like a commission, committee or 
other such entities. 
 
The issues of institutional framework and lifespan of a subsidiary organ are 
intertwined for the purposes of the institutional independence of the 
International Tribunals. Read together, they raise various issues of control 
and authority of the United Nations, in particular the Security Council over 
                                                                                                                                            
Also Sarooshi supra n.20, 416 ,ibid . An additional criterion of a subsidiary organ of the United 
Nations is that its establishment does not violate the boundaries of Charter powers between the 
principal organs. Sarooshi op cit.   
22
Sarooshi ibid 416  
23
Ibid 
24
 This distinction is necessary for it is important for the International Tribunals to maintain their 
integrity of independence from their creator, which is highly-political organ. 
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the Tribunal. These include issues such as the existence of control and 
authority and the effect of that control and authority over the independence 
of the Tribunals. These are issues that cannot be ignored. Although there is no 
direct connection between the independence of the International Tribunals 
from the Security Council and the right of the accused to receive a fair trial, 
any imputation of dependence would raise the doubt in the international 
community whether the accused would receive a fair trial. A clear example of 
such connection is the implementation of the Completion Strategy. 
 
The second requirement or characteristic of a subsidiary organ pertaining to 
the membership, structure and terms of reference of the Tribunal has been 
determined by the Statute, the Resolutions of the Security Council and the 
Report of the Secretary-General.25 This fact in turn raises two matters that 
require examination. First, whether there should be a degree of authority and 
control over a judicial organ by the Security Council, which is a highly 
political body, and secondly, whether the intrinsic characteristic of 
independence of the Tribunal as a judicial organ is adversely compromised as 
a result of that authority and control. 
 
Insofar as the first issue of control is concerned, it is necessary to make a 
distinction in the dual functions of the International Tribunals before “control” 
is considered. This distinction is pertinent, given the intrinsic judicial nature 
of the International Tribunals, between its operational functions and its 
judicial functions. The former relates to the administrative aspect of the 
Tribunal which includes the appointment of judges, the organisational 
structure of the institution, the staffing, the resources, the finances and 
various administrative matters. The latter relates to the conduct of legal 
proceedings before the International Tribunals in their judicial capacity. The 
proceedings and indeed the decisions of the Tribunals are not subject to 
                                                 
25
 The membership of the International Tribunals is determined both by the Security Council and the 
General Assembly. It involves a fairly complicated process, discussed in this text at page 183 et seq. 
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authority or control of the Security Council.26 A condition of institutional 
independence, that is, the courts should be the sole arbiter of their jurisdiction 
and that their decisions are not reviewable by a third party is therefore 
observed.27 The independence of the International Tribunals from the Security 
Council is thus preserved in this aspect. It was clearly intended that this 
should be so as observed from the statement by the Secretary-General in his 
Report: Whilst acknowledging that the ICTY was established as a subsidiary 
organ under Chapter VII, it was made clear that the Tribunal was ….:  
 
”….one of a judicial nature. This organ would, of course, have to perform its 
functions independently of political considerations; it would not be subject to the 
authority or control of the Security Council with regard to the performance of its 
judicial functions”28 
 
There are some interesting issues that have arisen out of the above statement. 
Ideally, the International Tribunals would perform its functions 
independently of political considerations and as a judicial organ, it would not 
be subject to the authority of Council with regard to the performance of its 
duties. Of course, the Report is at pains to emphasise that the International 
Tribunals would be independent in this regard. However, as several decisions 
of the International Tribunals would demonstrate, this was not strictly 
accurate. Secondly, whilst the Tribunals would be free from control vis-à-vis 
its judicial functions, there are other ways by which a possibility of control by 
a political organ could arise. The budget of the International Tribunals, the 
appointment and renewal of the judges to the Bench of the International 
Tribunals, the Completion Strategies are but some of the licences that the 
                                                 
26
 In an interview with the author at the Hague on June 29
th
 2002,  the late Sir Richard May asserted 
that the judges do not feel that the Security Council interfered with the independence of the ICTY. He 
was also very comfortable with the distance between the parent and subsidiary organs. “They (the 
Security Council) are in New York. We (the ICTY) are in the Hague”, thus stressing that they were not 
within the beck and call of the Council. the distance helps.”(on file with the author)But whilst it may be 
correct to say that the Security Council did not interfere directly with the Tribunal, it is argued that the 
interference came through indirect ways.  
27
Principle 3 of Basic Principles, supra Chapter Two, 69 
28
Report of the Secretary-General, Chapter One, supra n. 91 Paragraph 28 
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Security Council may and indeed have resorted to as means of indirect 
control of the International Tribunals which in turn may affect the judicial 
functions of the Tribunals, including their duty to ensure the right of the 
accused to a fair trial. These issues are discussed later in this work. 
 
The issue of “truly independent” from the Security Council is central to the 
International Tribunals as judicial organs, not merely uninfluenced but even 
tainted by political considerations, the International Tribunals must truly be 
independent from the Security Council in order to achieve legitimacy and 
credibility as judicial organs and consequently, ensuring that the right of the 
accused to a fair trial is maintained. 
 
The Appeals Chamber said this in Tadic: 
 
To assume that the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal is absolutely limited to 
what the Security Council "intended" to entrust it with, is to envisage the 
International Tribunal exclusively as a "subsidiary organ" of the Security Council 
(see United Nations Charter, Arts. 7(2) & 29), a "creation" totally fashioned to the 
smallest detail by its "creator" and remaining totally in its power and at its mercy. 
But the Security Council not only decided to establish a subsidiary organ (the only 
legal means available to it for setting up such a body), it also clearly intended to 
establish a special kind of "subsidiary organ": a tribunal29 
 
The decision in the Prosecutor v Joseph KanyabashiCase No. ICTR-96-15-
T(Trial Chamber, Decision on the Defence Motion on Jurisdiction)30 is relevant 
vis-à-vis the issue of the institutional independence of the International 
Tribunals. The defence argued that the ICTR could not be both a subsidiary 
organ of the Security Council and an independent judicial organ.31 It was 
                                                 
29
Appeal  Decision, Chapter One n.98,  Paragraph 15 
30
 Dated the 18
th
 of June 1997. Available at <http://www.ictr.org/default.htm> See Virginia Morris 
International Decisions: Prosecutor v Kanyabashi(1998)92 AJIL 66. The other challenges by counsel 
for Kanyabashi were substantially similar to those raised by Tadic. 
31
Ibid, Paragraph 38 
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further argued, as it was at the ICTY, that the Tribunal could not be impartial 
and independent as it was established by the Security Council, a political 
organ32 
 
The Trial Chamber dealt with these issues by comparing its mode of creation 
with that of national courts.  The court was untroubled by the fact that the 
Tribunal was created by a political body. This issue was addressed by a 
comparison with national courts. National courts, it was opined, were the 
creations of legislatures which were eminently political bodies. 33  In this 
regard, whilst there is no legislature34as one of the three arms of Government 
as is traditionally recognised in the national system, 35  it is the common 
political characteristics of both the national legislatures and the Security 
Council that was the underlying factor in the Trial Chamber arriving at the 
conclusion that the Security Council is entitled to do what national 
legislatures could do, which is the establishment of a judicial organ. In 
support of this finding, the Trial Chamber referred to the decision of another 
principal organ of the United Nations, that of the ICJ in the Effect of Awards of 
Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal Case and 
concluded that a political organ could and had created “an independent and 
truly judicial body”. 36 
 
                                                 
32
 It was argued that the ICTR was “just another appendage of an international organ of policing and 
coercion, devoid of independence.” Ibid Paragraph 37 
33
 Kanyabashi, supra n. 30 Paragraph 38 
34
 See also the Appeal Decision supra Chapter One, n.97 Paragraph 43. 
35
 See Warbrick, in The United Nations System: A Place for Criminal Courts? Supra, Chapter One, n. 
104. 
36
Kanyabashi, supra n.30, Paragraph 39. The Trial Chamber gave other reasons to reiterate both its 
personal and institutional independence such as the non-binding effect of national rules of evidence 
thus allowing it to apply the Rules of Evidence that is best suited to a fair determination of the case 
before it, the oath-taking by judges to exercise their judicial duties independently and impartially and 
Article 12(1) of the Statute which reiterates the independence and the impartiality of judges. Ibid, 
Paragraphs 40-42. All in all, the Trial Chamber was adamant that it was independent from the Security 
Council. “Judges do not account to the Security Council for their judicial functions”. Ibid Paragraph 41. 
This statement invites comment. For example, whilst it may be true that a particular judge may not be 
accountable to the Security Council for a particular judgement, but the Tribunal themselves and their 
Presidents may be questioned as to its case management process under the Completion Strategy 
Assessment and Reports. Also, they might not be re-elected if they do not “please” the Security 
Council or the General Assembly. See Bohlander, supra Chapter One n.17, 363. 
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In this regard, an analogous reference was made to the decision of the 
International Court of Justice in the Administrative Tribunal case. Although 
the judgement related to the power of a subsidiary body to bind the principal 
organ, the same principle could be applied to the Tribunal in gauging its 
independence from the Security Council. The test is the intention of the 
Security Council in establishing the Tribunal. As the International Court of 
Justice said: 
 
“Moreover, the fact that the Tribunal is a subsidiary, subordinate or secondary organ 
is of no importance. What is of importance is the intention of the General Assembly in 
establishing the Tribunal, and what it intended to establish was a judicial body.” 
 
The issue here should not be whether the status of the Tribunal is a subsidiary, 
subordinate or secondary organ but rather, the intention of the Security 
Council in establishing it. The intention of the Security Council was to create a 
judicial organ, albeit a Chapter VII measure. A judicial organ should 
necessarily be an independent institution, even if it is a Chapter VII measure. 
It would defeat the purpose and intention of creating a judicial organ if the 
principal organ impedes its functions by interfering through its authority and 
control. This corresponds with the argument that the fact that the Tribunal is 
exercising a function that the Security Council itself does not possess is 
significant in ascribing independence which prohibits interference by the 
Security Council in the proceedings of individual cases.37 
 
The Report of the Secretary-General made it a point to declare that the 
Security Council should not interfere with the Tribunal‟s “performance of its 
judicial functions”.38 It is argued that this is a myth. Whilst the Council will 
not interfere directly with the judicial proceedings and the decisions of the 
                                                 
37
Sarooshi, supra n.20, 453. Again, there are other ways in which such independence could be trifled 
with: extension of the judges’ term of office is one such mode which could be used or abused by the 
appointing authority. 
38
Report of the Secretary-General  supra Chapter One, n. 91Paragraph 21. 
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Tribunal, there has been indirect interference with the Tribunals‟ existence 
and functions through the Completion Strategies. The institutional 
independence of the Tribunals became uncertain as a result of the 
implementation of this grand scheme to bring about the end of the 
international ad hoc criminal tribunals. 
 
3.3.1.c THE COMPLETION STRATEGIES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS39 
 
(i). INTRODUCTION 
 
A significant scheme, which has become ingrained in the framework of the 
International Tribunals is the “Completion Strategy”, a scheme purportedly 
designed by the Tribunals themselves to wind up their proceedings and 
ultimately, end their life spans. A detailed discussion on this issue is 
necessary for it is argued that such a scheme have compromised the efficacy 
of the Tribunals, and hence their independence. 40  This is an unfortunate 
development after the declaration of bravado by the Appeals Chamber in the 
Tadicand Kanyabashicases that the International Tribunals are unique 
subsidiary organs as they are independent judicial organs outside the sphere 
of authority and control of the Security Council. 
 
That the threatened independence of the Tribunals has a correlative effect on 
the right of the accused to a fair trial is evident from the proceedings at the 
Tribunals in their attempt to give effect and carry out the conditions of the 
                                                 
39
 See Daryl Mundis The Judicial Effects Of The “Completion Strategies” On The Ad Hoc 
International Criminal  Tribunals (2005) 99 AJIL 142. The author is with the Office of the Prosecutor 
at the ICTY. Cf  Larry D. Johnson Closing An International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining 
International Human Rights Standards and Excluding Impunity (2005) 99 AJIL 158. This author is the 
Chef de Cabinet, Office of the President at the ICTY. Dominic Raab Evaluating the ICTY and its 
Completion Strategy (2005) 3 JICJ 82 and Sarah Williams The Completion Strategy of the ICTY and 
the ICTR in International Criminal Justice- A Critical Analysis of Institutions and Procedure 153 
Michael Bohlander (Ed) (London;Cameron May; 2007).  All articles set out the genesis of the 
Completion Strategy, its components, its goals and the measures taken to achieve those goals. 
40
 There are arguments to the contrary. See Johnson, ibid and Williams ibid  
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Completion Strategy. It is argued that independence of the Tribunals, when 
compromised thusly, may have an effect on the impartiality of the judges.  
 
 
(ii). JUSTICE HURRIED IS JUSTICE BURIED 
 
It was clear from the outset that the International Tribunals were established 
on an ad hoc basis, and consequently their life spans would be limited.41 As the 
Tribunals were established by resolutions of the Security Council, termination 
of their life spans by resolutions of the Council would be the appropriate 
action. 42  This reflects the general principle that the principal organ must 
clearly evince its intention that the subsidiary organs would be terminated.43 
The position of the International Tribunals was clear from the early stages of 
their establishment. Their mandates would come to an end once the aims of 
the establishment had been fulfilled, which is the restoration and maintenance 
of peace and international security in the affected areas.  So even if there was 
no time frame set out for the winding-up of the Tribunals,44 recourse could be 
made to the Chapter VII powers that were used to justify their establishment 
for the determination of their life spans.  
 
As the Secretary-General said in his Report: 
 
As an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, however, the life span of the 
international tribunal would be linked to the restoration and maintenance of 
international peace and security in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and 
Security Council decisions related thereto.45 
                                                 
41
 1 Morris & Scharf  The ICTR Prologue supra n.10 89, 106, 107 
42
However, it has been pointed out that the efforts to terminate the Tribunals came from the Tribunals 
themselves, rather than the Security Council as the parent organ. It is argued that whilst this may be 
true on record, the Tribunals were put in a position where they had to think out eventual phasing out of 
their duties. 
43
 Sarooshi supra n.20, 449 
44
 Williams, supra n.39 153 
45
Report of the Secretary-General, Chapter One supra n.91, Paragraph 28. 
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However, as events unfolded, it became quite clear that the strategy that 
would see an end to the Tribunals was as a result of concerns relating to other 
factors such as escalating financial costs and the extensive length of time for a 
trial to be completed, resulting in accused being held in detention for an 
undue period of time.46 Financial outlay was the major factor that raised 
concern among members of the United Nations. It is therefore arguable 
whether the life spans of the Tribunals are about to be terminated because 
they have been, as Chapter VII mechanisms, successful in restoring and 
maintaining international peace and security in that area, or due to worrying 
and escalating costs. The termination of the tribunals in reality was motivated 
by the prosaic issues of financing the tribunals and donor fatigue rather than 
the loftier goal of achieving justice.47 
 
In 1998, the Secretary-General appointed an expert group to review the 
operations and efficiency of the Tribunal and make such recommendations as 
necessary.48  The Report of the Expert Group made forty-six recommendations 
which identified procedural and institutional defects that needed to be 
addressed. 49  Following that report, which was submitted to the General 
Assembly, the ICTY was asked for its response. The response became what is 
known as the Completion Strategy.50 
 
                                                 
46
 Williams, supra n.39 154 
47
 Steven D. Roper, Lilian A. Barria Designing Criminal Tribunals: Sovereignty and International 
Concerns in Protection of Human Rights (London:Aldgate Publishing Ltd; 2006) 
48
 This question did not raise or evince any intention of the Security Council to end the life spans of the 
International Tribunals. Mundis, supra n.39 
49
Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective Operations and Functioning and 
Operations of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  See Daryl Mundis Improving the Operations and Functions of the 
International Tribunals (1999) 94 AJIL 759. See also The Completion Strategy for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 71 in 
Roper & Barria, supra n.47. 
50
Report on the Operation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslaviasubmitted 
by Judge Claude Jorda, President on behalf of the Judges of the Tribunal UN Doc.A/55/382-
S/2000/865 Annex 1 (2000). Mundis ibid 
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This document sets out the plans and deadlines for the Tribunals to wind up 
their work.  There are two aspects to the Completion Strategy. The first aspect 
is that the focus of the Tribunals and their priorities should be on the highest-
ranking suspected violators of international humanitarian law.51 The second 
aspect is the referral of cases to the national courts. This involved case 
disposal is dealt with by allowing only important “crimes which most seriously 
violate international public order” to be prosecuted at the Tribunal. All crimes 
committed by “intermediate-level accused” would be sent back to the national 
courts for trial.52 The Completion Strategy was framed by the then President 
of the ICTY, Judge Claude Jorda in his Annual Report to the Council when he 
set out the proposed dates that the Tribunal envisaged for completion of 
investigations, trials and appeals. 53  The Security Council endorsed the 
Completion Strategy for each of the Tribunals by adopting Resolution 1503 
(2003).54 
 
There are many perplexing issues arising from this Strategy. Matters such as 
whether the national courts are able to try trials of this enormity, involving 
complex issues of substantive international criminal law, procedure and over 
and above all this, the respect for the due process of law, the independence 
                                                 
51
 A consequence of the Completion Strategy is the creation of a separate position of the Prosecutor for 
the ICTR.Mundis supra n.39 147 
52
 Michael Bohlander Last Exit Bosnia- Transferring War Crimes Prosecution From The International 
Tribunal to Domestic Courts (2003) 14 Crim. LF 59 which gives an overview on the development of 
the Completion Strategy. Also by the same author: The Transfer of Cases from International Criminal 
Tribunals to National Courts , Paper presented at the Prosecutor’s Colloquium in Arusha, November 
1994. 
Available at <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/colloquium04/bohlander/Bohlander.pdf>.  The paper, inter 
alia, discusses in detail the transfer of cases from the ICTY to the national courts of various Balkans 
states, and the mechanics and the problems arising from such transfers. Doubts have been raised as to 
whether national courts have adequate resources to deal with the trials. Patricia M. Wald The 
“Horizontal Growth of International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges and Opportunities? (96) ASIL 
Proc. 369, 377,378. The situation is slightly different for Rwanda where referrals could be made to the 
national courts of that country or of any other State willing and able to take over the prosecution. Rule 
11bis(A) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR. Bohlander, ibid 
53
Ninth Annual Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 Doc.A/57/397- S/2002/985.  
Available at: <http://www.un.org/icty/rappannu-e/2002/AR02-e.pdf> 
54
 U.N.Doc S/RES/1503(2003) The completion dates set for both the International Tribunals were the 
end of 2004 for investigations, the end of 2008 for trials and the end of 2010 for appeals. The 
resolution also calls for Member States to cooperate with national jurisdictions as well the Balkan 
States and the African States to help bring leading indictees to the jurisdiction of the Tribunals. 
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and impartiality of such courts, the failure to prosecute major war crimes 
suspects have raised concern.55 
 
However, the most perplexing issue is the very conception of the Strategy 
itself. Whilst it is true that the Strategy was conceived by the ICTY,56  it does 
not necessarily mean that the Tribunal could not point out the weaknesses or 
defects in the winding-up plan especially since such defects would or could 
affect their credibility as a judicial organ. It also does not mean that questions 
of any compromise or curtailment of their independence should and would 
not arise.57 Whilst it may be true that the Strategy was framed by the ICTY 
itself,58 it would also be fair to say that such a ”strategy” was “nudged” into 
place as a result of the findings and recommendations made by the Expert 
Group.59 A detailed study of the events that led up to the creation of the 
Strategies show that the Tribunals were put in a position where they had to 
react to those findings and that reaction was in form of the Completion 
Strategy.60 It was not as if the Tribunals had acted out of their own initiative.61  
Once the Completion Strategy was presented to the Security Council, it was 
endorsed by them and acquired a significantly binding status. 
 
It is argued however, that it is immaterial how the Completion Strategy came 
about. The stand of the Security Council on the Completion Strategy appears 
uncompromising. Interpreting the surrounding circumstances and the 
                                                 
55
  Bohlander, supra n. 52. The author discusses at length the capacity and the ability of national courts 
to try complex criminal trials involving legal issues arising out of international criminal law. 
56
Williams, supra n.39, 161 
57
 Williams, supra n.39 161 
58
 The ICTY put forward its proposal, i.e. the Completion Strategy to the Security Council which 
endorsed it.  
59
 See Roper and Barria, supra n. 47 71  see also Johnson, supra n.39 159 Williams, supra n.39. 160.. 
60
 As Professor Bohlander put it Judges began thinking ahead towards a completion or exit strategy – 
after getting a little nudge from the Expert Group…” (emphasis is mine). Bohlander  Last Exit Bosnia 
supra n.52 61. The issues of who started what and in response to who are quite pertinent when it comes 
to the discussion of the independence of the Tribunals vis-à-vis the Completion Strategy. It is a 
common-held belief and opinion amongst the international circles that the International Tribunals were 
under pressure from the United Nations to wind up its proceedings and terminate its operations. See 
Patricia Wald Reflections on Judging: At Home and Abroad (2004-2005) 7 U. Pa J. Const. L 219 and 
Raab, supra n.39, 84. 
61
 Daryl Mundis Current Developments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals (2004) 2 JCIJ 
879.  
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responses that the Security Council has made, it appears that the Council is 
more interested in winding up proceedings than ensuring that the right of the 
accused to a fair trial is protected. Resolution 1503 states inter alia, “recalling 
and reaffirming in strongest terms” the Strategy as put forward by the President 
of the ICTY. It further “requests” that biannual progress reports be submitted 
to the Council.  It is opined that the Resolution is couched in peremptory 
tones regardless of the words used and reading the expressions used, the 
cumulative effect is that, it was a clear and unequivocal message to the 
Tribunals stating that now that the Tribunals have set forth the dates, they 
have to make sure that they comply with them. It is most improbable that the 
International Tribunals would refuse a Security Council‟s request. There 
should be some degree of flexibility, which this Resolution does not seem to 
show.62  It is difficult for a judicial organ to ensure that its cases will be 
completed by a certain date, as opposed to “may” be completed by a certain 
date. “Completion” here does not merely mean that the case should come to 
an end; it should mean that it comes to an end; it should come to an end not 
only after “all the guarantees of fairness, justice and even-handedness, in full 
conformity with internationally recognized human rights instruments” have been 
provided, but also protected. 
 
Further, it has been stated that Resolution 1503 has set forth target dates, and 
not deadlines. 63  This, with due respect, is mere labelling. It needs to be 
emphasised that bearing in mind that the status of the International Tribunals 
is ad hoc, it is not the Completion Strategy that is a threat to the institutional 
independence of the International Tribunals. It is the deadlines that are 
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Any lawyer or judge familiar with litigation and the trial process would admit that setting deadlines 
for completion of cases in toto as the Strategy seems to have done, including the completion of appeals, 
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paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1534 (2004) Paragraph 45. (Submitted 13
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 May 2008) 
Available at <http://www.un.org/icty/publications-e/assessments/documents/2008-326eng.pdf> 
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contained therein. By Resolution 1329 (2000),64 the Security Council “requests 
the Secretary-General to submit to the Security Council, as soon as possible, a report 
containing an assessment and proposals regarding the date ending the 
temporal jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia”(emphasis added).65 
 
Resolutions 1503 and 1534 give an overall picture that reiterates the 
impression that the Security Council is very firm in its intention to wind up 
the Tribunals and that the times set were prescribed timetables.66Resolution 
1534 is indicative of how determined the Security Council is in keeping with 
the schedules.  In fact Resolution 1534 went further. The Resolution was 
demanding in nature, in that it compelled the President of the International 
Tribunals to make biannual status reports to the Council. Whilst in 
Resolution 1503, the Presidents were requested to apprise the Security Council 
of their steps to implement Completion Strategy in their Annual Reports, in 
Resolution 1534 (2004)67, they were asked to submit Completion Strategy 
Assessments every six months.68 (Emphasis is mine). A commentator attributes 
this Resolution to the finding in a report by the UN Office of Internal 
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 See <http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/Resolutions/1329e.htm> 
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 Paragraph 6. Ibid. The Resolution was not aimed at the ICTR. See Williams, supra n.39, 159. 
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 Two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and China are unbending on the deadlines 
and expect the Tribunals to comply strictly with the deadlines. Russia has actually stated that it “will 
not accept attempts to reinterpret the completion strategy”. However, there are other members are of 
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progress of the Completion Strategy. See Security Council Report on the International Criminal 
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<http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/site/c.glKWLeMTIsG/b.3041227/k.E5DC/August_2007BRInter
national_Criminal_Tribunals.htm> 
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 U.N.Doc  S/RES/1534 (2004). On 8
th
 October 2003, the then-President of the ICTY, Judge Theodor 
Meron highlighted to the General Assembly of the United Nations the problems the Tribunal faced in 
executing the Completion Strategy 
68
 Paragraph 6: “Requests each Tribunal to provide to the Council, by 31 May 2004 and every six 
months thereafter, assessments by its President and the Prosecutor, setting in detail the progress made 
towards implementation of the Completion Strategy and what measures have to be taken to implement 
the Completion Strategy and what measures remain to be taken, including the transfer of cases 
involving intermediate and lower rank accused to competent national jurisdictions; and expresses the 
intention of the Council to meet with the President and Prosecutor of each Tribunal to discuss these 
assessments.” Of course, it could be argued that this is an administrative matter and that the Security 
Council has every right as a principal organ to be kept apprised of the progress of the Completion 
Strategies but that does not dispel the notion that the independence of the International Tribunals 
carries the risk of being compromised. 
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Oversight Services on the Offices of the Prosecutors of the ICTY and the ICTR 
to the effect that there was insufficient evidence that the Completion Strategy 
were on track to meet their target dates and that the Office of the Prosecutor 
lacked a specific and strategic plan to fulfil the requirements of the Strategy.69 
All these factors, taken cumulatively, go to show that the Security Council has 
now decided to hold a tight rein over the Tribunals, raising the risk of 
perception that the Tribunals as judicial organs, are being controlled by their 
parent organ and therefore their independence may be compromised, 
infringed or even questioned.70 The pressure is immense; the independence of 
the International Tribunals as judicial organs would definitely fall under 
scrutiny. 71 
 
There was a fear that the Completion Strategy would cause the International 
Tribunals to wind up before its proceedings before the main high-ranking 
accused were apprehended and tried for the serious crimes that they would 
be charged with. Besides Slobodan Milosevic and Biljana Plasvic, a former 
deputy of Radovan Karadzic and the former President of the Republika 
Srpska, no other high-ranking accused had been tried by the Tribunal when 
the Completion Strategies were endorsed.72 There was a fear that the ICTY 
winds down without prosecuting these accused at large, it would appear that 
those accused of war crimes could get away with impunity. In this regard, the 
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 Mundis Judicial Effects  supra n. 39 145 
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 A note of warning had already been raised by one of ICTY’s judges, Judge David Hunt. 
71
 Karen Zoglin The Future of War Crimes Prosecution in the Former Yugoslavia: Accountability or 
Junk Justice? (2005) 27 HRQ 41. See also Amnesty International’s concerns on case referrals to the 
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Challenges of International Justice. Available at <www.hrw.org/wr2k4/10.htm> 
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 General Ante Gotovina, the Croatian General allegedly responsible for the ethnic cleansing of Serbs 
was on the run from the prosecutors of the ICTY and was finally arrested four years later. He is now 
facing proceedings at the ICTY. 
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Prosecutor of the ICTY has argued before the Security Council that it is 
inconceivable that:  
 
“…..  the ICTY closes its doors with Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladić at large. I 
want to stress again before the Council that impunity for these two most serious 
architects of the crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both accused of 
genocide, would represent a terrible blow not only to the success or failure of the 
Tribunal, but to the future of international justice as a whole.”73 
 
However, on the 21st of July 2008, the ICTY issued a statement that Radovan 
Karadzic has been arrested in Belgrade. 74  This adds a new twist to the 
Completion Strategy. At the time of writing, Karadzic is yet to be transferred 
to the custody of the Tribunal still in Serbia. He has to be transferred to The 
Hague. It would be interesting for legal commentators and human rights 
activists alike to see whether the ICTY would accord Karadzic the full rights 
of an accused or whether in the haste to comply with the demands of the 
Completion Strategy and the deadlines as well as the pressure of Security 
Council, corners will be cut to hasten the closure of arguably one of the most 
impactful international judicial organs of the 20th and 21st centuries just 
because it became too expensive to be maintained. 
 
 
(iii). RULE 11BIS 
 
One of the elements of Completion Strategy is the referral of cases indicted at 
the ICTY to the national courts under Rule 11bis of its Rules of Procedure and 
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 Address by the Prosecutor to the Security Council, 7
th
 June 2006. Available at:  
<http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1085e-annex.htm.>  Note also Resolution 1534 (March 26, 
2004) where the Security Council asserted that the new indictments should focus on the most senior 
leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes within the relevant jurisdiction”. Mundis, supra 
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74 “Statement of the Office of the Prosecutor on the Arrest of Radovan Karadzic” available at 
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Evidence.  Rule 11bis authorises the trial chambers to order cases be referred 
to authorities of the state (a) where the crime is committed (b) or where the 
accused was arrested or (c) which has jurisdiction and is willing and prepared 
to take the case. A trial chamber considering a request for referral should be 
satisfied that the accused would receive a fair trial in the national courts and 
the death penalty will not be imposed.75 
 
The Completion Strategy must take into account the stability and efficiency of 
the national legal systems and whether they offer fair trial guarantees in 
accordance with the international standards of due process and impartiality.  
Concerns raised on the transfer of the cases to the national courts include 
political and other influences on the proceedings, the independence of the 
judiciary, ethnic bias and questions of competence and failure to meet 
international standards.76Otherwise they would be transferring cases from a 
developed international criminal justice system to a defective national one. 
The rights of the accused should not be derogated from and there might be a 
risk of that occurrence if the domestic systems are either not equipped to 
ensure that the international standards of fait trials are observed or do not 
observe them at all. The results of these case referrals to national legal systems 
have been mixed. In Croatia for example, there were great discrepancies in 
the number of Serbian and Croatian prosecutions, including the use of trials 
in absentia, which was applied widely to Serb accused, significant disparities 
in the rates of convictions between the Serbs and the Croats and length of 
proceedings.77 
 
The accused at the ICTY have been contesting the referrals by the Prosecutor 
of their cases to national courts on various grounds, including the right to a 
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 Office of the High Representative’s Consultants’ Report of 27th May 2002. See Bohlander in Last 
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fair trial.78   Challenges have been made on various grounds. One of the 
grounds of challenges to Rule 11bis cases is perceived national or ethnic bias 
in national judicial system of Bosnia and Herzegovina against Serb accused 
which would adversely affect the impartiality of the national courts resulting 
in the accused deprived of their fair trial rights.79 However, the ICTY have 
rejected these challenges.80 
 
That an enforcement measure would come to an end once the purpose for 
which it was established is no longer in existence is a logical consequence. The 
International Tribunals however, are, as it has been reiterated repeatedly, 
enforcement measures with special characteristics. They are judicial organs. 
They should not be ordered to wind up just because it was getting too 
expensive to maintain them. As judicial organs, it is the duty of the Tribunals 
to ensure that justice is achieved, convictions secured but not at the expense of 
circumscribing the right of the accused to receive a fair trial. The request for 
bi-annual reports by the President and the Prosecutor of the Tribunals to the 
Security Council may be perceived as a control on their independence as well 
as pressure to speed up the trials.81 This is particularly of concern as justice 
hurried may be justice buried and will give rise to the impression that the 
trials conducted were anything but fair.82 
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 See for example The Prosecutor v Pasko Ljubicic Decision on Appeal against Decision on Referral 
Under Rule11 bis dated 4
th
 July 2006.  
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Rule 11 bis dated  Available at 
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The dilemma that the President and the Prosecutor is facing in their attempts 
to observe the dictates of the Security Council resolutions remains unresolved. 
Admittedly there was pressure on them to wind up the proceedings at the 
International Tribunals but the troubling impression that is given is that the 
Completion Strategy was short-sighted and not well thought out.83 Having 
committed themselves to wind-up the Tribunals, which was taken up 
enthusiastically by the Security Council, the Tribunals have found themselves 
in the uncomfortable position of being held in a tight grip by the Security 
Council who seem to be rather concerned at the rising costs of the Tribunals 
rather than the respect of the right of the accused to a fair trial, especially the 
right of the accused to have his case heard by an independent and impartial 
tribunal. If a tribunal conducts its proceedings dictated by target dates fixed 
by its parent organ, the suspicion on its independence may arise and may 
very well be justified.84 
 
It was argued that “placing a restriction on the life span of an international tribunal 
is not necessarily incompatible with the independence of the tribunal and the judicial 
function”.85 This is true if the Tribunals had respected the right of the accused 
to a fair trial. That should be the overriding concern of the Tribunals as well 
as the Security Council and not the deadlines. In fact, commentators would 
have little cause to complain if the deadlines were set at the time the 
Tribunals were established, or even shortly after. There would be a time 
frame for the Tribunals to complete their work and they would not have to 
cut corners to expedite the trials. 
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 This problem can be gleaned from the statements made by former President of the ICTY, Judge 
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Judge Hunt seems to echo concerns of many commentators when he said in 
his Dissenting Opinion:  
 
“This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of convictions which it enters, or by 
the speed with which it concludes the Completion Strategy which the Security 
Council has endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials. The Majority Appeals Chamber 
Decision and others in which the Completion Strategy has been given priority over 
the rights of the accused will leave a spreading stain on this Tribunal‟s reputation.”86 
 
Judge Hunt was disappointed with the trend in the recent decisions of the 
Appeals Chamber in reversing of ignoring its previously carefully considered 
interpretations of the law or of the procedural rules “with a consequential 
destruction of the rights of the accused enshrined in the Tribunal‟s Statute and in 
customary international law.”87 
 
The concerns of Judge Hunt are warranted. Far from giving effect to fully 
respect the internationally recognised rights of the accused, the Tribunal 
appears to cut corners in order to give effect to the Completion Strategy. This 
in turn has incurred the impression that the Tribunal is acting at the behest of 
the Security Council at the expense of the accused, which in turn has had an 
adverse effect on the independence of the Tribunal. This may very well fortify 
Milosevic‟s criticisms that the Tribunal is a political tool. 
 
 There is a duty and responsibility on international criminal tribunals to 
comply with and observe international human right standards to ensure and 
maintain their credibility and legitimacy. Rightly or wrongly, the Completion 
Strategy has cast a pall on the credibility of the International Tribunals to 
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observe the right of the accused to a fair trial due to their control by the 
Security Council through the Completion Strategy.88 
 
 
3.4 FINANCING:  THE POWER OF THE PURSE STRINGS 
 
In the traditional triumvirate of the concept of Government, the judicial organ 
is in a unique position regarding the practical aspects of its operation. This is 
not an enviable one for in matters of finance, budget, and personnel, the 
courts rely on the other two arms. Finance is critical to the efficient and 
credible operations of courts. It is an important factor and vital to the 
performance of the courts as dispensers of justice.  
 
Financial considerations play a significant role in maintaining judicial 
independence. 89  They provide structural safeguards of the institutional 
independence and reliance on external sources for the functioning of the 
courts makes them vulnerable to potential threats to the independence of the 
courts.  
 
International courts are no exception to this general premise. The financial 
burden is one of the many burdens that they have to overcome. Unlike 
national courts which receive their budgets from the Government, 90  the 
International Tribunals have to rely on the United Nations who in turn has to 
rely on the cooperation and generosity of Member States. This in itself carries 
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a latent danger. This situation would be susceptible to the risk of control and 
manipulation being exercised, however slight, by both the contributing States 
and the principal organs of the United Nations.91 
 
Unfortunately, whilst the aims of the establishment of the International 
Tribunals were praiseworthy, the facts in reality did not seem to facilitate the 
achievement of those aims. Justice is expensive and international justice even 
more so. 92   The use of the budget to limit the operations of a court, 
inadvertently or otherwise, would have a direct impact on its institutional 
independence, for budgets can be used as means to control the court, one of 
the very factors that judicial independence eschews at all costs for fear of 
compromise. It should be noted that just as in domestic systems, finance has 
an impact on individual independence of the international criminal judges as 
well. How their independence may be affected by financial considerations is a 
potentially troubling factor for the overall independence of the International 
Tribunals. The Completion Strategy has had an effect on this aspect. As had 
discussed earlier, the prevalent view was that the scheme of the Completion 
Strategy was designed due to complaints of the rising escalating costs of 
maintaining the International Tribunals. 
 
The financing of the International Tribunals, the ICC and the hybrid courts 
are provided for in the Statutes. Article 32 of the Statute of the ICTY states as 
follows: 
 
The expenses of the International Tribunal shall be borne by the regular budget of 
the United Nations in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United 
Nations.93 
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Article 30of the Statute of the ICTR on the other hand states as follows: 
 
The expenses of the International Tribunal for Rwanda shall be the expenses of the 
organization in accordance with Article 17 of the Charter of the United Nations.94 
 
The expenses incurred by the International Tribunals are varied, numerous 
and colossal. Their expenses are unlike the expenses incurred by national 
courts. Besides the salaries of the judges and staff, the Tribunals incur 
tremendous expense in other areas, such as legal aid, translation of 
documents, interpretation of proceedings, the maintenance and operating of 
the Detention Unit, the witness relocation programmes and other expenses 
incidental, but necessary to achieving justice. 95  In this regard, the 
International Tribunals go beyond the role of courts of law in domestic legal 
systems. The role of national courts is strictly that of arbiter of the law and 
facts between conflicting parties. Matters such as translation, witness 
relocation programmes and legal aid are outside their responsibilities and 
purview.  It is therefore unsurprising that the International Tribunals should 
incur expenses that swallow a large portion of the United Nations‟ financial 
pie.96 
 
The activities at the Tribunals are discussed annually at the proceedings 
before the General Assembly and Security Council. Dissatisfaction has been 
voiced at these proceedings over several issues pertaining to the International 
Tribunals, one of those being the escalating costs.97 The fact was that the 
United Nations found itself paying out a huge portion of its regular budget to 
cover the expenses of the Tribunals, especially the ICTY.98 At one point, the 
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ICTY stopped recruitment of legal professionals due to budgetary constraints, 
thus compromising the professional knowledge and skills that are required 
for the satisfactory completion of cases. 99  This would have put the 
independence of the Tribunals at risk as lack of knowledge, skills and 
expertise may result in, at one extreme a cavalier attitude and on the other, an 
ignorant one on the part of the judges regarding the requirements of 
scrupulously respecting the right of the accused to a fair trial and observing 
the proper administration of justice. 
 
That the donor States could use their financial power to “control” the 
Tribunals was evident from the Completion Strategy as argued earlier in this 
work. The United States was one such donorState.100 
 
The question of finance posing as a threat to the judicial independence of the 
International Tribunals was discussed in a case before the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone. In the Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman (Case No: SCSL-2004-
14-AR72(E)), Decision  on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction 
(Judicial Independence) 101  the defence challenged the independence of the 
hybrid tribunal. The Appeals Chamber discussed two provisions of the 
Agreement of 16th January 2002 between the United Nations and the Government of 
Sierra Leone102 relating to the funding of the Special Court. These are Article 6 
and Article 7.  
                                                                                                                                            
Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
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Article 6: 
Expenses of the Special Court 
The expenses of the Court shall be borne by voluntary contributions103 
from the international community.  It is understood that the Secretary-
General will commence the process of establishing the Court when he has 
sufficient contributions in hand to finance the establishment of the Court 
and 12 months of its operations plus pledges equal to the anticipated 
expenses of the following 24 months of the Court‟s operation.  It is further 
understood that the Secretary-General will continue to seek contributions 
equal to the anticipated expenses of the Court beyond its first three years of 
operation.  Should voluntary contributions be insufficient for the Court to 
implement its mandate, the Secretary-General and the Security Council 
shall explore alternate means of financing the Court.  
 
Article 7: 
Management Committee 
 It is the understanding of the Parties that interested States may wish to 
establish a management committee to assist the Special Court in obtaining 
adequate funding, provide advice on matters of Court administration and be 
available as appropriate to consult on other non-judicial matters.  The 
management committee will include representatives of interested States that 
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contribute voluntarily to the Special Court, as well as representatives of the 
Government of Sierra Leone and the Secretary-General. 104 
 Based on these two articles, the accused doubted that his right to a 
fair trial would be respected since he argued that the independence 
of the Tribunals was compromised. The funding of the Special Court 
was through donations from States and he alleged that there would 
be a risk of donor States holding back their funds to show their 
displeasure or disapproval of any decision made by the Special 
Court.  He argued that the funding arrangements under Article 6 and 
the role of the Management Committee under Article 7create a 
legitimate fear of interference in the duties of the Special Court in 
dispensing justice through “economic manipulation.”105 The crux of 
the argument of the defence was that the independence of the Court 
and the impartiality of the judges were therefore suspect because of 
this.  
The objections by the accused were dismissed by the Appeals 
Chamber. The Court held that merely alleging that the Court derives 
its funding from a source which may be displeased by the decision of 
the Court is not sufficient. There are other factors which should be 
taken into account, the main one being whether the funding 
arrangement raises a real likelihood that the Court will give its 
decision to please its funding agency. 106 
The approach of the Special Court focused more on judicial 
impartiality. In its judgment, the Court discussed the issue of bias. 
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However, it should be noted that the issue of judicial independence 
also cropped up, since funding affects the independence of the Court 
if it could be shown that some form of control was exercised. Control 
need not be direct or overt. Any attempt by the Management 
Committee or State or a principal organ in curtailing the proceedings 
of the courts in any manner would raise the spectre of judicial 
dependence if there is a perception that decisions were made by the 
International Tribunals that resulted in the convictions of the accused 
to please the financing parties.107 
The provisions of Article 6 are rather unsettling: the finances of the 
Special Court are not certain. Unlike the International Tribunals 
which are part of the United Nations framework, the Special Court 
occupies a unique position. Whilst the Tribunals will get their 
budgets from the United Nations, the Special Court does not enjoy 
that privilege. The disturbing impression one gets from reading 
Article 6is that its functions and operations depend on whether or 
not the Secretary-General obtains funding. This should not be the 
case and goes against the very grain of judicial independence, which 
is the freedom to dispense its judicial functions without fear or 
favour. As was put succinctly by a legal commentator “It seems that in 
any event that circumstances of precarious finances create a danger of 
encroachment on the independence of any chambers.”108 
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As has been seen, States can show their displeasure of the courts in 
various ways. Withholding finance, cutting down on the budget or 
simply not making any payments at all, could affect the 
independence of the courts and even threaten their existence.109 Such 
improper influence should ideally be avoided, but the realpolitik of 
this type of scenarios make it impossible to rule out that possibility. 
What are the matters that could be controlled through inadequate 
funding? Facilities such as properly erected courtrooms, offices, 
technological equipment go to structural effectiveness. Skilled 
personnel such as judges, prosecutors, legal assistants, translators, 
investigators, secretaries are necessary to ensure that the accused 
receives a fair trial. If there are inadequate resources,110  then the 
Tribunals may not be able to ensure that the trials are proceeded with 
expeditiously and hence their character as an independent court may 
be affected since the lack of funding has affected their judicial 
functions adversely.111 
In this regard, the role of the General Assembly is also of relevance. Whilst the 
General Assembly was not involved in the establishment of the International 
Tribunals, the Assembly does have a significant say in crucial issues relating 
to the membership, operations and administration of the courts. Article 17 of 
the Charter confers the General Assembly exclusive control over the finances 
of the United Nations including the power to apportion expenses of the 
principal organs and their subsidiaries. This power of the General Assembly 
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has been explicitly recognised by the Statute of the Tribunal itself. It is a 
power that it guards jealously.  This was no more apparent than the 
Assembly‟s clash with the Secretariat over the funding of the ICTY.112 
 
The General Assembly was dissatisfied with the Secretary-General‟s 
contention that there was no barrier to the Security Council deciding for itself 
on the appropriate funding of the Tribunals subject to the approval by the 
General Assembly.113 In other words, the Secretary-General implied that the 
principal organ had the discretion to decide on budgetary matters relating to 
the Council‟s subsidiary organs. The relevant factor here was the relationship 
between the Security Council and the ICTY which was a parent-subsidiary 
organs relationship. The Assembly showed its displeasure at the usurpation 
of its powers over budgetary matters by first, expressing its dissatisfaction 
that the Security Council impinged on its exclusive prerogative over 
budgetary matters of the United Nations and secondly, by showing equivocal 
support of the Tribunal by approving the budget for only “immediate and 
urgent requirements of the Tribunal”114 The danger arising from this power is 
only too apparent: it could be used to restrict the effective operations of the 
court and would therefore have a significant effect on the independence of the 
Tribunals.  
 
An offshoot of the fact that the International Tribunals are unique entities 
compared to national courts is the internal funding of the Tribunal as a whole. 
It is the Registry who controls the purse strings.115 This could also give the 
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appearance that the Chambers, as the solely judicial organ of the International 
Tribunals bears the risk of its independence being threatened by the Registry. 
There is no doubt though that the General Assembly could exercise control 
over the International Tribunals by cutting down funds for the proper 
functioning of the Tribunals.116 
 
One aspect of the character of the International Tribunal as an independent 
court established by law is that financing can also affect the right of the 
accused to a fair trial. Almost all of the accused at the International Tribunals 
were and are on legal aid.117 Legal aid in national jurisdictions is usually 
provided for by an entity separate from the judicial organ. 118  At the 
International Tribunals however, such monies come from their budgets. If 
financing is reduced or limited, then the legal aid available to the accused is 
also affected.119 Should such a case occur, the chances of the accused retaining 
a competent lawyer to represent him are slim as there are simply no adequate 
resources.120 The quality of legal representation and skills presented during 
trials would be compromised and since it is the responsibility of the 
International Tribunals of obtaining competent and qualified counsel to 
ensure that the right of the accused to a fair trial, it needs to get the financial 
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assurances from the United Nations. Its dependency on the United Nations 
for funding also restricts its ability to give the accused to a fair trial. 
 
A corollary issue of the financing aspect has emerged as a problematic one in 
the aftermath of the Completion Strategy. Since International Tribunals were 
being wound-up, judges are seeking security for their retirement from the 
Tribunals. Unfortunately, the United Nations has been rather reticient about 
this matter, causing the President of the ICTY to state: 
 
Also of critical importance at this juncture is a positive resolution of the legal 
entitlement of the Judges to receive a pension in full parity with Judges of the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with the Statute of the International 
Tribunal, as was recommended in the independent consultant‟s study commissioned 
by the Secretary-General. The claim of the Judges to this entitlement has been long 
outstanding, and the failure to resolve it expeditiously and fairly has been detrimental 
to the morale of the Judges. Many of the International Tribunal‟s Judges are currently 
serving their second term, while a few are in their third term. The efficiency of the 
International Tribunal’s work is premised upon the experience and dedication 
of all of its Judges, and the retention of these qualified and highly experienced 
Judges is critical to meeting the aims of the Completion Strategy.121(emphasis 
added) 
 
The judges are put in a precarious position here because of the failure of the 
United Nations to pay their claims for pensions. Pensions form part of the 
financial security that is crucial to individual independence of the 
judge.122The uncertainty surrounding the payment of pensions to the Tribunal 
judges would surely raise a doubt as to their independence. Whether there is 
actual compromise of the independence of the judges is not the issue; the 
issue is whether the circumstances have given rise to a perception of 
dependence. 
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The second part of the President‟s statement gives an inference that skilled 
and experienced judges would leave the Tribunals if their pension claims are 
not met. He seems to make a veiled threat – pay up or they will leave and the 
Completion Strategy would not be accomplished. Here the financing issue 
relates to the individual independence of the judges and their security of 
tenure. President Pocar actually states it blatantly that the non-failure of the 
payment of the pensions have affected the morale of the judges adversely.  
This has given the implication that the impartiality of the judges may be 
affected as their financial security is not guaranteed. 
 
Article 115 of the Rome Statute provides that funds for the Court would be 
made up of assessed contributions by the Assembly of State Parties and 
where a case referral is made by the Security Council, by the United Nations 
with the approval of the General Assembly.123Article 116allows the Court to 
receive voluntary contributions from Governments, Non-Governmental 
Organisations and various other entities.124  The Assembly of State Parties 
have already formulated and adopted budgets for the Court.125 The ICC is 
already facing the same problems that the Special Court faced and indeed the 
United Nations itself faces – that of non-payment of its assessed contributions. 
Only a few States had paid their assessed contributions. Others made partial 
payments and some, none at all.126 This poses a possible emasculation of the 
performance and functions of the ICC and hence, its independence. 
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Secondly, there may be threats to the independence of the ICC from another 
potential source. The Committee on Budget and Finance, whose duty and 
responsibility includes preparing the budget, made recommendations on 
cutting the funds of all the organs of the ICC with the exception of the internal 
auditors and the Committee itself. The reasons given for the cuts were 
vague. 127  However, the possibility of the ICC, especially the Chambers, 
having to request funding for its operations and thus putting itself at the 
mercy of a committee, is rather unpalatable with its institutional 
independence. 
 
In order for a judicial organ to function properly, it must have the necessary 
resources, through finance and manpower. The needs of the International 
Tribunals are particularly complex as the law applied and practised there are 
sophisticated areas of international criminal law. The skills of the persons 
involved, especially in the legal arena, must be excellent. Finance is vital in 
ensuring that the Tribunals are able to perform properly. Lack of funds would 
handicap the Tribunals and there may be a danger that the independence will 
be threatened. 
 
3.5 THREAT TO INDEPENDENCE: THIRD PARTIES  
 
The Tribunals have had a mixed record of assuring its critics and 
supporters 128  alike of their institutional independence. Its position in the 
international arena is precarious as it has to depend on third parties for its 
operations – investigations, evidence gathering and enforcement of its 
judgments, decisions and orders. The independence of the Tribunals is at risk 
should a third party, whose assistance and cooperation are vital to the 
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Tribunal, are withheld if the decisions of the Tribunals are not to their 
approval. There are two decisions which bear truth to this type of threat to 
judicial independence. 
 
 
3.5.1. THE PROSECUTOR v STEVAN TODOROVIC: THE ICTY AND 
NATO 
 
The interlocutory decision of the ICTY in the case of the Prosecutor v Stevan 
Todorovic129 was made against Stabilization Force (“SFOR”), an arm of North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (“NATO”). The facts in brief are as follows. 
Todorovic was initially charged with twenty-seven counts ranging from war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and grave breaches of the Geneva 
Conventionsof 1949.  Whilst in custody, he had filed several motions 
disputing key issues such as the legality of his arrest130 and his detention.  
 
One of the motions filed by defence counsel131 sought an order from the Trial 
Chamber to compel certain third parties, mainly SFOR and its responsible 
authority, the North Atlantic Council132 to deliver documents relating to his 
arrest and witnesses to the defence to help them to prepare their case in the 
preliminary action of challenging the legality of the arrest of the accused.  The 
Trial Chamber granted the motion after hearing submissions of all parties, 
including SFOR.133 The Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson went further 
than the decision of his colleagues on the issue of recognising and respecting 
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of the rights of the accused in criminal proceedings. 134 The Separate Opinion 
reiterated the observation that it is incumbent upon a legal system, regardless 
of whether it is international or domestic, to ensure that the standards of the 
fair trial right of the accused are observed 135 and highlighted a consciousness 
on the part of the Tribunal as to possible criticisms to its independence. As a 
matter of principle, so the Judge held, the ICTY must be competent to make 
certain orders relevant to the right of the accused to challenge the legality of 
his arrest.136 A further consideration underlying this ruling is that legitimate 
questions could be asked of the independence of a judicial body, in this case, 
the Tribunal, if it claimed itself powerless to require the detaining or arresting 
authority to produce the necessary documents in a challenge to the legality of 
that detention.137 
 
The decision was appealed against, but a subsequent development changed 
the course of proceedings. The prosecution and defence entered into a plea 
agreement. Twenty-six of the twenty-seven charges were dropped. The 
accused changed his plea from non-guilty to guilty to the remaining charge. 
The accused also withdrew all the motions filed on his behalf including the 
one challenging the legality of his arrest.138Todorovic was sentenced to ten 
years imprisonment.139 
 
Several issues arise out of the decision on the Trial Chambers on the Motion 
of Judicial Assistance. First, the order demonstrated that the Tribunal is 
willing to ensure that the right of the accused to a fair trial is guaranteed by 
granting him an order so that he could prepare his defence properly and 
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adequately.140 Secondly, it acted on the issues and law presented to it, even 
though the some of the members of the organisation adversely affected by it 
were also permanent members of its creating body. Third, the tribunal also 
heard all parties, including a party not directly involved either in the 
proceedings before it or in the general business of the court. Its decision was 
therefore based on all the facts presented to it, and the law. 
However, there were also negative repercussions arising from this decision.  
All parties adversely affected by the Tribunal‟s decision had filed motions for 
review. 141 The United States also sought judicial review on the decision of the 
Trial Chamber issuing a subpoena against one of its generals who was the 
commanding officer of the base where Todorovic was arrested, to give 
evidence at the trial. 
 
The United States in its legal brief stated that the decision of the judges will be 
of utmost significance to the future of the tribunal as well as “the relationship 
with those engaged in the apprehension of persons indicted for war crimes”. 142 
Although the matter was settled, it was admitted that there was a decline in 
arrests of war crime suspects by SFOR following theTodorovic decision.143 
 
Here is a case of where a thinly veiled threat had an effect on the operations of 
the Tribunal. Despite giving valid legal reasons for issuing the orders for 
assistance and the subpoena, the court was given the impression that it 
should be careful of what it decided. In national jurisdictions, a court of law 
would have had no compunction in issuing an order against the authorities 
and expecting that order to be complied with. However, in the international 
arena, the courts have no such luxury as they do not have a proper 
enforcement system and have to rely on the cooperation of third parties and 
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the coercive powers of the Security Council. In the Todorovic decision, there 
was covert pressure exerted on the independence of the Tribunal. Whether 
such threat would have succeeded is moot butTodorovic illustrates situations 
where threats to institutional independence of the Tribunal could emanate 
from a third party, in this case the unlikely third party being NATO. As 
matters stood at that stage, the decision of the court showed that it took into 
consideration legal arguments and was acting independently and in 
accordance with the law as well the right of the accused to a fair trial.  
 
The connection between NATO and the ICTY was again highlighted in the 
aftermath of the bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia from 24th 
March to 9th June 1999. The Prosecutor of the ICTY was asked to look into the 
prosecution of senior political and military officials of member States of 
NATO for serious violations of international humanitarian law under Articles 
18(1) and (4)144 of the Statute of the ICTY. A committee was established to 
advise the Prosecutor on this matter and prepared a report entitled The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY): Final Report to 
the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 145  The Report 
recommended that no investigations be undertaken for several reasons such 
as the ambiguity of the law and insufficient evidence to prove the commission 
of crimes by high-ranking officials or low-level officials.146 The most telling 
factor in that Report was the observations of the Committee on the failure and 
reluctance on the part of NATO to cooperate with the Committee and provide 
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relevant information for the Committee and by extension, the Prosecutor, to 
act on.147 
 
Although the action of the Prosecutor in not proceeding against the persons 
responsible for the commission of the bombing campaign is not connected in 
any manner with the independence of the judicial organ of the Tribunal per se, 
it does have a reflection on its institutional independence. This is an example 
of a dilemma faced in an international criminal system where there is no 
separation of powers. The Office of the Prosecutor is considered as an organ 
of the Tribunal, unlike national systems where the Prosecutor is part of the 
Executive arm of the Government. There is an argument, with some merit, 
that the failure of the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigations has 
weakened the credibility of the Tribunal. 148  The independence and 
impartiality of the Tribunal was seen as compromised by a perceptible 
submission to the pressures from third parties in particular, NATO. The fact 
that the Office of the Prosecutor relies heavily on NATO and its agencies in 
carrying out some of its duties and responsibilities under the Statute could 
have been a key factor in the Committee arriving at the recommendations that 
it did.149 
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3.5.2. THE PROSECUTOR v JEAN-BOSCO BARAYAGWIZA: THE 
ABUSE OF PROCESS DOCTRINE 
 
Inherent in the duty and responsibility to ensure the right of the accused to a 
fair trial, is a corresponding duty by the International Tribunals to ensure that 
there is no abuse of process by any other organ of the Tribunals. A strongly 
independent and impartial tribunal should be able to ensure that such a fair 
trial right is protected. When there have been grave violations of the accused 
have been committed, the court should redress these violations. 
Unfortunately the International Tribunal, having first stepped up and flexed 
its independence, then retreated and allowed the abuse of process by the 
Prosecution in the Barayagwiza case. A scrutiny of the facts surrounding the 
arrest, the detention and the production of the trial of the accused would lead 
the objective commentator to question whether there has been an 
infringement of the right of the accused to a fair trial. The ICTR was put in a 
position where it had to consider this issue and the application of the abuse of 
process doctrine in particular. The independence of the ICTR thus came 
under scrutiny as a result of two conflicting Appeals Chamber decisions 
arising from the same case and came out wanting.  
 
The doctrine of abuse of process is a doctrine that has been evolved as a 
safeguard against the abuse of the right of the accused to a fair trial through 
undue process. It has been elucidated in the following manner: 
 
“Proceedings may be stayed in the exercise of the judge‟s discretion not only where 
fair trial is impossible, but also where it would be contrary to the public interest in the 
integrity of the criminal justice system that a trial should take place.”150 
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Two main issues of this doctrine should be noted. First, the decision to halt 
proceedings is a discretionary matter, which could only be exercised by the 
judge. Secondly, the violations of the rights of the accused must be so 
egregious and serious that it would be impossible to grant him a fair trial. The 
court would look at all the circumstances of the case before it decides whether 
or not to stop or discontinue proceedings against the accused. The right of the 
accused to be tried without delay is a fair trial right that has been guaranteed 
in all regional and international human rights as well as the Statute of the 
ICTY. Delay in producing the accused to a trial expeditiously and without 
delay is a common ground for abuse of process.151 This was the ground that 
was raised in the case of Jean Bosco Barayagwiza v The Prosecutor.152 
 
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was indicted for genocide, conspiracy to commit 
genocide, complicity to commit genocide and crimes against humanity under 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute of the ICTR. Barayagwiza fled Rwanda to 
Cameroon where he was arrested on the 15th of April 1996.153 There were 
several complications arising in these proceedings, including irresolute 
conduct of the Prosecutor regarding the detention of the accused as well as 
the conduct of the Government of Cameroon.154 
 
The Appeals Chamber was asked to decide on a motion by the accused 
requesting for the quashing of his arrest155 and for his immediate release. The 
court allowed the motion156 and dismissed the indictment against the accused 
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on several grounds, including an inordinate delay in informing the accused of 
the charges against him 157  and failure to try his case without undue 
delay.158The court found that the pre-trial length of detention of the accused 
was significantly longer than that was acceptable under international human 
rights standards.159 The Appeals Chamber held that it would be a travesty of 
justice if the Tribunal allowed the prosecution of the accused to continue in 
view of the egregious violations of his rights under the Statute. This in turn 
would have affected the integrity of the Tribunal in protecting the rights of 
the accused as well as putting in doubt the independence of the Tribunal. The 
Tribunal asserted that its proper role as an independent judicial organ was to 
ensure that injustice to the accused was halted in this case.160 
 
Having decided to set the accused free, a somewhat differently constituted 
Appeals Chamber,161 in an unprecedented move, allowed the Prosecutor‟s 
Motion to review its earlier decision and reversed it in light of “new 
evidence”. 162  The Appeals Chamber allowed the Prosecutor‟s motion and 
ordered the accused to remain in custody until trial.  
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In the course of her submissions to the Appeals Chamber, the Prosecutor 
informed the court that as a result of its November 1999 Decision, the 
Government of Rwanda had suspended all cooperation with the Tribunal. 
The consequence of this was that “justice as dispensed by this Tribunal was 
paralysed”.163 The Prosecutor admitted that the ability of the prosecution to 
carry out its work164 and by extension, the ability of the Tribunal to fulfil its 
mandate depended on the cooperation by Rwanda.165 
 
The Appeals Chamber did not accept the validity of the submissions of the 
Prosecutor but there was no doubt whatsoever as to the subtle issue in her 
submission, which was basically a threat to the duty of the Tribunal to form a 
judicial decision independently without fear or favour from two quarters. The 
thrust of her argument was that if the Appeals Chamber did not issue a 
decision that would appease the Government of Rwanda, the court would be 
signalling its own demise.   
 
The threat to the independence of the Tribunal came from two sources: first, 
from the Prosecutor herself and secondly, from the Government of Rwanda. 
The Attorney-General of Rwanda appeared as amicus curiae in the hearing of 
the Prosecutor‟s Notice of Motion and expressly threatened non-cooperation 
of Rwanda if the Appeals Chamber dismissed the request for review.166 If 
Rwanda had carried out its threat, the Tribunal‟s work would have been 
severely and adversely affected 167 and it would not be able to carry out its 
mandate.  
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Rwanda had renewed cooperation prior to the hearing of the Prosecutor‟s 
Motion but made it clear that its cooperation was conditional and that it 
would withdraw cooperation if it was faced with an “unfavourable Decision”.168 
In light of this statement and the submissions of the Prosecutor, the March 
2000 Decision was controversial and raised a perception that the Appeals 
Chamber had bowed to external pressure from the Government of Rwanda. 
 
Barayagwizais a case where the Tribunal was asked to weigh the rights of the 
accused against the mandate of the Tribunal which is to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the crimes mentioned under the Statute. The accused came out 
wanting. The Tribunal came out with a dented reputation. By reversing its 
earlier decision which had addressed the injustice caused to the accused by 
breach his statutory rights, the Appeals Chamber appeared to give the 
impression that it had capitulated to external pressures, namely the dictates of 
a State and a forceful stance by the Prosecutor of the Tribunal, and therefore 
had compromised its independence.169 
 
The Appeals Chamber attempted to assert its independence when it said the 
following: 
 
“The Appeals Chamber wishes to stress that the Tribunal is an independent body, 
whose decisions are based solely on justice and law. If the decision in any case should 
be followed by non-co-operation, that consequence would be a matter for the Security 
Council.”170 
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The decision of the Appeals Chamber does not rest comfortably with the 
notion that the Tribunal must respect fully respect the international human 
rights standards at every stage of the proceedings.  In this case, it includes the 
rights contained in Article 9(3)171 and Article 14(3) of the ICCPRwhich are the 
right of the pre-trial detainee to be tried within a reasonable time and the 
right of the accused to be tried without undue delay respectively.172 There is 
an overlap between these two rights, since the right of the accused to have his 
case tried without undue delay, a minimum guarantee of fair trial, may be 
affected if he was detained for an inordinate length of time.173 
 
That the Appeals Chamber was aware that their independence would be 
called into question was evident when three of the five judges issued separate 
Declarations denying expressly that there was any coercion on them for the 
new contrary decision.174 
 
 The Declaration of Judge Nieto-Navia stressed that the independence of the 
Tribunal was not compromised by political pressures and that the decision 
taken was based on the law and not “as a result of political pressure and threats to 
withhold co-operation being asserted by an angry Government”175 
 
The judge further held: 
 
“The principle of the independence of the judiciary is overriding and should at all 
times take precedence faced with any conflict, political pressures or interference. The 
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proposition put forward by the Prosecutor that political considerations can play a role 
in the Appeals Chamber‟s decision making and actions is not acceptable.“ 176 
 
Judge Nieto-Navia‟s declaration on judicial independence is correctly put. His 
admonition of the Prosecutor is also correct, since her submissions did give 
the impression that proceedings at the Tribunal are politicised. Whatever the 
reality of the situation at the Tribunal may be, judicial independence does not 
have room for political considerations. However, the Declaration as well as 
the Declarations of the other judges are unconvincing in light of the effect of 
the decision of the Appeals Chamber. The March 2000 decision has 
unfortunately dented the integrity of the international criminal system, in 
particular the ICTR. Barayagwiza has demonstrated that political 
considerations did play a role in the Appeals Chamber and its independence 
in particular has been adversely affected. 
 
The Barayagwiza decision is not a good precedent to support the contentions 
of the International Tribunal that they are “truly independent”. The 
judgement of this case seem to reflect “validate” abuse of process and are 
rather repugnant to the whole concept of fair trial. That “validation” can be 
traced back to pressures from third parties and somewhere alongst that path, 
the independence of the Tribunals was sacrificed.177 
 
 
3.6. THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE 
 
Threats to the independence of the Special Court may emanate from two 
sources – the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone.  Perhaps 
the analogous reference to the establishment of a judicial organ in a national 
system by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic once again might be of some 
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assistance. Comparatively, the Special Court is created by two political bodies. 
Whilst it does not mean that the Special Court may be tainted with the 
political characteristics, as all other courts, whether national or international, 
the Special Court bears the risk of indirect threat to independence through 
financial aspect.  
 
The Appeals Chamber in the Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana 178(Case NO. 
SCSL-2004-14-AR72 (E)) adopted the stance of the International Tribunals and 
asserted that the Court could not be controlled than in administrative matters, 
meaning advice and policy direction. 179 The question of control over the 
Special Court was succinctly answered by Justice Robertson: 
 
“Judicial independence requires courts to be “beyond the influence or control” of any 
political body in their judicial functioning”180 
 
In the case before the Court, Judge Robertson held that there was nothing 
illegal in the Security Council decision that the non-judicial functions of the 
Special Court should be the responsibility of a Management Committee which 
was established to carry out the administrative and finance aspects of the 
Tribunal. 
 
Indeed, the Appeals Chamber concluded that although termination of the 
Special Court and/or amendment to its Statute wouldneed the agreement of 
the Government of Sierra Leone but “in reality would follow from any such 
decision by the Security Council itself”.181 
   
The Appeals Chamber stated that the termination of its mandate lies in the 
hand of the Security Council. This is probably the correct statement as the 
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Security Council‟s powers are very significant. It does not necessarily mean 
that the Appeals Chamber is indicating that it is dependent on the Security 
Council. 
 
 
3.7 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
 
Potential sources of threats to independence are the members of the Assembly 
of State Parties and the Security Council. Article 2 of the Relationship 
Agreement avers that the United Nations recognises the ICC as an 
independent court. Article 16 of the Rome Statute allows the Security Control 
to exercise a certain degree of control over the ICC in its judicial capacity.  
Article 16 states as follows: 
 
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded with under this 
Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security Council, in a resolution adopted 
under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has requested the Court to 
that effect; that request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions.182 
 
The Security Council could issue mandatory orders to the Court to defer the 
proceedings before it for a period of 12 months. Theoretically this could go on 
infinitely, as there appears to be no limitation to the number of requests the 
Security Council could make. This provision, although arguably is necessary 
in order to avoid potential overlaps and conflicts between the duties and 
responsibilities of the Security Council and the ICC, is open to potential 
misuse by the Security Council resulting in an adverse effect on the ICC.183 
The role of the Security Council in the proceedings of the ICC is seen as a 
politicisation of the judicial process.184 It allows investigations or proceedings 
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against an accused to be deferred at the whim of the Security Council. Such 
deferral may go against the right of the accused to be tried without undue 
delay under Article 67. 
 
 
3.8  SUMMARY 
 
The nature and jurisdiction of the international courts in the international 
arena makes them particularly susceptible to political considerations.185 An 
irreproachable distance is difficult to maintain as the operations of the 
Tribunals depend to a large extent on the organs of the United Nations and 
MemberStates whose cooperation may depend on policy and political issues. 
The various trial proceedings at the International Tribunals have sometimes 
put them in difficult situations. They have to ensure that the perpetrators of 
the crimes committed be punished and as a consequence, appease victims of 
those crimes by showing that justice is done and at the same time, they have 
to ensure that the rights of the accused to receive a fair trial are guaranteed as 
well. The dilemma posed by Barayagwizawas unfortunate; but as a court of 
law, the Tribunal was bound to apply the laws as provided for in its legal 
documents as well as the international human rights standards that it vowed 
to and was in fact expected to follow. In Barayagwiza the Tribunal did find 
that there were breaches of the statutory rights of the accused. The 
subsequent decision to allow the Prosecutor‟s motion did not reflect well on 
the independence of the Tribunal.186 A tribunal that is independent has a duty 
to ensure that the due process of the law is served, and this means having to 
apply the law as it stands even though such a decision may be unpopular.187 
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Both Todorovic and Barayagwiza raised much debate. For all their efforts to 
meticulously safeguard their independence, they had to bow down to 
political pressure, as much as they tried to deny it.  
 
There is no satisfactory solution to this dilemma; the choice the Tribunal has 
to make between guaranteeing the rights of the accused to a fair trial and 
fulfilling its mandate have resulted in decisions that have restricted the rights 
of the accused. A perception has arisen that the Tribunals have failed to fulfil 
the requirement in its mandate to scrupulously observe fair trial guarantees 
for the accused particularly with relation to its independence. Whatever 
choice the court may have made in two conflicting decisions such as these, it 
would have been a controversial one. If the Appeals Chamber had found for 
the Prosecution in the November Decision, the Court would have been criticised 
of not safeguarding the fair trial rights of the accused, not respecting the 
international fair trial standards and confirming criticisms that the 
International Tribunals are neither independent nor impartial.188 
 
Another dilemma faced by the International Tribunals in asserting its 
independence is the relationship that it has with the Security Council. Aside 
from their relationship qua principal organ and its subsidiary, the relationship 
between the Tribunals and the Council is not as distinct and unambiguous as 
a relationship between a political and a judicial organ in national systems. A 
pre-requisite of judicial independence is that there must be a clear 
demarcation of functions between these two organs. 
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 The Human Rights Committee said in the context of Article 14(1) that a 
situation where: 
 
“…the functions and competences of the judiciary and the executive are not clearly 
distinguishable or where the latter is able to control or direct the former is 
incompatible with the notion of an independent and impartial tribunal”189 
 
Although the comments above were made in relation to domestic proceedings, 
they could be applicable by analogy to the international courts principally 
with regard to their relationships with the Security Council. Yet again, the 
peculiar set-up of the International Tribunals as an institution makes it 
markedly different from the national courts in the constitutional set-up. A 
major difference is the powers of the courts. In order that they are able to 
carry out the terms of their mandates efficiently the Tribunals should have 
coercive powers to ensure that its orders are complied with. The Tribunals 
does not have an enforcement or coercive mechanism. There is no police or 
security force to carry out its orders. It relies on the cooperation of national 
systems to carry out its mandate effectively as it cannot compel member 
States to comply with its orders. 190  Problems arise when States refuse to 
cooperate with the Tribunals. The intransigence of the Republic of Croatia in 
its refusal to cooperate with the ICTY as well as complying with its orders191 
prompted two Presidents of the ICTY, first President Antonio Cassese and 
then his successor President MacDonald to officially complain to the Security 
Council.192 The Tribunal was as President Cassese put it, a “giant who has no 
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arms and legs”.193 The Tribunal‟s resort to the Security Council for assistance in 
compliance with a judicial order is damaging to the institutional 
independence of the Tribunal as it puts the ICTY in a position of dependence 
on the Security Council.194 
 
Certain other non-judicial activities of the ICTY as an institution has attracted 
criticisms and raised the issue of its independence vis-à-vis the Security 
Council. In February 1995, the judges of the ICTY issued a press statement 
requesting the Prosecutor to issue a “programme of indictments” to “meet the 
expectations of the Security Council and of the world community at large”.195 
This statement clouded the institutional independence of the Tribunal as it 
gave the impression that the aim of the ICTY was to secure convictions as 
expected by the Security Council rather than doing justice between all parties 
concerned.196 It brought a political angle to the operations of the ICTY as a 
judicial organ as it highlighted the alleged obeisance of the Tribunal to the 
Security Council. 
 
In domestic systems, it would be very rare for judges to adopt a prominent 
role as the judges of the ICTY. It could be argued that the action by the ICTY 
should not be interpreted in negative terms as compromising its 
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independence but rather calling attention to its inability to proceed with its 
judicial business, which was being hampered by lack of cooperation, by 
member States. However, such action by the judges could be interpreted as 
stepping out of their sphere of duties into the realm of the prosecution. It is 
the prosecutor‟s duty to issue indictments and the judges‟ duty to adjudicate. 
Press statements such as the one above may make their position vulnerable to 
the adage of being a “football of political factions”.197 
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3.9 INDIVIDUAL INDEPENDENCE 
 
In order for a judge to be able to assert his individual independence, he 
should be able to offer objective guarantees that the personal attributes to his 
term of office are secured. These personal attributes include matters such as 
manner of appointment, security of tenure, qualifications, promotions, 
pensions and other relevant factors. The existence of any safeguards against 
pressures is also pertinent.198 They are keys to the core of that independence 
and must be secured to maintain it. The extent to which judicial independence 
is observed may be gauged from the objective conditions or guarantees that 
the judge individually and the tribunal as a whole possess and enjoy.199 Once 
the judge has his essential conditions assured, his individual independence 
and consequently, the institutional independence of the tribunal are 
presumed guaranteed. 
 
The European Court said in the case of Campbell and Fell v United 
Kingdom200 
 
“….the Court has had regard to the manner of appointment of its members (of the 
adjudicating body) and the duration of their  term of office, the existence of guarantees 
against outside pressures and the question whether the body presents an appearance 
of independence.”201 
 
Pressure on the judge‟s individual independence through deprivation or 
compromise of those conditions, primarily by the Executive, may also result 
in jeopardising the institutional independence of the judicial organ202 which 
may give an appearance of an organ that is subservient to and at the mercy of 
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the other limbs of Government. Further, when the objective guarantees of 
individual independence are compromised, the individual independence of 
the judge is affected and this may in turn have a negative bearing on his 
impartiality since any decision he may come will be open to criticism of bias. 
A dependent judge cannot, by definition, be impartial. Independence is 
therefore an innate and essential condition of impartiality.203 
 
Individual independence has many aspects to it. These aspects must be 
secured to protect the individual independence of the judge. These include 
method of appointment, terms of appointment including security and 
conditions of tenure and personal characteristics of the judges such as 
qualifications and training. It was succinctly put by the Human Rights 
Committee when it said: 
 
“a competent, independent and impartial tribunal” (as provided by Art. 14(1) of the 
ICCPR) raises many matters including the manner in which the judges are 
appointed, the qualifications for appointment, and the duration of their terms 
of office; the condition (sic) governing promotion, transfer and cessation of 
their functions and the actual independence of the judiciary from the 
executive branch and the legislative.”204(emphasis added) 
 
Individual or personal independence was elucidated by the Trial Chamber of 
the ICTR in Kanyabashi205 
 
......the personal independence of the judges.....[is]underscored by Article 12 of the 
Statute....which states that persons of high moral character, integrity, impartiality, 
who possess adequate qualifications to become judges in their respective countries and 
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having widespread experience in criminal law, international law including 
international humanitarian law and human rights law”206 
 
Thus the independence of the judge is gauged in the manner as stated above. 
Whether the requirements are complied with or if they were, how detailed 
was the compliance are interesting issues that will be discussed below. 
 
 
3.10 MANNER OF APPOINTMENT 
 
The appointment of judges is a critical factor in gauging judicial 
independence. Two considerations arise from this particular aspect of 
individual independence. First, the nature and character of the organ 
appointing the judges may have a bearing on the personal independence of 
the judges. The second consideration is the process of the appointment itself 
which takes into account the necessary factors required for judicial office, 
such as qualifications, experience and expertise.  The selection mechanism is 
important as this is the process that would ensure that only persons who are 
of excellent qualifications and very good character would be chosen to hold 
an office that commands essentially a great degree of responsibilities and 
power.  
 
State practice of appointment of judges varies but the most common mode of 
appointment is by the Executive.207 The European Court has held that the 
appointment of judges by the Executive is acceptable.208 However, this is not 
to say that such appointments could not be doubted on grounds of eligibility, 
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independence and their qualifications. The former Chief Justice of Australia, 
Sir Gerald Brennan observed 
 
 “judicial independence is at risk when future appointment or security of tenure is 
within the gift of the Executive.”209 
 
Judgements issued by such persons may be set aside, not necessarily on their 
merits but merely on the fact that the judgements were made by a person 
whose appointment was a “gift by the Executive”.   
 
The personal independence of a judge could be challenged on the manner of 
appointment  aspect only if it could be shown that that particular practice of 
appointment is, as a whole, unsatisfactory or that that  “the establishment of the 
particular court deciding the case of which was influenced by improper motives”.210 
 
The Human Rights Committee had made observations on the issue of the 
nature of the appointing body in State Practice. In its Concluding 
Observations on Slovakia, the Committee said as follows: 
 
“The Committee notes with concern that the present rules governing the appointment 
of the judges by the Government with the approval of Parliament could have a 
negative impact on the independence of the judiciary. Therefore, the Committee 
recommends that specific measures guaranteeing the independence of the judiciary, 
protecting judges from any force of political influence through the adoption  of laws 
regulating the appointment, remuneration, tenure, dismissal and disciplining of 
members of the judiciary”211 
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Principle 10 of the Basic Principles 212  makes it imperative that not only 
should candidates for the positions of judges have integrity but also ability, 
training and qualifications. It is imperative that the method of appointment of 
judges ensures that candidates who are best qualified for judicial office are 
appointed. Equally, such method should ensure that there are safeguards 
against improper influences on the appointments.213 The pitfalls in appointing 
a person who is not qualified for the position of a judge are only too apparent. 
Misleading and misinformed judgements and improper or unreliable conduct 
of trials are examples of possible pitfalls of having non-qualified persons 
sitting on the bench. The judge has to be a good judge as it were, so that he 
could perform his functions efficiently, having the necessary knowledge, 
expertise and skills. These characteristics of a judicial office are very relevant 
in ensuring that the rights of the accused are not compromised. 
 
At the International Tribunals, the mode of election of judges is a fairly 
complicated and comprehensive process. Two of the principal organs of the 
United Nations, namely the Security Council and the General Assembly are 
involved in the method of appointment of judges to the panels of the 
International Tribunals. This is akin to the national practice of electing of 
judges by the Government and Parliament. The procedure provides a role for 
Member States of the United Nations to participate in the election process. 
Since the Tribunals are exercising criminal jurisdiction on the part of 
international community, this involvement is appropriate.214 
 
Article 13 bisof the Statute of the ICTY 215  provides for nomination of 
candidates for judicial office at the Tribunal  by member States and non-
member States maintaining permanent observer missions at the United 
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Nations Headquarters.216 The Security Council then screens the nominations 
received and prepares a list for consideration by the General Assembly.  The 
final decision of the appointment of judges lies with the General Assembly 
who would elect the candidates from the list submitted by the Security 
Council. 
 
This method of election is geared towards negating any observation of lack of 
transparency in the election of process. The involvement of the General 
Assembly would avoid any possible criticisms of lack of institutional and 
individual independence of the International Tribunals and their judges from 
the Security Council. Such a method of appointment could theoretically be 
free from the criticism that the appointments of the judges could have 
political connotations since they were made solely by a political body.217 
The appointment of judges at the ICC is governed by Article 36 of the Rome 
Statute. The relevant provisions concerning nominations and elections of 
judges are as follows: 
 
Qualifications, nomination and election of judges 
1.  Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2, there shall be 18 judges of the Court. 
2.......... 
3......... 
 
4. (a) Nominations of candidates for election to the Court may be made by any State 
Party to this Statute, and shall be made either: 
(i) By the procedure for the nomination of candidates for appointment to the highest 
judicial offices in the State in question; or 
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(ii) By the procedure provided for the nomination of candidates for the International 
Court of Justice in the Statute of that Court.  
Nominations shall be accompanied by a statement in the necessary detail specifying 
how the candidate fulfils the requirements of paragraph 3. 
(b) Each State Party may put forward one candidate for any given election who need 
not necessarily be a national of that State Party but shall in any case be a national of a 
State Party. 
(c) The Assembly of States Parties may decide to establish, if appropriate, an Advisory 
Committee on nominations. In that event, the Committee‟s composition and mandate 
shall be established by the Assembly of States Parties. 
 
5. For the purposes of the election, there shall be two lists of candidates: 
List A containing the names of candidates with the qualifications specified in 
paragraph 3 (b) (i); and 
List B containing the names of candidates with the qualifications specified in 
paragraph 3 (b) (ii). 
A candidate with sufficient qualifications for both lists may choose on which list to 
appear. At the first election to the Court, at least nine judges shall be elected from list 
A and at least five judges from list B. Subsequent elections shall be so organized as to 
maintain the equivalent proportion on the Court of judges qualified on the two lists. 
 
7. No two judges may be nationals of the same State. A person who, for the purposes 
of membership of the Court, could be regarded as a national of more than one State 
shall be deemed to be a national of the State in which that person ordinarily exercises 
civil and political rights. 
 
8. (a) The States Parties shall, in the selection of judges, take into account the need, 
within the membership of the Court, for: 
(i) The representation of the principal legal systems of the world; 
(ii) Equitable geographical representation; and 
(iii) A fair representation of female and male judges. 
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(b) States Parties shall also take into account the need to include judges with legal 
expertise on specific issues, including, but not limited to, violence against women or 
children. 
 
The nomination and election process of the judges at the ICC are fairly 
complex processes which involve two lists of nominees with names of 
candidates who fall within the qualifications requirements of Article 
36(3)(b)(i)and Article 36(3)(b)(ii). Nominations are made only by States party 
to the Statute of the ICC, unlike the judges at the ad hoc tribunals who are 
nominated by members of the United Nations. States could nominate 
candidates who are not its nationals but nationals of another State party to the 
Statute.218 
 
Appointment of judges is done through a secret ballot at a meeting of the 
Assembly of State Parties219 convened for that purpose.220 The main organs of 
the United Nations would not be able to exert direct pressure on the 
independence of the judiciary as they are not the appointing parties.221 The 
involvement of the State Parties is not free from pitfalls either. The secret 
ballot method negates any transparency and as most secret ballot methods of 
election, it has its drawbacks and is open to abuse.  
 
By Article 12 of the Statute of the Special Court at Sierra Leone, the judges 
are elected through a consultation process between the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone as contractual parties 
to the Special Court Agreement. It could be said that prima facie this manner of 
appointment appears to be a sound method as two parties are involved in the 
appointment of judges. 
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3.11  QUALIFICATIONS 
 
A judge must be a qualified person in order to serve on a judicial panel. He 
should have proper legal training. A sophisticated criminal system as the 
international criminal justice requires judges to be persons of appropriate 
qualifications with knowledge and expertise of international humanitarian 
and criminal laws. An accused person is entitled to expect that the 
adjudicating officer is well-versed in the law and is equipped to ensure that 
he receives a fair trial. 
 
Whilst Article 11 of the Statute of the ICTY requires the judges be 
independent, Article 13states that they 222  shall be persons of high moral 
character, impartiality and integrity. They must have the necessary 
qualifications that are required in their respective jurisdictions to be 
appointed to the highest judicial office in their national legal systems. This 
requirement imposes a high threshold, as judges eligible to the highest 
possible judicial appointment in their national jurisdictions would have 
acquired experience, knowledge and skills in adjudicating trial proceedings. It 
could be argued that this provision means that the judges appointed to the ad 
hoc tribunals are the most senior and experienced members of the judiciary in 
their national jurisdictions.  A natural corollary is that they bring their 
considerable knowledge and experience in the law as well as conduct of 
criminal trials to the international courts.223 
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Article 13 has been amended to add Article 13 bisand Article 13 terto 
encompass both permanent and ad litem judges.224 
 
The qualifications of the judges at the ICC are set out in Article 36(3). This 
states:  
 
3. (a) The judges shall be chosen from among persons of high moral character, 
impartiality and integrity who possess the qualifications required in their respective 
States for appointment to the highest judicial offices. 
(b) Every candidate for election to the Court shall: 
(i) Have established competence in criminal law and procedure, and the necessary 
relevant experience, whether as judge, prosecutor, advocate or in other similar 
capacity, in criminal proceedings; or 
(ii) Have established competence in relevant areas of international law such as 
international humanitarian law and the law of human rights, and extensive 
experience in a professional legal capacity which is of relevance to the judicial work of 
the Court; 
(c) Every candidate for election to the Court shall have an excellent knowledge of and 
be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the Court. 
The provisions here are similar to the provisions of the Statutes of the ad hoc 
Tribunals. Like the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals, the Statute of the ICC 
makes it clear that the judges must be highly qualified, experienced and 
impartial. The inherent requirement of impartiality personal to the office of 
the judge has been made into a statutory requirement. This is in line with the 
intent expressed in the Preamble to the Basic Principles that judicial 
independence and impartiality should be respected and incorporated into 
national legislation. That intention is reflected in the international criminal 
proceedings through the provisions of the Statutes of the Tribunals and ICC. 
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However, the Rome Statute provisions are far more comprehensive than the 
provisions of the International Tribunals. It appears that Article 36 was 
designed to cover the lacunae exposed by the Statutes and Rules of the 
International Tribunals, such as requirement of excellent command of one of 
the working languages of the court, specific expertise in areas germane to 
international criminal law and international humanitarian law as well as 
relevant professional experience. 
 
Article 36(3)(b) is very comprehensive as to the qualifications required for a 
successful candidate. The requirements are specific, unlike the more general 
provisions of the Statutes of the ad hoc Tribunals. 
 
The Article makes it mandatory that the candidates must have established 
competence in both criminal law and procedure and obtained the necessary 
experience either as a judge, prosecutor or a legal practitioner. The experience 
required under this requirement is “relevant”: Article 36(3)(b)(i)whereas a 
candidate seeking nomination under the international humanitarian law or 
human rights qualification limb of Article 36(3)(b)(ii)has to show that he is 
competent and has had extensive experience in a professional legal capacity 
which is relevant to the judicial work of the Court. Presumably this includes 
those who have legal experience but have not served as a judge or worked as 
a prosecutor or as a practitioner. This provision could mean that established 
academics may also be nominated as candidates.225 The second condition for 
suitability for candidacy for the positions of judges is that the candidate must 
be fluent in at least one of the working languages of the court: Article 36(3)(c).  
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Undoubtedly the requirements for the nominees for the ICC are more 
stringent than that required of the judges at the ad hoc tribunals. As the ICC 
will be dealing with highly-specialised areas of law, it is important that the 
judges hearing the cases should have in-depth knowledge of the areas of the 
relevant laws. Lack of knowledge and indeed experience would be an 
obstacle to fair and expeditious trials and also may jeopardise the right of the 
accused to a fair trial thus. This Article also avoids the problems international 
judges faced at the International Court of Justice, where their work in 
international law prior to their appointments to the Court have in the past 
invited challenges to their independence.226 
 
The qualifications required of the judges at the Special Court are similar to 
their counterparts at the International Tribunals. Article 13 (1)of the Statute 
requires the judges to be of high moral character, impartiality and integrity. 
The provision is very clear in asserting the independence of the judges in the 
performance of their functions which should be executed without “taking 
instructions from any Government or source.” Article 13(b)requires the 
judges to have obtained experience in international law, international 
humanitarian law and human rights law. 
 
The Articles relating to the qualifications of judges at the ICC are far more 
comprehensive than the requirements set by its ad hoc counterparts. The 
lacunae in the specifications for qualifications at the ad hoc tribunals has 
caused problems in the actual trial process, for having a string of first-class 
degrees from prestigious Universities are useless in reality if such brilliance is 
marred by hapless understanding of the practical approach towards trial 
proceedings. 
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An issue involving qualifications that have attracted much comment is 
peculiar to international judges. This relates to their linguistic skills, or rather 
lack of. It goes without saying that language is vital to proceedings, more so 
criminal proceedings, since a person‟s liberty is at stake. Therefore 
proceedings and evidence given during the proceedings must be understood 
by all parties, especially the judges who are the ones who bear the 
responsibility of making a finding of guilt of an accused. 
 
Linguistic problems were rampant in the ICTY where the official languages of 
the Tribunal are English and French.227 The lack of fluency or knowledge in 
either of these languages on the part of the judges as well as in the native 
languages of the accused, victims and witnesses can be a hindrance to a fair 
trial. 228Article 13does not require any language skills on the part of the 
judicial candidate.229 What would be the effect of the lack of language skills 
on the part of the judges? For one, the trials would take longer than necessary, 
thereby breaching the right of the accused to a fair and expeditious trial. For 
another, it would take time to draft judgements and may hold back the right 
of the accused to appeal against the decision.230 
 
A matter that is quite common in the International Tribunal is the attempt by 
the judges to get their legal assistants to write judgements on their behalf. The 
admission by a former serving judge that the task of initially drafting the 
judgement, “is not infrequently” delegated to a pool of legal assistants casts a 
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shadow on the knowledge and hence the individual independence of the 
judge.231Judge Wald states (and it is worth repeating  what the judge said): 
 
“Reading some of the several-hundred-pages-long, format-stylized judgments of the 
ICTY, one can guess that many of the judgements are the work of a committee rather 
than an individual judge or judges. Indeed sometimes judgements are parcelled out to 
different judges, sometimes the staff assistants prepare first drafts with guidance from 
the judges who then review, revise and approve the judgement…….I have recognised 
the risk of losing control of the process if the judge does not define the issues, work out 
the reasoning and responsibility in advance with law clerks, and meticulously analyze, 
revise and edit any draft presented to her.”232 
 
That statement deserves analysis. Apparently it is a common culture at the 
International Tribunals to assign or delegate writing of judgements to legal 
assistants. Who exactly are the legal assistants? 
 
An advertisement in the ICTY website in 2005, for the position of an Associate 
Legal Officer with the Chambers, carrying the rank of P-2‟233 specified the 
duties of the successful candidate. These included, inter alia, assisting the 
judges in drafting legal opinions and advice, draft background memoranda, 
decisions and judgements of the Tribunal and the preparation and case 
management and drafting decisions during pre-trial and pre-appeal phase. 
The expected competencies for candidates included theoretical, analytical 
skills and ability to apply legal principles, procedures and concepts, ability to 
carry out research., familiarity or experience in research and analysis on 
various international legislative instruments, ability to make concise opinions, 
orally and written, excellent drafting skills, and ability to draft well under 
                                                 
231
 Wald, supra n.228 
232
 Wald, supra n.228Ibid. 93 
233
 P-2 signifies those who are junior professionals employed in the United Nations. Candidates for this 
position usually possess a first-level degree and are not required to possess vast experience.  
171 
 
pressure. 234  (Emphasis added) Overall, it appears that the qualifications 
requirement for a legal assistant is far more complex and detailed than what 
is required of a candidate to the position of a Tribunal judge.  
 
The use of assistants to assist Judges in drafting judgements is not new or 
startling. National judiciaries make full use of that facility. However, the 
assistants or research officers do not write the judgement – that is for the 
judge alone. The assistant would assist by doing the requisite research. That is 
acceptable as it is also a common practice in domestic systems.235 However, 
drafting the judgement for the judge is not. It affects the personal 
independence of the Judge for it shows that the judge lacks the qualifications 
that are required of his office. It shows the delegation of judicial responsibility 
to non-judicial officers and there have been cases where there has been no 
proper control by the judges.236 
 
Reading the requirements for such an Assistant Legal Officer, it is clear that 
she or he is expected to do more than assist the judge. Not only are they 
supposed to assist the judge, they are also expected to make concise opinions 
and have the ability to draft well under pressure. This paints the picture that the 
assistants are expected to draft opinions, judgements and decisions. It 
therefore begs the question: when a judgement is delivered in Court, was it 
drafted by the Judge or a junior assistant with scant legal experience? It may 
well be that this is not the actual scenario, but a reading of Judge Wald‟s 
statement and the terms and conditions in the advertisement above gives the 
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impression that there is a likelihood of that happening. In fact, it would not be 
surprising if it did.237 
 
There are pitfalls in this arrangement. Aside from the glaring irresponsibility 
of a Judge not writing his or her own judgement, this scheme can be abused 
by judges who are weak and inexperienced.238 These judges could delegate 
the drafting of the judgements to the assistants completely without any 
supervision. Secondly, a judge with no or scant knowledge of international 
criminal law may not even be able to correct any mistake the assistant makes. 
All these factors affect the judge‟s individual independence. 
 
 
3.12  SUMMARY 
 
On the whole the personal character qualifications of the judge are standards 
expected of a person who is holding judicial office – integrity and high moral 
character. The requirements of independence and impartiality are innate to 
the office of the holder, whilst the requirement of experience in specified areas 
of law is essential to the conduct of trial proceedings and the legal reasoning 
for decisions that would affect the accused. As international criminal law 
becomes more complex, developed and sophisticated, the requirements of 
personal attributes to the position of an international criminal judge have 
been amplified. Experience and qualifications are now longer sufficient – 
germane to the office of the international judge in the 21st Century is the 
relevant requirement of language skills. A worrying dependence on the skills 
of legal assistants to write judgements for criminal trials of major proportions 
is unsettling to the whole concept of judicial independence. Knowledge that is 
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a personal attribute to individual independence, if lacking, compromises that 
independence. This is the risk that creators of international criminal judicial 
organs take when the range of qualifications for a position that requires skill 
and expertise is limited. 
 
 
3.13  NOMINATION AND ELECTION OF JUDGES 
 
A primary cause for concern amongst legal experts and commentators is the 
election to the Bench of judges who have had little or no trial experience at 
all.239 This is a sombre fact that raises questions whether the right of the 
accused to a fair trial in a highly-complex criminal matter that carries penal 
sanctions can indeed be secured by an inexperienced or worse, inept judge.240 
Whilst the input of commentators such as academics is welcome and indeed 
helpful, the question that arises is how they would be able to conduct trial 
proceedings if they do not have the experience of a trial judge? 241  In an 
interview at the Hague on the 30th of June  2002, a senior legal counsel with 
the Chambers of the Tribunal informed the author that the International 
Tribunals do need academics as there are new points of law that come for 
elucidation. At the same time, a practical problem was highlighted. New 
judges who come into the Tribunal need time to settle in.242 Invariably, they 
are immediately assigned to conduct cases. Without the benefit of prior trial 
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experience,243  the trial judge is unable to control procedural issues being 
frequently raised during proceedings even though there may have been 
earlier court decisions on similar issues. Thus the judges find themselves 
being educated and trained all over again, and in some cases, for the first time 
about the proceedings at the Tribunal. Such real occurrences do not inspire 
the confidence of the accused himself and the international community on the 
individual independence of the judge to ensure that his right to a fair trial is 
guaranteed.  
 
An experienced trial judge is no less informed about the law than an academic. 
Otherwise he or she is not qualified to be a judge. Academics lack the 
practical experience of trial proceedings. Would they be able to focus on trial 
proceedings of a criminal nature, where much relies on oral evidence and 
cross-examination, and at the same time ensure that the rules of fairness being 
observed? Judge Patricia Wald put it pithily: 
 
“Of course we need a mix, but you wouldn‟t put a judge who has never been in court 
in charge of a big conspiracy case….you wouldn‟t take a professor of anatomy and put 
him into an operating theatre and say, “Now perform this brain surgery.” ”244 
 
Candidates for the office of international judges are nominated by States. It is 
common for States to nominate candidates who share, in general terms at 
least, their stance on issues that the candidate would have to adjudicate on. 
 
The nominations and elections of international judges are highly politicised 
processes involving intense canvassing by States and are neither transparent 
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nor subject to scrutiny.245 The involvement of diplomats and politicians in the 
election process already adds a political taint to the election process of judicial 
officers. It has been suggested that the election of the judges at the ICC should 
be done through an independent committee composed of international legal 
personae such as practitioners and retired judges.246  Despite the elaborate 
provisions contained in the Statute of the ICC, the election process was 
heavily criticised as States were accused in indulging in the practice of “horse-
trading”247  and thereby ruining the integrity of the election process with 
political overtones.248 The danger of electing judges by politicians is that there 
would always be the risk of judges being appointed to the ICC by virtue of 
their backers and not their qualifications and experience. This, coupled with 
the fact that States are very overprotective of their right to nominate casts a 
shadow on judicial independence. This is a dangerous and unwelcome 
possibility with potential for abuse as there is a risk that an uninformed, 
inexperienced judge with scant knowledge of international humanitarian and 
criminal law would prejudice the fairness of a trial. Another risk is that the 
judges who are nominated by States may have been ministers or legal 
advisers or coming from the fields of politics and diplomacy with no judicial 
or courtroom experience at all.249 This argument applies to the International 
Tribunals as well.250 
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Yet another one of the criticisms aimed at the election process in the ICC is the 
nomination committee under Article 36(4)(c).  This Article gives the Assembly 
of Parties the discretion to establish an Advisory Committee on nominations. 
The original suggestion of screening nominations put forward by the United 
Kingdom based on the system operative at theEuropean Courtwas rejected as 
State Parties refused to make any concessions on their right to nominate their 
own candidates. The potential for political influence on the nomination 
process which may have an effect on the independence of the judge is latently 
present.251 
 
 
3.14 SECURITY OF TENURE 
 
An essential condition of individual independence of a judge is security of 
tenure.252 A judge should be able to enjoy a reasonable length of tenure in 
order to be able to exercise his independence without fear or favour. He 
should be removed from his office only under special circumstances and with 
very stringent measures. The terms of appointment and employment should 
not be compromised so that he could enjoy his independence. 253  The 
Executive is usually responsible for the security of tenure as well as the 
financial aspects of the administration of justice. The notion of executive 
control over judicial terms of service is anathema to the concept of judicial 
independence.254 However, although ideally the role of the Executive should 
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be minimal, it is the Executive who ultimately exercises a degree of control 
over the security of tenure of the judge and other matters ancillary to it such 
as transfers, salaries and pensions. There is a degree of control through the 
terms of service of the judges by the Executive. This is the norm in most 
domestic jurisdictions rather than the exception. 
 
Primary characteristics of security of tenure are a guaranteed and a 
reasonable lengthy period of employment and the assurance that a judge 
could only be removed from his office in extreme cases and such process is 
fair.255 
 
The insecurity of his tenure by virtue of it being short or renewable at the 
discretion of the Executive poses a threat to the judge‟s personal 
independence as it underpins the notion that the independence of the judge is 
at the mercy of the Executive. It raises the perception of control over the 
tenure of office by the Executive. Concerns that he may not be re-elected at 
the end of his short tenure would make him vulnerable to outside pressures, 
particularly those posed by the Executive. It may affect his performance and 
place his independence at risk, as there is a danger that he may be influenced 
by considerations irrelevant to the case he is called to decide. If the length of 
tenure is fixed for a short period,256 it could be used as a threat257 against an 
“undesirable” judge whose decisions may have not found favour with 
Executive who then chooses to “penalise” the judge by not re-electing him. 
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The judge should be able to enjoy the security of his tenure in order for him to 
be able to dispense his duties and offer sufficient guarantees that he is able to 
afford the accused a fair trial. These guarantees must be able to assure the 
reasonable man, who has full knowledge of the relevant circumstances, 
including the need for a judge to be independent, would conclude that the 
judge would come to an independent and impartial decision.258 
 
There are other threats to a judge‟s security of tenure as well. A worrying 
trend in some national systems is the practice of appointing judicial officers as 
“Judicial Commissioners”259 and not as judges. The appointments are usually 
for one to two years, subject to confirmation. Apart from the short term of 
tenure, such appointment is akin to putting the judge on probation260; the 
practice of appointing these judicial commissioners was to gauge whether 
they conduct themselves in a manner agreeable to the Executive before being 
confirmed as judges.261 The security of the judge‟s tenure is precarious and at 
the discretion of the Executive. In criminal cases, the independence of the 
judge in a situation like this would affect his impartiality since the State is a 
party to the proceedings.262 
 
An essential condition of the security of tenure is that a judge should not be 
removed during his term of office. This is “a necessary corollary of his 
independence from the administration.”263 
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The duration of the tenure of the judges of the International Tribunals is four 
years. That term may be renewed for another four years.264 Judges at the 
Special Court are appointed for a three year term and are eligible for re-
election.265 The judges at the ICC shall serve for nine years and not be eligible 
for re-election.266 Experiences of the ad hoc tribunals have shown that a term of 
four years is short. This is unusual in criminal courts.267 
 
Problems may arise when the judges are not re-elected and they have not 
completed the hearing of pending cases. The right of the accused to a fair trial 
is compromised as there is no speedy disposal of his trial. Re-election to the 
Tribunals is possible but not as of right. The short period of tenure of four 
years had led to anomalous situations where judges hearing a case could not 
complete the hearing as their terms had come to an end and they were not re-
elected An example of this was the Celibici268 case where all three judges of 
the Trial Chamber were ineligible to continue hearing the case as they were 
not re-elected269 The Security Council was required to address the situation 
which was done by the passing of a resolution.270 The terms of service of all 
three judges were extended until they completed the hearing of the trial. This 
incident exemplifies the position of the ICTY when they find themselves in 
situations that fall outside the ambit of the Statute and the Rules. They have to 
depend on a political organ to validate an action needed to rectify the internal 
workings of the Tribunal. This shows again the defective international system 
as the relationship between the Security Council and the judicial organ is not 
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as detached as it would have been due to the lack of the separation of powers 
doctrine.  
 
The difficulties caused by the Celibici case highlight one of the weaknesses of 
having a short period of tenure for the judges. The problems that would arise 
had the Security Council not addressed the situation would have been 
manifold; a rehearing would have to be ordered, witnesses would have to be 
recalled. All these would have resulted in the trial being prolonged and the 
right of the accused to a fair trial would have been prejudiced since his right 
to have his case heard expeditiously would have been prejudiced. 
 
There is a body of opinion that views the relative short tenure of a judge may 
also pose a risk to his independence and impartiality.271 Whether he was 
influenced by the short term in reaching decisions is open to speculation. In 
order to seek re-election, he may have to canvass his government and other 
States. This is deemed not a healthy practice as it makes him susceptible to 
political influence and carries the risk of his independence losing 
credibility.272 A longer term, as envisaged by the Statute of the ICC without 
re-election is viewed as a better guarantee for the judicial independence as 
well as impartiality, as the judge concerned would be sufficiently secured in 
his tenure to decide matters without fear or pressure or influence. The fear is 
that such a short term of tenure with an uncertain chance of getting re-elected 
may risk the independence of the judge as he may issue decisions that might 
find favour with States who would re-elect him. 
 
On the other hand, it may be argued that whilst the period of tenure may 
have a certain degree of effect on the independence of the judge, it may not be 
a conclusive factor in that an observer may not necessarily perceive a lack of 
independence just because a judge was appointed for six months or one year. 
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The domestic judges in the Kosovo tribunals were appointed for six months 
but now this has been extended until the end of the mission. 273  The 
international judges are also appointed for six months through the United 
Nations in New York.274These appointments are renewable for further six 
months. Kosovo is an example where the judges are appointed for short-term 
but there has been no serious complaint about their lack of independence.275 
 
It is argued that although short-term appointments are a serious factor that 
could affect judicial independence, it is not a decisive factor. Generally such 
appointments are discouraged, but where judges are appointed for such a 
term, it is submitted that his independence should be gauged by taking all the 
circumstances in consideration. 
 
 
3.15  COMPOSITION OF COURT 
 
Article 12276 of the Statute of the ICTY contains provisions that regulate the 
composition of its Chambers. It has been amended to include sixteen 
permanent independent judges and a maximum of twelve ad litem independent 
judges.277 
 
Article 12 reflects the internal structure of the Chambers that was organised in 
a manner that ensured full respect for the rights of the accused, the effective 
performance of all judicial functions, the international character of the 
Tribunal and the efficient administration of justice.278 This amendment was 
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necessary to ensure that the trials were conducted swiftly and to expedite the 
Completion Strategy.279  
 
The article specifically states that no two judges may be the nationals of the 
same State. It applies equally to the permanent as well as the ad litem judges. 
This aims at avoiding favouritism and over-representation of certain countries 
in the Tribunal, particularly those from Member States of the Security 
Council. 280  It will also avoid the suspicion of the impairment of judicial 
independence. The composition the Chambers is structured in such a manner 
as to ensure that there would be full respect for the rights of the accused and 
there was efficient administration of justice and judicial functions. 281  This 
includes ensuring only permanent judges sitting in the Appeals Chamber 
who would have had wide experience in trying cases involving important 
issues of international criminal law and human rights.282 They would be able 
to use those skills at hand to decide on novel issues of international criminal 
law. Article 12 adheres closely to the aim that the court should be truly 
international, with judges being appointed from different countries and from 
different legal systems.283 
 
Article 36(7) of the Rome Statute also states that no two judges may be 
nationals of the same State. In the event that a candidate could be considered 
as a national of more than one State Parties, then he or she shall be deemed to 
be the national of the State Party in which that person ordinarily exercises his 
or her civil and political rights.  This Article ensures that the ICC is indeed 
international in name as well as in practice. It is similar to the provision of the 
ICTY. It also is geared towards dispensing any notion of bias which may be 
perceived to arise just because the judges are fellow countrymen. 
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In many respects the Statute of the ICC is much wider than the provisions of 
the Statutes of the International Tribunals that concern appointment of 
permanent judges. The selection process of the judges involve the 
consideration of many factors including geographical representation, 
representation of principal legal systems of the world, fair gender 
representation of the judges, and if necessary, judges with legal expertise on 
specific issues such as violence against women and children: Article 36(8). 
 
The Statute of the ICC seems to have covered the loopholes of the Statutes of 
the ad hoc Tribunals. The Statute states that the Court will consist of 18 judges 
but at the same time allows the President of the Court to propose an increase 
or a decrease in the number of judges in accordance with the workload of the 
Court.284There is no need for the Statute to be amended to adjust the number 
of judges required to deal with the cases at the Court and allows the Court the 
flexibility to operate according to its needs and also cut down on expenses. 
The number of judges will always be 18.285 
 
An interesting problem is that although the permanent judges are 18, only 3 
would serve as full time judges upon being elected.286 The other 15 judges will 
be asked to serve in the court as and when the need arises. The problem arises 
as to the remuneration of the 15 judges. They should be allowed to seek 
alternative employment as they need to be remunerated. It is imperative that 
the alternative employment do not clash with their duties as judges of the 
international criminal court and therefore compromise their independence, 
either directly or indirectly. There was intense debate between the delegates 
who wanted to ensure that once the judges were elected, they should not 
undertake any other work outside the court and those delegates who wanted 
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a skeleton staff. A compromise was reached under Article 40 of the Statute 
which stated inter alia, that the judges shall be independent in the 
performance of their functions and that they shall not engage in any activity 
that was likely to interfere with their judicial functions or affect the 
confidence in their independence. Judges who are required to serve full time 
are forbidden to work in any other professional occupation.287 
 
Insofar as the membership of the court is concerned, it is observed that the 
Statute of the ICTY has not been amended to include provisions for the 
appointment of female permanent judges. The relatively low number of 
female judges in international courts has caused some concern. 288 
Contributions by female judges to the development of international legal 
jurisprudence are immense. Two former Presidents289 of the ICTY and ICTR 
were both women. The first lady judge in the International Court of Justice is 
an eminent jurist.290 Even the position of Judge Florence Mumba, the only 
female judge at the ICTY, was precarious as she stood to lose out on re-
election and managed to get re-elected, partly due to pressure from non-
governmental organisations.291 
 
The inclusion of rape as a crime against humanity falling under the 
jurisdiction of the ICTY and ICTR292 posed uncharted waters for the Tribunals 
although the basic elements of the offence are similar to that under national 
laws.  Women and young girls, the victims have to testify against their 
aggressors. Despite protections offered by the Tribunals, the possibility 
remains that a victim would feel daunted, fearful and embarrassed to testify 
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before a male judge. The presence of a female judge would have been 
reassuring to the victim.  
 
Although the provisions for elections of judges to the ICC293 and the ad litem 
judges urge the parties to take into account a fair representation of female and 
male judges, these provisions are meaningless if the parties ignore them or do 
not act positively on them. Appointment of judges to the tribunals and courts 
do not become invalid just because female judges are not appointed. If Judge 
Mumba had not been re-elected all fourteen judges at the ICTY would have 
been male.  Ironically, Judge Mumba had served as a Vice-President of the 
ICTY, a position that she was voted into by her colleagues. 
 
3.16 RECUSAL, DISQUALIFICATION AND REMOVAL OF 
JUDGES 
 
Rule 15 of the Rules or Procedure and Evidenceof the Statute of the ICTY bars 
a judge from sitting on a trial or an appeal of case where he is a personal 
interest or where he has had a previous association that may have affected his 
impartiality. In such a case he should recuse himself.294 
 
The Rules of Procedure and Evidence295 of the ICC has much wider scope and 
effect than the Rules of the ICTY. The ICC Rules contain elaborate provisions 
for the recusal, disqualification and removal of judges.  
 
A judge may be removed from his office on three grounds. The first ground is 
of removal is where the judge has committed serious misconduct. The second 
ground is where he is in serious breachof his duties and the third ground is 
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when he is unable to exercise the functions under the Statute.296 The level of 
seriousness appears on a sliding scale, the most extreme being serious 
misconduct and the least severe, but still unacceptable, being an inability to 
exercise his judicial functions. Whilst the first two grounds imply an intention to 
commit these acts, the third ground will operate when the judge is infirm 
mentally and even physically. Rule 23 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence297 states that a judge shall be removed from office or subject to 
disciplinary measures and with guarantees as established in the Statute and 
the Rules.298 
 
Rule 24 defines “serious misconduct” and “serious breach of duty” as referred 
to in Article 46(1). Serious misconduct of a judge may occur not just when he 
is carrying out his official functions but also outside of his official duties. 
Where the act complained of is committed in the course of his official duties, 
it has to be an act or misbehaviour that is incompatible with his official 
functions and either causes or likely to cause serious harm to proper 
administration of justice or “proper internal functioning” of the Court.299 In 
other words, such misconduct may occur in the court involving proceedings 
before him or in relation to the other organs of the Court. It may even include 
acts of misconduct vis-à-vis his colleagues. Serious harm to proper internal 
functioning may also include disclosing facts or information acquired in the 
course of his duties or on a matter which is sub judice. The disclosure must be 
seriously prejudicial to the judicial proceedings or to any person.  
 
Further, serious misconduct may also occur where the judge conceals 
significant personal information that would have otherwise excluded him 
from holding office and where he abuses his position to obtain unwarranted 
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favourable treatment from any authorities, officials or professionals. The 
former relates to his personal qualifications and character. The list of acts of 
misconduct under Rule 46 is not exhaustive.  
 
The judge may also be accused of serious misconduct if he misbehaves 
himself outside the course of his official duties in such a serious and grave 
manner that it causes or likely to cause serious harm to the reputation of the 
Court. 
 
Rule 24(2) defines “serious breach of duty” where the judge has been grossly 
negligent in the performance of his duty or alternatively, has knowingly acted 
contrary to the duties of his judicial office. It covers situations where the judge 
does not request to be excused where there are grounds to do so or causes 
repeated unwarranted delay in the exercise of his judicial powers. The 
provision covers both negligent and non-negligent activities. 
 
If there are equivalent provisions of Rule 24(2) applicable to the jurisdiction of 
the United Kingdom situation, Lord Hoffman in the Pinochet300case would 
have prima facie committed serious breach of duty as he had not requested to 
be excused since there are grounds to do so although the judge himself may 
be of the view that there is no reason for him to excuse himself. The best 
solution for a judge at the ICC who finds himself in a Hoffman-like situation 
is to seek advice from the Presidency. 
 
Rule 25 defines misconduct of a less serious nature that falls within the ambit 
of Article 47. These are where such misconduct occurs in the course of official 
duties and causes or is likely to cause harm (as opposed to serious harm in Rule 
24) to the proper administration of justice before the Court or the proper 
internal functioning of the Court. Conduct that is likely to cause harm is 
conduct such as interfering with the exercise of the functions of a judge, a 
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Prosecutor, a Deputy Prosecutor, Registrar, and Deputy Registrar., failure to 
comply with or ignoring requests by the Presiding Judge or the Presidency in 
the lawful exercise of their duties; such failure must be committed repeatedly. 
A judge could be chastised under this Rule for his failure to enforce 
disciplinary measures against the Registrar or Deputy Registrar or other 
officers of the court when he knows that the person concerned is in serious 
breach of duty by them.  
 
Rule 25(1) (b) states that misconduct of a less serious nature occurs when the 
judge conducts himself outside the course of official duties in a manner that 
would cause or is likely to cause harm to the standing of the Court. 
 
The rules relating to misconduct of judges are wide-ranging. It covers 
different degrees of offences and it covers their judicial as well as their extra-
judicial activities. It is a useful instrument for it could be referred to should a 
judge conduct himself in an unbecoming manner. It remains to be seen 
whether the Rules would actually be enforced or remain good on paper. 
 
Unlike the judges of the International Criminal Court, the judges of the ad hoc 
international criminal tribunals do not fall under any code of conduct, ethics 
or discipline relating to their offices and the exercise of their functions. There 
is no issue of accountability of the international judges at the International 
Tribunals.301 Ironically, they would have had to be party to a code of conduct 
or ethics of their own national systems but not to any international code of 
conduct or ethics.302 The Rules of the ICC are supplemented by the Code of 
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Judicial Ethics,303 which provide for judicial independence,304 impartiality,305 
integrity306 (including not directly or indirectly gifts, rewards and so on that 
can reasonably be perceived as being to intended to influence the 
performance of their judicial activities). Article 8 relates to conduct during 
proceedings and is of particular interest: 
 
1. In conducting judicial  proceedings, judges shall maintain order, act in accordance 
with commonly accepted decorum, remain patient and courteous towards all 
participants and members of the public present and require them to act likewise.  
2. Judges shall exercise vigilance in controlling the manner of questioning of 
witnesses or victims in accordance with the Rules and give special attention to the 
right of participants to the proceedings to equal protection and benefit of the law.  
3. Judges shall avoid conduct or comments which are racist, sexist or otherwise 
degrading and, to the extent possible, ensure that any person participating in the 
proceedings refrains from such comments or conduct. 
 
This provision is very wide and is probably wider than some provisions in 
national codes of conduct for judges. An Article like this would have 
addressed a situation like the notorious case of Judge Karibi-Whyte at the 
ICTY.307 
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who would have been appointed to the Federal Court of Malaysia. Judge Lamin was the President of 
the Court of Appeal whereas Judge Tan Sri Azmi was a serving member of the Federal Court who was 
also a member of the (in)Famous Five judges who were suspended when they asserted their 
independence and convened a hearing to hear the appeal of the suspended Lord President, Tun Salleh 
Abas against the decision of the High Court in the Judicial Crisis of 1988.  See Harding, supra n.254. 
Judge Azmi was reinstated to the Federal Court.. All three judges would be subject to the Code of 
Ethics of their country. 
. Kosovo has its Code of Ethics and Professional Judges: 
See <http//:www.pcit-pcti.org/courts/pdf/kosovo/CodeJudges.pdf>  Another domestic code of conduct 
is the  Code of Conduct for United States Judges 
 See  <http://www.uscourts.gov/understand03/content_5_0.html> 
303
 It is to be noted that the Code was adopted by the judges themselves. Available at <www.icc-
cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/ICC-BDO2-01-05_En.pdf> 
304
 Article 3 
305
 Article 4 
306
 Article 5 
307
 Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone stipulates that 
a case relating to a judge unfit to sit as a judge shall be referred to a Council of Judges who will then 
consider the case and shall refer the matter to a Plenary meeting who will then make a recommendation 
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The accused in the Celibici case raised in his appeal that the Presiding Judge at 
his trial fell asleep a number of times during trial and this denied them the 
right to a fair trial. The accused questioned the judge‟s ability to perform his 
duties as a presiding judge. The Appeals Chamber held that the accused had 
failed to establish that the Judge was asleep during substantial portions of the 
trial.308 The judgement of the Appeals Chamber could be questioned. Having 
stressed that the charges the accused faced were serious and the consequences 
of conviction were equally serious, the Chamber dismissed the argument by 
the accused that his right to a fair trial is compromised.  A judge found 
sleeping or not paying attention to the trial proceedings should be warned or 
asked to step down or even censured. No such steps were taken against Judge 
Karibi-Whyte; an existence of a similar Code of Ethics to that of the ICC 
would have assisted the judges at the ICTY to be more decisive on this issue. 
The situation is made worse by the fact that the judge was the Presiding Judge 
of the trial; who if possible should have been more alert to the proceedings 
than even his colleagues. 309  The results of this deplorable situation were 
unsatisfactory, more so in light of the fact that the Appeals Chamber did find 
the conduct of the Judge as inappropriate for a judge.310 
 
Another related issue to those of discipline and accountability of judges is that 
there is no provision for removal of judges at the ad hoc Tribunals akin to the 
Rome Statute or Article 18 of the Statute of International Court of Justice.311  
It appears that the judges are not accountable to anyone, which basically gives 
                                                                                                                                            
to the appointing authority. Nothing is said about the range of recommendations the Plenary Meeting 
may take and the sanctions that the judge may face. Bohlander, Chapter One supra n.17 388. 
308
<http://www.un.org/icty/celebici/appeal/judgement/index.htm>  Paragraph 620 et seq 
309
 See the detailed discussion and critique on this case in Bohlander supra n2.39 375-383. The role of 
the presiding judge is grave. He wields a certain degree of control over the proceedings; he makes the 
rulings from the Bench (after consulting his colleagues) and other administrative and judicial functions 
vis-a-vis that trial he is presiding over and he is the official spokesman for the panel. See Patricia Wald 
Judging War Crimes (2000) 1 Chicago J. Int’l L 189, 195. 
310
 Paragraphs 629-630 of Appeal Judgement, supra n.305. 
311
 Article 18 provides for the dismissal of a judge where in the unanimous opinion of his fellow judges, 
he has ceased to fulfil the required conditions relating to his office. It is a high threshold to achieve, but 
at least there is a removal mechanism. 
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them unfettered licence to “misbehave”. Judges at the ICJ are very senior 
judges; after all they are sitting in an institution that is a principal organ of the 
United Nations, as opposed to the judges of the ad hoc tribunals, which are 
subsidiary organs of the Security Council.312 If these judges can be subjected 
to discipline and removal, then why are the judges of the ad hoc tribunals 
exempt?313 The various occurrences involving the judges from the sleeping 
judge at the ICTY to the laughing judges at the ICTR 314  should have 
prompted the President and other senior judges to draft something similar to 
the ICC‟s Code of Judicial Ethics. 
 
Finally, another problematic area relating to the dismissal of judges is the 
question of who has the responsibility of exercising that power? Should the 
offending judge be dismissed by a unanimous decision of his fellow judges as 
required by Article 18? That is a possibility but it is not clear whether 
unanimity can be achieved. It is uncertain that a judge would want his fellow 
to be dismissed, unless that offending judge has done something so 
manifestly and grossly wrong that dismissal is an obvious and inevitable 
outcome. “Judicial comity” could be an obstacle to the dismissal of an 
offending judge. So it leaves for the power to the Security Council and/or 
General Assembly to take that drastic action. In the case of the International 
Tribunals, the United Nations could simply refuse to re-elect the offending 
judge.315 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
312
The salaries judges of the ICTY rank equal to that of a judge of the ICJ: Article 13 ter of the Statute 
of the ICTY. 
313
 Professor Bohlander’s article offers an interesting insight into this issue. In his correspondence to 
Professor Bohlander, the former Legal Counsel of the United Nations, Hans Corell revealed that he had 
included an Article on the Dismissal of Judges but nothing came out of it. Bohlander, International 
Criminal Justice, supra Chapter One, n.17 388   
314
Ibid.     
315
 Interestingly, Judge Karibi-Whyte was not re-elected, although the reason for that is not known.  
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3.17  SUMMARY  
 
The Articles and the Rules relating to the removal of judges introduce a new 
phenomenon into the arena of international law. These principles have not 
been arisen or tested in the context before. The approach suggested by the 
legal documents of the ICC raises many questions – procedural and legal. The 
idea of the Assembly of State Parties having the power to remove a judge 
rests unpalatably with the concept of separation of powers, even if such a 
concept does not exist in international law in its traditional sense.316 Political 
threat to the security of tenure of a judge is highly undesirable. It remains to 
be seen what standards are to be applied, the legality of those standards, 
whether any national standards would have an impact to the standards that 
are to be applied in the international context and whether those standards 
would actually be applied by a non-judicial organ. 
 
There is also no clarification as to what threshold needs to be reached before 
the particular conduct complained of could be deemed as serious harm, mere 
harm and gross negligence. 
 
Although there are provisions to preserve the judge‟s internal independence 
under Rule 25, there are no provisions where judges could be obtain 
unwarranted favourable treatment from third parties other than professionals 
or authorities. It is submitted that this provision could have been widened to 
include all parties who could influence the judge such as an accused or parties 
connected to the accused. 
 
On the other hand, the Rules of Procedure and Evidence have serious 
implications. It puts the security of tenure of judges in the hands of politicians. 
Although the process for removal of judges is complex and makes it difficult 
                                                 
316
 It could be argued that this situation is akin to certain domestic systems like the United Kingdom, 
where judges can only be removed by Parliament 
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to actually put the motion for removal in order, the independence of the 
judges is at the mercy of politicians.  
 
Removal of judges is a serious matter. In certain national jurisdictions, the 
Executive uses it as a weapon to punish and threaten judges.317 Such powers 
should not be left in the hands of a political body in as they can be abused. An 
alternative option would be to create an independent body with senior judges 
from the Assembly of State Parties as members and the Special Rapporteur for 
the Independence of the Judiciary and Legal Profession appointed in an 
advisory position. 
 
The provisions also cover “acts of misconduct” that are committed during the 
course of his judicial activities as well as outside. The “offence” committed is 
one that could cause serious harm to the standing of the Court. The standing 
of the Court is a vague and broad statement. Would delivering a public 
speech to a non-legal audience relating to deficiencies in the ICC amount to a 
grave act of misconduct that affects the standing of Court? If a judge is 
interviewed by the press, is his freedom of expression curtailed because some 
of his opinions may be construed as affecting the “standing” of the Court? 
                                                 
317
 The judiciary crisis of 1988 in Malaysia where the Lord President was dismissed by the Government 
was a major blemish on the proud legal history that the country enjoyed since its independence from 
Britain in 1957. The judiciary and the legal profession never recovered from that black period. A panel 
of 5 judges (the usual Supreme Court coram is 3 judges) granted an injunction and stay of proceedings 
to the Lord President against a Tribunal that was convened to hear charges of misconduct against him. 
The spurious charges were drafted by the Attorney-General on behalf of the Government and were 
based on a letter written by the Lord President to the King on behalf of all the judges, complaining 
against the conduct of the then Prime Minister as well as cuts in funding. The Tribunal that was 
convened was objectionable on many grounds, the principal one being that it was headed by the then 
Chief Justice of Malaya, who would become the next Lord President if Tun Salleh Abas, the  then Lord 
President was found “guilty”. The other judges who sat on the Tribunal were junior judges from the 
Commonwealth and a retired High Court judge who was being sued on a monetary claim in the 
national courts. Subsequently the five judges of the Supreme Court were also suspended and faced 
disciplinary proceedings. Other than the Lord President himself, the most senior judge who ordered the 
convening and headed the panel of the Supreme Court and another Supreme Court judge were 
dismissed. They lost their pensions and other benefits as well. See Mark Gillen and Ted L McDorman 
The Removal of the Three Judges of the Supreme Court of Malaysia (1991) 25 U Brit. Colum. L. 
Rev171. The “Judicial Crisis 1988”crippled judicial independence. Despite international condemnation 
from law and human rights groups, including the Bar of England and Wales, LAWASIA and Lawyers 
for Human Rights, the Executive continued with the disciplinary hearings against the judges. See Abas 
and Das, supra n.254, Harding supra n254. Also based on the author’s personal knowledge and 
experience. 
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These are difficult questions to answer for the simple reason that there is no 
obvious answer. There are situations where the acts of misconduct are so 
grave that the hypothetical fair-minded observer, with sufficient knowledge 
of the facts to make reasoned decision would come to the conclusion that acts 
of serious misconduct have been committed. However, there will be 
situations where the answers may not be that clear. The Presidency must draft 
clear standards that would decide the nature of the complaint, whether it is a 
meritorious one, and the necessary steps that need to be taken in pursuant of 
that complaint. 
 
Another point of concern is that under Rule 26complaints under Articles46 
and 47 will be received in confidence. The complaints will contain the 
grounds as well as the identity of the complainant but this information will 
remain confidential. Whilst a degree of secrecy is necessary to encourage a 
complainant to be able to voice his misgivings freely and voluntarily, there 
are two possible pitfalls to this situation. First, the judge will not know the 
identity of the accused and hence unable to confront his accuser, and secondly, 
it will be open to abuse by defendants which may in turn delay proceedings 
as the challenged judge may not be able to sit on that trial whilst the 
complaint against him is pending. One could only surmise the delays in the 
proceedings at the ICTR if such a provision was available in its Statute 
 
Further, the provisions of the Rules are rather wide and this might actually 
constrain the independence of the judge who might be concerned with the 
threat of “serious harm” or “harm” looming over him when he is exercising 
his judicial functions. He could face complaints for not disciplining an officer 
of court when he “should have” known where such an officer is in serious 
breach of his duty. It remains to be seen what is the test that would be applied 
in ascertaining the responsibility of the judge concerned and whether the 
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reasonable man would be called to the fore again. The affected judge has no 
right of appeal or right to recourse to the courts.318 
 
It is argued that the conditions for any form of disciplinary action against the 
judge be made stringent. The removal and disciplinary provisions are far too 
wide and could easily be abused. States which have vested interests may have 
improper motives to get the judges removed from sitting on a case in which 
they may have an interest and they may harbour a perception that the judges 
would be against them. 
 
3.18 CONCLUSION 
 
The lack of a constitutional framework in the international legal system makes 
it difficult for the court to be insulated from political influence. There is no 
possibility of constitutional status for international courts in international law 
and there will be problems of securing complete independence. 
 
The traditional definition of “judicial independence” is freedom to act on 
judicial matters from pressure or influence from the Executive. Most 
definitions of “judicial independence” perceive threats to judicial 
independence from the State or the Executive. An example of such a threat in 
an international criminal tribunal is the removal of the judge presiding over 
the former President of Iraq, Saddam Hussein by the Prime Minister and 
Council of Ministers of Iraq. Article 4(4) of the Statute of the Iraqi High 
Tribunalprovides that the Iraqi Presidency Council, can upon the 
recommendation of the Council of Ministers transfer a judge from the court 
without any reason. 319The transfer of the judge is a blatant and unwarranted 
                                                 
318
 In some national jurisdictions the removal of judges is left to specially constituted tribunals. In that 
event the judges have recourse to courts for judicial reviews. The complaint procedure is set out in 
Rule 29. The President of the Court’s role is limited to sieving the complaints; discarding the frivolous 
ones and submitting the serious ones to the Bureau of Assembly of States Parties. 
319
Removal of Judge a Grave Threat to Independence of Genocide Court Sept 19 2006. Available 
at<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/09/19/iraq14229.htm> The independence of the judges at the trial 
of Saddam Hussein have been under constant threat by the Executive.  
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interference with the judge‟s individual independence. The removal of the 
judge in this manner is in flagrant breach of a number of Basic Principles 
provisions including Principles 2 and 4. The reason given by the Executive is 
that the judge‟s impartiality was suspect for expressing a personal opinion on 
the character of the accused. Even if that was the case, Judge Abdullah Al-
Amiri should have been asked to recuse himself or alternatively the proper 
procedures for disqualification should have been followed. It is not for the 
Executive to remove the judge. 
 
There is an alarming increase of threats or undue pressure or influence on the 
judiciary emanating from parties other than the State.320 A wider approach to 
judicial independence, that the judiciary should be free from actual, direct, 
apparent or indirect interference 321  not just from the State, through the 
Government and its agencies but also from any third party should be adopted. 
The broader concept of “third party” is preferred to the older and narrower 
concept of State or Executive as threats to judicial independence may emanate 
from parties as varied as parties to the proceedings, influential institutions 
such as multi-nationals, non-governmental organisations, politicians and even 
senior judges and colleagues. In the context of the international arena, such 
threats include the principal organs of the United Nations, their agencies, 
MemberStates and international agencies such as NATO. 
 
The concept of judicial independence has also been widened322 to include 
different aspects of independence.  Other than the personal independence and 
the institutional dependence already discussed, the modern definition 
includes substantive or functional independence.323 Basically this means that 
in discharging his judicial functions, a judge should do no more than decide 
on the issues according to the law and his conscience. It demands the judge 
                                                 
320
 Threats to the independence of the judiciary at the national level could come from powerful pressure 
groups, multi-corporations and even the accused themselves through indirect means. 
321
 Sir Guy Green, The Rationale and Some Aspects of Judicial Independence (1985) 59 ALJ 135 
322
Ibid 
323
 Labelled by American writers as “decisional independence”. Shetreet, supra n.18, 630. 
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being neutral and free from irrelevant pressures. This aspect is also 
comparable to judicial impartiality.324 
 
A fairly new aspect to judicial independence is internal judicial 
independence.325 Aside from the risk of pressure being applied by external 
factors, judges may face risks from his judicial colleagues or his superiors. He 
could be pressurised to decide on a case in a particular manner by his 
superiors. Internal censure could take the form of not selecting a judge to sit 
on a panel, the non-assignment of cases to him or having his cases assigned to 
another judge.326 The judge should be able to enjoy judicial independence 
from his judicial colleagues and superiors.327 Selection of judges to sit on a 
panel could affect the independence of the Tribunals if the individual judges 
are partial or biased. 
 
The modern concept of judicial independence has many aspects to it. Other 
than the individual and institutional aspects, the objective guarantees 
surrounding his office are important. The practice at the international 
criminal courts varies with the ICC providing the most detailed provisions 
regarding the international judiciary. There is no doubt however that the 
judge at the international criminal courts should be independent as an 
individual and as a member of an institution to ensure that due process of law 
is observed. The terms of appointment, conditions of work and security of 
tenure varies in the different international criminal jurisdictions but these are 
vital matters that need to be secured for individual independence. 
 
 
 
                                                 
324
Shetreet defines substantive independence as independent decision-making by the judge subject to 
no authority other than the law. Ibid 
325
Ibid 637 
326
Ibid 638-643 
327
Ibid 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
_____________________ 
 
JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
 
 
Impartiality implies freedom from bias, prejudice and partisanship; it means not 
favouring one more than another; it connotes objectivity and an absence of affection or 
ill-will. To be impartial as a judge is to hold the scales even and to adjudicate without 
fear or favour in order to do right….” 
 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of the Judiciary and 
the Legal Profession 
6th February 19951 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There is a wealth of jurisprudence on judicial impartiality both at national 
courts and international courts. This chapter considers this concept not just at 
the international criminal courts but also State practice. This approach is 
helpful as a comparative study of the jurisprudence of different jurisdictions 
is useful in gauging the approach of the International Tribunals to this 
essential but at times problematic question.  Judges at the International 
Tribunals have the benefit of this ample jurisprudence which they could 
consult and which would serve them as persuasive precedents when they are 
posed with issues of impartiality and bias.  
 
Of particular interest are the different tests of impartiality that are applied in 
domestic courts. The threshold varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. The 
                                                 
1
Report of the Special Rapporteur supra, Chapter Two n.1. Paragraph 35 
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test is also applied at the International Tribunals and an examination is 
undertaken on the demands of that test. 
 
A unique aspect to the position of the international judge is his activities prior 
to his appointment to an international court. States usually nominate 
candidates who had served as diplomats and advisors in the international 
arena. The issue that then emerges is whether the prior activities of that 
particular judge would have affected his impartiality at the international 
tribunals and court. 
 
These and several other issues relating to the impartiality of the judges of the 
international courts and tribunals are the focus of this Chapter. Challenges 
made by the accused, changes made to the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
and the functions of the judges themselves raise several issues of impartiality 
that are exceptional to the international legal system. 
 
 
4.2 JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY: GENERAL 
 
Judicial impartiality, compared to judicial independence, is less abstract. Just 
as the concept of judicial independence, judicial impartiality has both 
individual and institutional postulates. 
 
As established in Chapter Two, there is a close connection between the 
guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality. A tribunal that is 
connected to the Executive is neither independent nor impartial in cases 
where the Executive is a party. Likewise, a judge who is a connected to a 
party to the proceedings before him cannot be independent and impartial.2 
 
                                                 
2
Harris et al supra Chapter One n.17, 234 
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The key element of impartiality is a lack of bias. A judge should bring an open 
mind, free from bias and prejudice, actual or perceived, to the case before him. 
He should abandon whatever personal opinion or conviction, if any, that he 
may have in relation to that particular case that he is trying. Even if he did 
harbour a personal opinion on a particular issue, he should decide the matter 
on the facts and the law without allowing his personal views influence him. 
One party should not be treated favourably at the expense of the other. In 
other words, he should be impartial.  
 
An exposition on judicial impartiality by the HRC is also particularly helpful: 
 
“„Impartiality‟ of the court implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions 
about the matter put before them, and that they must not act in ways that promote the 
interests of one of the parties. Where the grounds of disqualification are laid down by 
law, it is incumbent upon the court to consider ex officio these grounds and to replace 
members of the court falling under the disqualification criteria.”3 
 
A biased judge compromises the right of an accused to a fair trial. He should 
be able to offer objective guarantees so as to exclude any legitimate doubt as 
to his partiality.   The question arises therefore as to how the impartiality of a 
judge can be gauged. Should he bear the responsibility of proving that he is 
impartial by offering objective guarantees or is the burden on the party 
alleging that he is not impartial? 
 
Personal convictions or beliefs are intimate to a judge. The standard of proof 
is therefore high and proving the partiality of a judge in a particular matter is 
exceptional, though not rare. The burden lies on the party alleging bias to 
prove it. Mere allegation or the fear of an accused is not sufficient. There must 
be objective justification for the alleged bias.  
                                                 
3
Referring to the decision of the Human Rights Committee in Communication No.387/1989, Kartunnen 
v Finland Decision of 17
th
 November 1992, CCPR/C/46/D/387/1989, paragraph 45. 
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Bias in a judge may take two forms. The first is where there is actual bias on 
the part of the judge. The second manner in which bias may arise is where 
there is a veneer of bias, or what is now known as an appearance of bias.  The 
bias here is not as obvious or apparent as it is in the first situation. The 
consequence of both types of bias is the same though. If bias is proved, then 
impartiality is negated. 
 
Again, bias may arise in many ways. The judge may be a party to the matter 
that he is asked to adjudicate or he may have a relationship with one of the 
parties to the action before him. That relationship may either be direct or 
indirect and the duty falls under the impugned judge that he should offer 
objective guarantees to exclude that perception of bias.  A perception of actual 
bias will arise where the judge has a personal interest in that matter, 
regardless of the outcome. The personal interest may be pecuniary or non-
pecuniary.   
 
The impartiality of a judge is prima facie a rebuttable presumption. In order to 
decide whether a judge is impartial or not, a two-pronged test has been 
formulated. The first prong is the subjective aspect, which basically means 
determining the personal convictions of that impugned judge. Having 
decided on that, the next aspect is the objective one – whether the judge 
himself has offered guarantees to exclude any perception of impartiality. 
 
Where there is actual bias on the part of the judge, disqualification from the 
trial he is sitting on is automatic. This issue needs actual proof as the 
consequences of such an issue are serious. Once his bias is established, the 
question of objective guarantees does not even arise. Actual bias needs no 
further proof. 
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The judge will also be disqualified where the circumstances would indicate to 
the reasonable man, having full knowledge of the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the matter that the judge might be biased. The standard for 
deciding what amounts to a risk of bias in the eyes of the reasonable observer 
varies in the jurisprudence of the national legal systems but at the 
international criminal proceedings before the Tribunals that issue has been 
resolved. How these issues are dealt with by regional and national courts as 
well as the international tribunals is quite elucidating.  
 
In this context, most countries that are members of regional organisations are 
bound to take into consideration the decisions of the regional courts and 
apply the ratio decidendi 4 when considering similar legal issues. This would 
also apply to decisions of the Human Rights Committee on complaints 
submitted to it under the ICCPR. Hence, decisions of the European Court on 
the impartiality of the judiciary such as Piersack v Belgium5 and De Cubber v 
Belgium6 would have a bearing on the practice of national courts.7Similarly 
members of the Organisation of American States would be guided by the 
decisions of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 
 
 
4.3  “BIAS” – THE VARIOUS APPROACHES 
 
4.3.1  THE EUROPEAN JURISPRUDENCE 
 
As already stated above, the standards of judicial impartiality applied in most 
Member States of the European Union are dictated by Strasbourg 
                                                 
4
 See Porter v Magill [2002] 1 All ER 465 
5
(1982) 5 EHRR 169 
6
Judgment of 26 October 1984, Eur. Ct. H. R., Series A, No.86 
7Colloquially referred to as “Strausborg Jurisprudence.” An example of the national courts being 
guided by the Strausborg Jurisprudence is the judgement of Lord Phillips MR in the case of Re: 
Medicaments and Related Class of Goods (No.2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 where the judge “modestly” 
changed the test for bias in England to be in line with the Strausborg jurisprudence. 
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jurisprudence.  The decision of the European Court in Piersack is particularly 
important for the two-prong test it formulated for gauging bias.8 
 
Briefly, the facts are as follows. The Applicant was found guilty of murder 
and sentenced to eighteen years of hard labour by a Belgian assize court. The 
Applicant complained that there was a breach of Article 6(1) of the European 
Convention as he was not accorded a hearing by “an independent and 
impartial tribunal.” The President of the Court that found him guilty9 was the 
senior deputy prosecutor and head of the department that was dealing with 
the appellant‟s file before he was appointed to the Court.  
The European Court held that impartiality denotes absence of prejudice and 
bias. Bias under Article 6 may be determined by embarking an approach that 
involves both subjective and objective elements. The first step is to assess the 
subjective aspect and ascertain the personal conviction of the given judge in a 
given case; having done so, the next step is to address the objective aspect 
which is the determination whether he had offered sufficient guarantees to 
eliminate any legitimate doubt that may prevail as to impartiality. 10  The 
objective aspect is measured from the perception of a member of a public who 
is convinced that the guarantees offered by the impugned judge are sufficient 
to show his impartiality. 
 
The actual extent of the involvement of the judge was not explored, but the 
Court found that as the hierarchical superior of the deputy prosecutors in charge of the 
file, the President of the Court was entitled to supervise their work including revision of 
written submissions and discussions on adoption of strategies in court as well as advise them 
on points of law. The Court found from the information obtained a confirmation that the 
President did in fact play a certain part in the proceedings. 
                                                 
8
supra n.5 
9
 The jury found the Applicant guilty by 7 votes to 5. The President and the other two judges agreed 
with them. Where an accused is found guilty on a principal charge on a simple majority by 7 to 5 as it 
was in this case, the judges then deliberate on the same issue. supra n.5, paragraphs 14, 22 
10
Ibid, paragraph 30. Legitimate doubt is the accepted phrase instead of real suspicion or danger or 
apprehension. 
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The judgment of the Court, insofar as relevant to judicial impartiality states as 
follows: 
“30. Whilst impartiality normally denotes absence of prejudice or bias, its existence or 
otherwise can, notably under Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention, be tested in 
various ways. A distinction can be drawn in this context between a subjective 
approach, that is endeavouring to ascertain the personal conviction of a given judge in 
a given case, and an objective approach, that is determining whether he offered 
guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect. 
(a) As regards the first approach, the Court notes that the applicant is pleased to pay 
tribute to Mr. Van de Walle's personal impartiality; it does not itself have any cause 
for doubt on this score and indeed personal impartiality is to be presumed until there 
is proof to the contrary (see the Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 
23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 25, § 58). 
However, it is not possible to confine oneself to a purely subjective test. In this area, 
even appearances may be of a certain importance (see the Delcourt judgment of 17 
January 1970, Series A no. 11, p. 17, § 31). As the Belgian Court of Cassation 
observed in its judgment of 21 February 1979 (see paragraph 17 above), any judge in 
respect of whom there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality 
must withdraw. What is at stake is the confidence which the courts must inspire in 
the public in a democratic society.11 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The Court held that the public is entitled to fear that a judge does not offer 
sufficient guarantees of impartiality”.12  Where there is a legitimate reason to 
fear a lack of impartiality on part of the judge, he must withdraw from the 
case. It was the perception of the public that is of importance. The Court 
found that personal impartiality of the impugned judge was intact under the 
                                                 
11
Supra n.5, Paragraph 30 
12
Ibid paragraph 32 
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subjective aspect; personal impartiality is presumed until the contrary is 
proved.13 However the Court found that objectively, the judge could not offer 
any guarantee to remove any legitimate doubt as to the impartiality of the 
tribunal and held that there was a violation of Article 6(1) of the European 
Court. The test was applied in other cases such as De Cubber v Belgium14and 
Hauschildt v Denmark 15 .  Thus, the impartiality of the judge may be 
challenged but whether the challenge is upheld or not depends on the 
circumstances.  Hauschildt held that special circumstances must exist in order 
to give rise to a legitimate doubt as to the impartiality of the judge. In any 
single case where the impartiality of a judge is doubted, such doubt must be 
resolved by applying the Piersack test. 
 
The two-prong test of impartiality is now the accepted test in both civil and 
continental systems and has been incorporated into the ICTY jurisprudence.16 
 
 
4.3.2 NATIONAL CASE-LAW AND PRACTICE  
 
National standards of judicial independence and impartiality do not differ 
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 17  Some Constitutions18  give better 
protection to judges than others. In Belgium, for example, a judge cannot be 
transferred without his consent and his salary is established by law. 19 In some 
jurisdictions the law is fairly lenient towards non-judicial activities; the judges 
in Austria, for example are allowed to be members of political parties and 
                                                 
13
 Applying the principle in Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, (23 June 1981, Series A no. 43) 
referred to in paragraph 30(a). Ibid. “Legitimate doubt” is the common thread running through the 
European jurisprudence. 
14
Supra n.6 
15
 (1989) 12 EHRR 169 
16
The Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija Case No: IT-95-17/1. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgement/index.htm> 
17
 For studies on impartiality and independence in different countries, see Shetreet and Deschenes, 
supra Chapter 3, n.17 
18
 For example, Australia; see Michael Kirby at Shetreet and Deschenes,ibid at 219 
19
Ibid.Belgium Prof Marcel Storme 43 See also Piersack v Belgium, supra n.5 
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even be Members of Parliament20 whilst in others the judges are expected to 
conform to strict codes of conduct and ethics whether written or otherwise.21 
However, the underlying principle of all these jurisdictions is that the tribunal 
and/or the judges are able to dispense their judicial functions impartially and 
without control or pressure from the Executive or any third party. 
 
 
4.3.2. a  THE UNITED KINGDOM EXPERIENCE 
 
The jurisprudence in the English courts has been erratic on the proper test to 
be adopted in gauging whether there was apparent bias on the part of the 
decision-maker. On one hand some decisions favoured the “reasonable 
suspicion or apprehension of bias test”.22 On the other hand, certain decisions 
adopted the “real likelihood of bias”.23 Then there was the “real danger of 
bias” test which was modified into “real possibility of bias”24 test. 
 
However, the test for bias was reformulated by the House of Lords in the case 
of R v Gough 25  where the House of Lords was called to consider the 
circumstances in which bias, in this case allegedly that of a juror, may affect 
the right of the accused to a fair trial by virtue of the tribunal not being 
impartial.  The facts briefly were as follows. The Appellant appealed against 
his conviction on the grounds that a member of the jury who found him 
guilty was a neighbour of his brother‟s and therefore this affected her 
impartiality towards him.  
 
                                                 
20
See Prof Dr. Hans Fasching Austria Shetreet and Deschenes, supra, Chapter Four, n.15 
21
 For example the United Kingdom, Australia and Malaysia 
22
 See for example R v Sussex Justices ex p McCarthy [1923] All ER 233 
23
R v Barnsley County Borough Licensing Justices ex p Barnsley and District Licensed Victuallers 
Association [1960]2 All ER 703 
24
Porter v Magill, supra n.9 
25
R v Gough (1993) A.C. 646. The test for bias in the English courts prior to Gough was “reasonable 
suspicion”.  See also Judges on Trial:  A Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English 
Judiciary (Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Co., l976) 304. It is surprising that the House of 
Lords in Gough did not discuss the ECHR and the jurisprudence therein even though the Human Rights 
Act 1998 was not in existence then. See also Grant, infra n.30 at 56. 
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The main speech was delivered by Lord Goff of Chiveley. Faced with the two 
existing tests for impartiality in the form of “reasonable suspicion” and “real 
likelihood” of bias, the House of Lords opted for a third one, that of whether 
there was a “real danger of bias”. The reasonable man or fair-minded 
observer was also replaced. Placing the Court in place of the reasonable man, 
Lord Goff went to state further:  
 
“Having ascertained all the relevant circumstances, the court should ask itself 
whether, having regard to those circumstances, there was a real danger of bias on the 
part of the relevant member of the tribunal in question, in the sense that he might 
unfairly regard (or have unfairly regarded) with favour, or disfavour, the case of a 
party to the issue under consideration.”26 
 
Although the case involved a juror, it was nevertheless important that the 
same rule of a fair hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal apply to 
the jurors as they are judges of facts. They should decide on the guilt of the 
accused impartially and on even-handedness. 
 
The Gough test posed problems as it imposed a high standard of proof on the 
party alleging bias.27 It was considered as too stringent and rigorous.28  It 
rejected “real likelihood” in favour of “real danger of bias”.29 It was also much 
narrower than the reasonable suspicion or apprehension test. The second 
problem posed by the judgement was that the Court dispelled the role of the 
reasonable person as the arbiter of bias and replaced him with the Court itself. 
It rejected the notion of a reasonable man and argued that the Court 
personifies reasonable man in cases like these more so since the Court may be 
privy to evidence that the ordinary and reasonable man may not.  
                                                 
26
Supra n.25,670 
27
 See for example Webb and Hay v the Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 See also judgement of Judge David 
Hunt in The Prosecutor v Brdanin and Talic: Decision on Application by Momir Talic for the 
Disqualification and Withdrawal of a Judge dated 18
th
 May 2000 where Judge Hunt criticised the 
Gough judgement. Paragraph 9. 
28
Ibid 
29
Supra n.25 670 
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Gough streamlined the test for bias. The House of Lords asserted that there 
was no difference between test for bias between judges and jurors and more 
importantly, that there is no difference between the test for actual bias and 
apparent bias.30 
 
The Gough test was considered in the case of Locabail (UK) Ltd v Bayfield 
Properties Ltd and Another, Locabail (UK) Ltd and Another v Waldorf 
Investment Corps, Timmins v Gurley, Williams v HM Inspector of Taxes and 
Others, R v Bristol Betting and Gaming Licensing Committee ex parte 
O’Callaghan31(“Locabail”) 
 
The Court of Appeal was asked to determine questions relating to 
impartiality of judges. It was given a chance to review existing English 
authorities on the proper test of impartiality and it also considered the case-
law from other jurisdictions including that of the European Court. It reiterated 
the principles enunciated in Pinochet32and although the Court found that the 
test espoused in the European Court jurisprudence for gauging judicial 
impartiality was different from the Gough test – indeed that test was 
disapproved by cases in other jurisdictions, the Court was of the view that it 
was bound by the House of Lords decision in Gough33 The Court of Appeal 
also followed the mechanism adopted by the House of Lords in gauging bias 
– the reasonable onlooker, personified by the Court. 34 
 
The Court of Appeal found that in the overwhelming majority of cases the 
application of the two tests would lead to the same outcome.35 
                                                 
30
 Evadne Grant: “Pinochet 2: The Questions of Jurisdiction and Bias” 41, 48-49. The Pinochet Case, 
Diane Woodhouse (ed) (Oxford; Hart Publishing 2000) 
31
 [2001] All ER 65. For a critical discourse on the Locabail case, see Kate Malleson Safeguarding 
Judicial Impartiality (2002) 22 Legal Studies 53 where the author argues that Locabail test was too 
restrictive. Locabail followed Gough, which in itself was too restrictive. 
32
Infra n.42 
33
Supra n.25 74 
34
Ibid 87 
35
supra n.2574, paragraph 17 
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The confusion and criticisms36 arising from the Gough test and the conflict 
between the jurisprudence of the English courts and the jurisprudence arising 
from the European Convention has now been resolved by the House of Lords 
in the case of Porter and another v Magill.37 The House of Lords held38  that 
the test in determining apparent bias on the part of a tribunal is no longer to 
simply ask itself whether, having regard to all the relevant circumstances 
there was a real danger of bias but whether the relevant circumstances, as 
ascertained by the court, would lead a fair-minded and informed observer to 
conclude that there was a real possibility that the Tribunal had been biased.39 
The test therefore allows the court to play a role in that it would determine 
the circumstances of the case and then the reasonable, fair and knowledgeable 
observer would step in and decide whether there is a real possibility of bias. 
The fair-minded and informed observer has therefore been reinstated in 
having the decisive say in whether or not bias exists. 
 
The House of Lords followed the decision of the Court of Appeal in In re 
Medicaments and Related Classes of Goods (No 2) [2001] 1 WLR 700 which 
altered the Gough test. The Court also followed the principle in Hauschildt 
where the European Convention held that what is decisive is the fears of the 
complainant can be objectively justified. The fears of the complainant are 
relevant at the initial stage but lose their importance on the next stage, which 
is when the matter is looked at objectively. 
 
The test for judicial impartiality in the United Kingdom is now settled. It is a 
two-prong test and the decisive factor is the viewpoint of a reasonable 
observer on the real possibility of bias. As the House of Lords has said 
                                                 
36
 The Gough test was not followed in other jurisdictions which preferred the reasonable suspicion or 
apprehension test of the ECHR jurisprudence. Scottish courts applied the same test as well, using the 
perception of the reasonable man as the gauging device. See Bradford v McLeod [1986] S.L.T. 244  
37
 [2002] 1 All ER 465.  
38
Ibid  paragraph 108, p506 
39
Ibid p.467 
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emphatically that the test is now in line with the test in the European 
Convention,  presumably in this context “real possibility” is not the same as 
“real danger” but “reasonable suspicion or apprehension”.  
 
An aspect of judicial impartiality was discussed in Gough is the position of a 
judge where he is not a party to the proceedings or he does not have either a 
proprietary or pecuniary interest. Gough recognised however that besides 
actual bias, a judge might be automatically disqualified if he is shown to have 
an interest in the outcome of the case which he is to decide or has decided.40 
The question of bias in this situation does not depend on his relationship with 
the parties but rather hinges on the outcome of the case that may have a 
realistic effect on the judge‟s interest. The principle of automatic 
disqualification, explored in the case of Dimes v Proprietors of Grand 
Junction Canal 41 was initially limited to direct pecuniary interest or 
proprietary interest but was extended to apply to a limited class of non-
financial interests. 
 
 In R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (2) 42 (“Pinochet”) the House of Lords held that the automatic 
disqualification principle would apply where the issue that raises concern 
relates not to a financial or an economic interest but a promotion of a cause.43 
The test for bias was discussed in detail in the context of the “automatic 
disqualification” vis-à-vis actual bias.  
The Pinochet Case was concerned with the extradition of the former dictator 
of Chile to Spain to face various charges, including crimes against humanity. 
Warrants of arrest were issued against him. Both were quashed. The Crown 
                                                 
40
 The House of Lords stressed that “automatic disqualification” category should not be extended any 
wider. Lord Woolf, Goughsupra n.25 at 673 as the creation of any other category of automatic 
disqualification would give rise to uncertainty as to the boundaries of that category and confusion 
would arise in the test to be applied. Lord Goff, 664. But see Pinochet infra 
41
(1852) 3 HL Cas 759 
42
[1999] 1 All ER 577. See also Kate Malleson Judicial Bias and Disqualification after Pinochet (No.2) 
(2000) 63 MLR 119 
43
Ibid  588 
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Prosecution Office, acting on pressure from the Government of Spain 
appealed against the decision of the Divisional Court quashing the second 
order of provisional warrant issued for the arrest of Pinochet. 44 The matter 
was heard in the House of Lords by Lord Slynn of Hadley, Lord Lloyd of 
Berwick, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Steyn and Lord Hoffman. 
At this juncture Amnesty International (“AI”) and other parties who were not 
directly involved in the proceedings sought for leave to intervene in the 
proceedings. Leave was granted by a committee of the judges in the House of 
Lords that was comprised of three judges who were members of the main 
panel hearing the appeal but did not include Lord Hoffman, the judge 
subsequently challenged. 
 
The appeal by the Prosecution was allowed by a majority of 3 to 2. 
 
It later transpired that Lord Hoffman, who was with the majority allowing the 
appeal of the prosecution, was a director of the charity arm of AI, Amnesty 
International Charity Limited (AICL). The two were separate entities, the 
former being a registered charity incorporated to undertake the charitable 
aspects of the work of the latter. It was also noted that Lord Hoffman was not 
employed or remunerated by AI or the AICL and that Lord Hoffman was not 
even a member of AI. However, the Court was of the view that the judge was 
involved in an entity that was closely linked to AI which had become a party 
to the proceedings by virtue of the intervention order. Although there was no 
direct pecuniary interest gained by the parties in this suit, the fact that Lord 
Hoffman was involved, as a director, in promoting the causes 45  of AI, 
automatically disqualified him from sitting on the panel. There was no 
necessity to consider whether he was actually or apparently biased. Lord 
Hoffman‟s situation fell under the nemo judex in sua causa principle. Several 
facts were taken into account in arriving at this conclusion. Whilst the House 
                                                 
44
 For the facts in detail, refer to speech of Lord Browne-Wilkinson  
45
 The House of Lords created a “new ground” for automatic disqualification. Grant supra n.30 53.  
212 
 
of Lords was at pains to highlight the observation that it did not consider the 
judge to be actually biased, they considered the fact that AICL had access to 
research papers and publications of AI, and one of the publications of AI was 
a report on Chile.46 The House of Lords emphasised that each case should be 
decided on its facts. In this case, the relationship between the challenged 
judge with AI, although not direct was close and was neither tenuous nor 
nebulous since he was a director of one party which was closely and directly 
associated to another entity that was a party to the proceedings. It could 
therefore be said that the judge had an interest in the outcome of the 
proceedings. The other factors taken into consideration by the court in 
deciding that the judge was automatically disqualified were his position in 
AICL, the relationship between him and the concerned institutions, the 
duration and proximity of that relationship, the mandates and the purposes of 
those institutions. 
 
The House of Lords concluded that by virtue of his position in AICL, Lord 
Hoffman was automatically disqualified. As such, he should have recused 
himself or revealed his interest to the parties.  
 
In the course of his speech, Lord Browne-Wilkinson was of the opinion that 
there was no necessity to re-evaluate the real danger test of Gough even 
though courts in other jurisdictions in the Commonwealth have specifically 
refused to follow it in favour of the real suspicion or apprehension test. It was 
said that  
“If the absolute impartiality of the judiciary is to be maintained, there must be a rule 
which automatically disqualifies a judge who is involved, whether personally or as a 
Director of a company in promoting the same causes in the same organisation as is a 
party to the suit.”47 
 
                                                 
46
Grant ibid 65 
 
47
 Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson, supra n.42 588 
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Pinochet raises the interesting question of how far a judge‟s experiences 
gained through his non-judicial activities would affect his impartiality. Judges 
should not be barred from participating in non-judicial activities by virtue of 
their profession. On the other hand, they must ensure that their views, 
opinions and activities do not affect their impartiality when they are 
adjudicating. However, the experiences they gain through these activities 
would stand in positive stead when deciding on cases as it would negate the 
perception that judges are removed from the reality of everyday life.  
 
In this regard, a lesser-quoted judgement in Pinochet is on point. The speech 
of Lord Hutton discusses in detail disqualification arising out of “association 
of a judge”.48  Whilst agreeing with Lord Goff in Gough that direct pecuniary 
interest automatically disqualifies a judge from sitting in a trial without the 
necessity to inquire whether there is bias, Lord Hutton was of the view that 
automatic disqualification was also applicable where the  
 
“interest of judge in the subject- matter of the proceedings from his strong 
commitment to some cause or belief or his association with a person or a body 
involved in the proceedings could shake public confidence in the administration of 
justice as much as a shareholding (which might be small) in a public company 
involved in the litigation.”49 
 
Indeed the automatic disqualification rule covers cases in which the interest 
or association of the judge in the parties or the matter in dispute “make it 
difficult for him to approach the trial with the impartiality and detachment 
which the judicial function requires”.50 
 
                                                 
48
 See Rule 15 of the RPE of the ICTY.  
49
Supra n.42 
50
Ibid 
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Lord Hutton referred to the Australian decision of Webb v The Queen51and in 
particular the judgement of Deane J for the purposes of this particular 
situation relating to the association between Lord Hoffman and AI. Four 
possible areas covered by the doctrine of disqualification were identified.52 It 
would be helpful to identify these areas to gauge how wide the “net” of 
judicial bias has been cast. 
 
The first is “disqualification by interest” which would occur where there is some 
direct or indirect interest on the part of the judge in the proceedings whether 
pecuniary or otherwise that would give rise to reasonable apprehension of 
partiality or prejudice or prejudgement. The other category which is 
particularly relevant to Pinochet is “disqualification by association” where there 
is an apprehension of prejudgement or other bias that arises from some direct 
or indirect relationship. The relationship covers experience as well as contact 
with parties or individuals who are interested in or involved in the 
proceedings." Ultimately he concurred with the other members of the panel 
that Lord Hoffman was automatically disqualified by virtue of his association. 
Lord Hutton‟s reference to Deane J‟s judgement in Webb did not address the 
issue of the reasonable apprehension test espoused by that case.53 
 
Pinochet was criticised for not making any reference to the European 
Convention and the extensive jurisprudence of the European Court.54 The 
Human Rights Act of 1998 which imposed a duty on the court “determining 
any question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into 
account, inter alia, any judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
                                                 
51
 (1994) 122 ALR 41  
52
 The other two categories covered by the doctrine of disqualification are disqualification by conduct 
and disqualification by extraneous information. The former covers situations where the conduct of the 
impugned judge, either in the course of, or outside the proceedings causes apprehension of bias or 
partiality. Locabail falls under this category.The latter category covers situations such as where the 
judge had sat on an earlier case. The four categories may overlap. 
53
Supra n.48 
54
 Paul Catley and Lisa Claydon: “Pinochet, Bias and the European Convention on Human Rights” 
The Pinochet Case: A Legal and Constitutional Analysis, Diana Woodhouse (ed) (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 
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European Court or the Commission, which in the opinion of the court, is relevant to 
the proceedings before it. ”55The Act had received the royal assent before the 
hearing.56 
 
The approach of the courts in the United Kingdom to the issue of 
commitment to a cause by a judge is therefore very strict vis-a-vis the 
impugned judge. Although there is a possibility that the impugned judge 
does not stand to gain personally from the outcome of the case and his 
interest is neither pecuniary nor proprietary, he will be automatically 
disqualified under the disqualification by association principle. The need to 
ascertain whether there is bias on the part of the judge evidently does not 
arise. This is a complex situation. A judge who is active in human right 
matters, for example, and who has written and spoken extensively on the 
subject would be an advantage to a panel which is hearing a case on human 
rights. If he is an expert on torture and has expressed his opinions on it, 
should he be automatically disqualified just because he is interested in the 
outcome of a case on torture that he is hearing?57 If he is disqualified on the 
grounds that he has an association, the court may be deprived of his 
knowledge in that particular field. A preferable approach would be for the 
court, instead of opting for the actual bias principle, to take the “reasonable 
apprehension” method and apply the reasonable man test instead of 
disqualifying the judge at the outset.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 Section 2(1). 
56
 Catley and Claydon supra n.54  
57
Cf the position of Judge Geoffrey Robertson in Sierra Leone whose impartiality was challenged due 
to a book that he had written prior to his appointment to the Special Court. See discussion on this case 
text, infra 
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4.3.2. B  PRACTICE AT OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
 
National standards in other jurisdictions were discussed at length in Locabail 
and Furundzija. 
 
The case-law of various national jurisdictions seems to favour the reasonable 
apprehension or suspicion tests espoused in the European jurisprudence.58 
Judicial decisions in Australia, New Zealand, 59South Africa, Canada and the 
United States all have adopted the reasonable apprehension test in gauging 
bias.  
 
The cases also favoured the reasonable man/member of the public approach 
rather than the perception of the Court itself.60 
 
The High Court of Australia in Webb and Hay also dealt with judicial 
impartiality in depth and discussed decisions from other jurisdictions. It 
rejected the Gough test and found that the “reasonable likelihood” or “real 
danger” test, besides being rigorous,61 emphasised the viewpoint of the court 
of the facts rather than public perception.  The Court said of the “real danger” 
test: 
 
“They indicate that it is the court's view of the public's view, not the court's own 
view, which is determinative”.62 
 
                                                 
58
Furundzija supra n.16, Paragraph 183 
59
R v Papadopoulous (No.2) (1979) 1 NZLR 621, 629, 634 referred to by the High Court of Appeal in 
Webb, paragraph 5. There was a suggestion that the proper test to be applied should be “reasonable 
suspicion or real danger”. It was concluded that the test applicable was the reasonable suspicion 
standard. 
60
 The cases discussed were Webb and Hay v the Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41, a decision from Australia, 
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union on Others, 
Judgement on Recusal Application, 1999(7) BCLR 725 (CC) decision of the Supreme Court  of South 
Africa, R.D.S. v The Queen (1997) Can.Sup.Ct,  decision of the Supreme Court of Canada  and U.S. v 
Bremers et al, 195 F. 3d 221, 226 (5
th
 Cir.1999): see Furundzija supra Chapter 3 n.21paragraphs 184-
188 
61
Webb and Hay v the Queen (1994) Ibid 
62
Ibid Mason CJ and McHugh J, paragraph 11f 
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In Malaysia63 however, the courts have adopted the Gough test. In the case of 
the Allied Capital Sendirian Berhad v The Raintree Club of Kuala 
Lumpur,64the Applicants applied for leave to appeal against the decision of 
the Court of Appeal on the merits of the case. At the Federal Court65 the 
Applicant raised a preliminary issue of bias against the judge of the Court of 
Appeal, Dato Gopal Sri Ram J who delivered the main judgement against the 
Applicants. The Applicants did not allege actual bias but argued that the 
Judge was a member of the defendant club and secondly, that he had acted 
professionally as counsel for the Applicants on the very issues that were 
before the court.66 The Federal Court followed its previous decision in the 
case of Majlis Perbandaran Pulau Pinang v Syarikat Bekerjasama Serbaguna 
Sungai Gelugar Dengan Tanggungan 67  where the Court applied the 
Gough68test in deciding whether there was bias on the part of the challenged 
judge. The Court also followed Gough in rejecting the viewpoint of the 
hypothetical reasonable man.69 The Court preferred the Gough test, stating 
that the test would avoid setting aside the judgement upon “some 
insubstantial grounds and the flimsiest pretexts of bias”.70 
 
This reasoning is the other consequence of the Gough test. The real danger 
threshold is too high and this would make it difficult for an applicant to prove 
the risk of bias; the courts may very well view a challenge to the impartiality 
of a judge askance based on the assumption that the challenge is based on 
insubstantial and flimsy grounds. It is unsafe for the judges to step in the 
                                                 
63
Judicial impartiality is provided for in the Judges Code of Ethics 1994 issued under Article 135(3)(a) 
of the Federal Constitution. 
64
 [2001]2 AMR 2097 
65
 The highest court in the hierarchy of the Malaysian judicial system. 
66
Supra, n. 62 paragraph 6 
67
 [1999] 3 AMR 3529 
68
 In Singapore, the Court of Appeal suggested that the test for apparent bias is “whether a reasonable 
and fair-minded person sitting in court and knowing all the relevant facts had a reasonable suspicion 
that a fair trial for the litigant was not possible” or alternatively “a real danger of bias in the sense that 
the judge might unfairly regard with favour or disfavour, the case of a party in respect of the issue 
under consideration by him” per L.P.Thean JA in Tang Liang Hong v Lee Kuan Yew and anor [1998] 1 
SLR 97. This assessment is very unhelpful and allows the judges to pick and choose a test that may 
vary from case to case. 
69
Supra n. 62 paragraph 9 
70
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shoes of a reasonable man, for the judges with their specialised knowledge 
may not necessarily make a finding of bias when an ordinary reasonable 
member of the public, fair-minded and well informed, may very well 
reasonably apprehend bias. The “reasonable man” device was used to 
support the oft-quoted dictum of Lord Hewart CJ. 71 In other words, it is the 
perception of the public that justice has been done is of paramount 
importance. A concern will also arise when judges are asked to decide on the 
alleged bias of one of their own. There may be a risk that they would not 
make an adverse finding against their colleagues. The question therefore 
arises: quis custodiet ipsos custodies? To quote Webb: 
 
“public confidence in the administration of justice is more likely to be maintained if 
the Court adopts a test that reflects the reaction of the ordinary reasonable member of 
the public to the irregularity in question."72 
 
The Federal Court in the Allied Capital Case distinguished Pinochet on the 
grounds that Lord Hoffman did not reveal his connections, whereas in the 
present situation, Justice Dato Sri Ram had informed counsel for all parties in 
chambers that he was a member of the Club. The meeting in chambers was 
held in the presence of the other judges of the panel that was hearing the 
appeal. The judge had specifically inquired whether counsel had any 
objections to his hearing the case. No objections were raised. The impugned 
judge also disclosed that as a member of the Bar, he had acted in a brief which 
he originally thought was connected with the subject matter of the appeal. He 
had checked with his former office and was informed that he had not acted 
for any of the parties in the appeal, but rather a third party and that the brief 
involved a subject which was unconnected with the subject matter of the 
                                                 
71
R v Sussex Justices ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256, 259. However, Lord Hewart himself was 
criticised for his inability to keep an open mind during trial; see Shetreet,Chapter Three n. 146  297 
72
  See also Furundzija supra Chapter 3 n.21,paragraph 185 
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appeal.  The Federal Court found that the judge had made full disclosure of 
the facts within the best of his knowledge to all parties.73 
 
The Federal Court did not use the “reasonable man” test but rather chose to 
ask itself whether there was a real danger of bias of the part of the judge. The 
Court commented that the judge had an erroneous belief as to his 
participation in the case when he was a member of the Bar based on the 
knowledge supplied to him by his former office.74That erroneous decision as 
to his bias was not fatal as he had disclosed to all the parties of his 
involvement, albeit indirectly, in the matter.  
 
Another risk that may arise when the reasonable man is substituted with the 
Court itself is that the viewpoints the Court may adopt may not necessarily 
inspire confidence. The Federal Court held that it was a very serious matter to 
raise against a judge that: 
 
“he is biased or has a personal interest, financial or otherwise, in any case he is 
hearing or in any decision he makes in his judicial capacity. 
 
If the allegation is true, then not only would his judgment or decision be vitiated, but 
disciplinary or criminal proceedings may be instituted against the errant Judge. 
However, if the allegation is unfounded, there would be an unwarranted aspersion 
cast on the integrity of the Judge even if the complainant categorically states that he 
does not question the integrity of the Judge in raising such objection or allegation.”75 
 
The part of the judgement does not take into account the basic concept of 
justice that it should not only be done but being manifestly seen to be done. It 
gives the impression that the personal impartiality of a judge is not presumed 
                                                 
73
Ibid paragraphs 13-15 
74
 An affidavit was filed by the Applicants affirmed by a solicitor who had acted for them in 1984, 
averring that the judge had acted for the Applicants on the very matter that was raised in the 
proceedings here. Ibid. paragraph 19. 
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 Per Mohtar Abdullah FCJ at paragraph 26. 
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but asserted and that raising the issue of bias is heavily discouraged on the 
basis of there being a risk of “unwarranted aspersion” being cast on the judge. 
The Court is giving undue preference to a perceived harm to the judge‟s 
reputation over that of the legal maxim that judicial impartiality is one of the 
dual hallmarks of justice. 
 
In fact, the Court was of the view that a party could be cited for contempt of 
court for raising bias. The Court said: 
 
 “It is unfortunate that the learned Judge now falls victim to his own observation in 
Hock Hua Bank (Sabah) Bhd v Yong Liuk Thin[1995] 2 AMR 1332, at p 1339: 
 
“I notice an unhealthy trend of late to allege bias too readily against a judicial arbiter 
on insufficient material. Nothing is more capable of eroding public confidence in the 
judicial arm of the state than unwarranted and unfounded allegation of bias. It is 
therefore to be avoided at all costs, if necessary, by having resort to the power to 
punish for contempt.”76 
 
On the contrary, public confidence in the judiciary would erode if parties to 
proceedings are discouraged from requesting judges to recuse themselves by 
the veiled threat of contempt of court, which carries a penal sanction. This 
slant to judicial impartiality fortunately has not arisen in other jurisdictions.77 
Frivolous objections to a judge must of course be dismissed. However, if the 
parties genuinely thought that the judge‟s impartiality may be prejudiced, 
they should be able to raise it. They should not be punished just because the 
complaint failed the “reasonable apprehension” or the “real danger” tests. 
The Federal Court held that, by applying the real danger test to the present 
case, the objections by the Applicants were without merit.78 
 
                                                 
76
Ibid 
77
 Except in Singapore; see Public Prosecutor v Mary Tuen  [2003] SGDC 81 
78
Ibid paragraph 28 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
 
There are three clear situations where a disqualification of a judge may arise.79 
First, where he is a party to the proceedings. Secondly, where he has a 
proprietary or a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case. In both cases, 
there will be automatic disqualification on the grounds of actual bias. The 
third situation is when the judge is neither a party to the proceedings that is 
before him nor having a pecuniary or proprietary interest in it but has a 
relevant interest in the case and its outcome. Ideally he should disclose his 
interest and recuse himself. He should only proceed hearing it if the parties 
do not object to his participation. Where he does not disclose his interest, the 
test that the court will apply is whether the relevant circumstances, as 
ascertained by the court, would lead the reasonable man to conclude that 
there was a real possibility of bias. Whilst the view of the complainant is 
relevant, it is not conclusive and will only be upheld if it is objectively 
justified. 
 
There is now uniformity in standards applicable for judicial independence 
and impartiality. The majority of jurisdictions advocate the two-prong test 
espoused in Piersack80.  The real danger test is no longer applicable.  
 
 
4.5 PRACTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 
 
The locus classicus on the independence and impartiality of international 
judges is set out in the judgement of the Appeals Chamber in the case of The 
Prosecutor v Anto Furundzija. 81  The test espoused in this case has 
                                                 
79
 Of course there are situations where these scenarios may overlap. 
80
Supra n.6 
81
 IT-95-117/1-A. See: <http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/appeal/judgment/index.html>  The question 
of trial by an independent and impartial court was first addressed by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 
in the Tadic(Merits) Appeal Decision of 15
th
 July 1999. However, that issue related more to equality of 
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subsequently been applied to other cases and is considered the authoritative 
judgment on these issues. 82  The jurisprudence from the Tribunal has 
contributed to the development of the case-law of international criminal 
proceedings. The principles of judicial impartiality and independence are 
now well and truly ensconced in international criminal law. 
 
 
4.5.1 RULE 15  AND JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
 
Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidenceof the international ad hoc 
tribunals encompasses the impartiality of the judges.83 It states: 
 
“(A) A judge may not sit on a trial or appeal in which the Judge has a personal 
interest or concerning which the Judge has or has had any association which 
might affect his or her impartiality. The Judge shall in any such circumstance 
withdraw, and the President shall assign another Judge to the case.”84 (emphasis 
added) 
 
There are two limbs to Rule 15 (A).  The first limb highlights situations where 
a judge has a personal interest. In such a case, the disqualification should be 
automatic since personal interest connotes actual bias. Whilst personal 
interest is not defined, it includes both pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
interests.85 However, it is the second limb that is more complex. It contains 
conjectures. It basically states that a judge may not sit where he has had any 
association that might affect his impartiality. This is the “apprehension of bias” 
or “perception of bias” limb that has been dealt by national and regional 
courts. If it is shown that the judge‟s association might affect his impartiality, 
                                                                                                                                            
arms between parties as one of the facets of fair trial rights. See 
<http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/index.htm> 
82
 For example the Delalic Case, infra and The Prosecutor v Issay HassanSesay (SCSL-2003-05), 
decision of the Appeals Chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court. infra n.182 
83
 Identical Rule in the Rules of Procedure and Evidence at the ICTR. 
84
 http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm 
85
Gough supra n.22 
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then the disqualification is automatic.86 The association could be a present one 
or could be one which the judge had in the past, prior to his appointment to 
the Tribunals. It could be direct or indirect. Each case should be decided on its 
own facts and merits. The crux of the issue is that the association has to have 
an effect on his impartiality and consequently, a negative and adverse bearing 
on his outlook towards the case particularly against one of the parties in the 
proceedings. 
 
A challenge based on Rule 15(A) was made against Judge Orie by the accused 
in the case of The Prosecutor v Krajisnik where the accused sought to 
disqualify the judge on the ground that he had an association which might affect 
his impartiality. Judge Orie was one of the defence counsel for Dusko Tadic 
whom the accused intended to call as a defence witness. The challenge was 
rightly dismissed.  
 
Judge Liu held that  
 
It would be erroneous to assume from the outset that every possible association, 
however remote, between the Judge and the Accused or for that matter a witness or 
the facts relating to another case automatically qualifies as “an association” within 
the meaning of Rule 15. For there to exist a relevant association, in my view, the 
party challenging the Judge‟s impartiality must demonstrate that the Judge entertains 
a personal interest in or a particular concern for any of the Parties, the witnesses or 
the facts of the case. Such personal interest or particular concern is certainly different 
from any lawyer‟s professional interest in the subject-matter of the case.”87 
 
Applying the hypothetical reasonable/fair-minded observer test, Judge Liu 
held that there could be no reasonable apprehension of bias. This is the right 
approach, for first, when Judge Orie appeared for Tadic, it was in his 
                                                 
86
 1 Morris and Scharf 156, supra Chapter One, n.2 
87
Decision on the Defence Application for Withdrawal of a Judge from Trial dated 22
nd
 January 2003. 
See D Mundis and F.Gaynor Current Developments at the ad hoc International Criminal Tribunals 
(2003) 1 JICJ 703, 710,711 
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professional capacity. This is akin to prior activities of the international judges. 
A demarcation must be made between personal interest and professional 
interest. Whilst the former may attract claims of bias, the latter will not. 
 
Procedurally, any party, whether it is the defence or the prosecution, who is 
concerned whether a particular judge could bring an open and unbiased mind 
to the case should apply to the Presiding Judge of the Chamber if they wish to 
seek the disqualification and withdrawal of that judge. The challenged judge 
shall be consulted, rightly so, since he should be given an opportunity to 
explain his position and if need be, dispel any notion of partiality. If the judge 
himself has any doubts as to his impartiality, he should consult other judges. 
However, the final decision whether he should disqualify himself lies within 
him. The self-disqualification is within his discretion and is not subject to 
review in the event of a finding of disqualification by his colleagues.88 If 
neither the challenged judge nor the President can decide on the impartiality 
issue then the Bureau89 of the Court will be asked to determine the issue. 
Should the Bureau uphold the objections, the challenged Judge will be 
disqualified and another judge will be assigned in his place.90 
 
If a judge finds himself in a situation where he has an interest or connection 
or association, he should not wait for a challenge from the defendant. The 
judge should reveal all material facts to the defendants, like what transpired 
in the Allied Capital Case.91It should be up to the defendant whether he 
wishes the judge to hear his case. If the defendant knew of the judge‟s 
personal interest in that matter, he should challenge the judge‟s impartiality at 
the outset in order to save time and costs of proceeding with the case. It could 
also be argued that the defendant was hoping to pick and choose his 
                                                 
88
Ibid. Cf to the practice at the ICC,where he could be accused of misconduct if he does not excuse 
himself. Rule 24 of  the RPE of the ICC. 
89
 The Bureau shall be composed of the President, the Vice-President and the Presiding Judges of all 
the Trial Chambers. Rule 23, Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Available at 
<http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc/index.htm> 
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 Rule 15(B). supra, n.424 
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Supra n.60 
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decision.92  It is contended that regardless of the conduct of the defendant, the 
judge should recuse himself for the reasonable observer would come to the 
conclusion that the trial was not conducted impartially. 
 
 Where the judge sat as a trial judge, he is stopped from sitting as an appellate 
judge on the same case. 93  This is a logical application of the automatic 
disqualification rule as it would be a flagrant breach of principles of natural 
justice if the judge sits on an appeal against his own judgement. He is also 
disqualified from sitting as an appellate judge on matters relating to Rule 108 
bis94 where he sat as a trial judge.95 
 
Disqualification of a judge from hearing a case is not automatic where he had 
sat as a reviewing judge on the indictment of the accused.96 
 
This sub-Rule has been amended. The new amendment is not inspiring.97 The 
original Rule 15(C) stated that the judge of a Trial Chamber who reviews an 
indictment against an accused pursuant to Article 19 of the Statute and Rule 
47of the RPE shall not sit as a member of the Trial Chamber of the trial of that 
accused. 98  The amended Rule 15(C)removes that bar and a reviewing judge 
is not disqualified from sitting in the trial proper or its appeal. This situation 
raises some concern to a lawyer trained and practising in an adversarial legal 
system. The duty of the reviewing judge under Rule 4799 of the RPE is to 
examine all the facts and evidence that the Prosecutor presents before an 
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 See Furundzija where the Appeals Chamber expressed their opinion that the appellant could have 
raised the matter of Judge Mumba’s qualifications much earlier and that the Court could find the 
Appellant had waived his right to raise the matter and it could dismiss the appeal.  supra n.81 
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 Rule 15(D)(i) Ibid. But see Rule 27, discussion infra 261. 
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 Rule 15(D)(ii), Ibid 
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Ibid. Rule 15(B) 
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indictment is to be issued against an accused. The judge has to be satisfied 
that there is a prima facie case against the accused100 in order to confirm the 
indictment prepared by the Prosecutor. Even though all he has to do is to 
decide on the matter only on a prima facie basis, he must have had formed 
some view on the guilt of the accused when he decides to confirm that 
indictment. Admittedly, it is a prima facie view but the impartiality may not be 
absolute as set out in Pinochet. This is analogous to the cases in the civil law 
systems that came under review by the European Court.101 
 
The accused in the case of The Prosecutor v Galic 102  filed a motion 
challenging the impartiality of one of the judges assigned to his case who had 
confirmed an indictment in a different case, which included supporting 
evidence that implicated Galic. Needless to say, that challenge failed. In 
dismissing the challenge, the Bureau held that the determination of the 
confirmation of the indictment was tentative and is an initial judgement based 
on relevant evidence. This, said the Bureau, does not demonstrate bias.103 
 
However, it is argued that the apprehension for bias in this type of situations 
is valid. The judge may have formed certain opinions on the case based on the 
information tendered at the indictment stage. He may have been privy to 
evidence that may beinadmissible at the trial proper. Finally, he may be 
tempted to convict the accused in order to validate his decision to issue the 
indictment in the first place. He may not change his view on the guilt of the 
accused for apprehension of proving that he was wrong in confirming the 
indictment.These are possibilities. It does not mean that they would actually 
occur, but possibilities exist to raise a perception of partiality. Rule 15 (C) is 
incompatible with judicial impartiality. It would be preferable if the indicting 
judge does not sit on the actual trial of the accused.  
                                                 
100
 Article 19 of the Statute of the ICTY. Article 18 of the  Statute of the ICTR 
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It is just not the adversarial-trained lawyer who is concerned however. Rule 
15(C) would also be unacceptable to a continental lawyer as the defence is not 
represented at the confirmation stage since this is an ex parte proceedings 
whereby only the Prosecutor appears. The judge may not be able to make an 
impartial assessment of the facts before him. 104Hence how assured will the 
accused be that the judge will bring an impartial mind to the trial? The old 
Rule 15(C) would have gone some way in assuring the independence and 
impartiality of the judges participating at every stage of the proceedings.105 It 
is uncertain that a reasonable observer, properly informed, would not 
reasonably apprehend bias. 
 
The provisions in the Rome Statute for the disqualification and excusal of a 
judge from sitting on a panel in a matter where his impartiality might be in 
doubt are comprehensive and are provided for in the Statute itself.106Article 
41of the Rome Statute allows for the voluntary disqualification of a judge by 
submitting his request to the President. Sub-article (2) forbids a judge from 
participating in any case where his impartiality might “reasonably be doubted on 
any ground”. (emphasis added) The Article envisages the objective aspect of the 
impartiality test being satisfied by proving reasonable doubt, as opposed to 
reasonable danger or reasonable apprehension. There are no restrictions on 
the grounds of justification as long as those grounds may be objectively 
proved. This is a catch-all provision.  
 
The second limb on disqualification under Article 41(2) imposes automatic 
disqualification of judges where they have previously been involved in any 
capacity in relation to that particular case before the Court or where they have 
                                                 
104
 Megan Fairlie The Marriage of Common and Continental Law at the ICTY and its progeny, Due 
Process Deficit (2004) 4 ICL Rev 243,  313 
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 1 Morris and Scharf, supra n.2, 155 Prologue. See also Fairlie ibid Zappala supra Chapter One n.4, 
23 where the author argues  that the amendment i.e. the new Rule 15(C) implies that a judge who has 
full knowledge of the materials supporting the charges against the accused is allowed to be a member 
of the Trial Chamber. 
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been acting in a related criminal case in a national jurisdiction. This Article 
will apply to situations where a judge had acted as counsel or the prosecutor 
in that particular matter in the national jurisdictions prior to his appointment. 
His impartiality might also be affected if he was not directly involved in that 
particular case but in a different case that was related to the one before the 
ICC. The circumstances need to be examined and several factors need to be 
looked into, such as the capacity of his involvement, the type of involvement, 
whether such involvement was direct or indirect and the degree of 
involvement. Once that subjective element has been proved, the next question 
to be examined is whether there is a reasonable doubt, proved objectively, as 
to his impartiality.  
 
Article 41(2)(c) leaves the question of disqualification to be decided by an 
absolute majority of the judges and the challenged judge will be given an 
opportunity to present his case but shall not take part in reaching a decision 
as to his impartiality. This is also a preferable approach as his impartiality is 
decided by all of his colleagues and not just the three judges in the Presidency. 
Additional grounds of disqualification are set out in Rule 34107 of the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence. The scenarios elaborated in this Rule are examples 
and are not all-exhaustive. They are very wide and would be of assistance in 
resolving any doubt as to potential bias, including resolving any differences 
between what amounts to actual bias and apprehended bias.  
 
A judge will be disqualified if he has a “personal interest” in the case. 
“Personal interest” in this context relates to relationships, which include 
personal relationships, professional relationships and subordinate 
relationships with any of the parties involved in the case. 108  The second 
ground envisages cases where a judge, prior to his appointment, had acted in 
a private capacity in any legal proceedings initiated prior to his involvement 
                                                 
107
 Rule 34 covers the disqualification of a judge, Prosecutor and a Deputy Prosecutor. 
108
 Rule 34(1)(a). Cf the meaning of personal interest in the United Kingdom and the ICTY 
jurisprudence.  
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in the case or where he himself had initiated the legal proceedings where the 
person being investigated or prosecuted was an opposing party.  
 
The third ground for disqualification of a judge is set out in Rule 34(1) (c). A 
judge who had performed functions prior to his appointment during which 
he could have reasonably expected to form an opinion on the case or the 
parties or their legal representatives will be disqualified if his impartiality is 
objectively and adversely affected. 
 
The sub-rule will cover situations where the judge was involved in functions 
which may have elicited an opinion from him on a particular case.  A 
situation where the judge had issued a legal opinion on a matter that 
subsequently comes up for hearing before him would attract Rule 34(1) (c). 
Another situation where a judge was actively involved as a result of his 
membership of an organisation for example could very well affect his 
impartiality. Another example by analogy would be members of the 
Commission of Experts on Yugoslavia, whose involvement may give rise to 
the perception that it was reasonably expected for the members to form an 
opinion that may adversely affect their impartiality.  
 
The sub-rule will also cover situations where the judges who prior to their 
appointment acted as diplomats or legal advisors to their States on matters 
that they were subsequently designated to hear.  The essential elements are (i) 
prior to taking office (ii) performance of functions (c) an opinion that could 
have been expected to be formed (iv) which objectively affects his impartiality 
adversely. 
 
Rule 34(1) (d) disqualifies a judge when he had expressed opinions, through 
the media,109 either via publications or broadcasts, openly and publicly that 
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 A judge of the ICJ who has committed himself to an opinion in a treatise or an article on the 
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could adversely affect his impartiality adversely. The connection between the 
publication and the impartiality is to be gauged objectively in deciding 
whether the former has affected the latter. The provision covers situations 
prior to his appointment as well as his tenure as a judge. If a judge, prior to 
his appointment, had published articles expressing opinions on legal issues 
and not merely on the guilt of the accused (particularly if the accused had 
been a major political figure), how would his impartiality be gauged?110 The 
provision could also entrap lawyers who had delivered lectures or present 
papers or written books on subjects that subsequently come before him 
adjudication.111The test applicable would be the general test of impartiality 
that has been applied by the European Convention and the ICTY in their 
jurisprudence by embracing both the subjective and the objective aspects. 
 
 
4.5.2 CASE-LAW AT THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 
 
Furundzija is a significant decision on impartiality of a judge at the 
international criminal court. The case is an important one for its exposition of 
the concepts of independence and impartiality, including a discussion on 
various jurisprudence on those standards such as the genesis, evolution and 
application of those standards in the international legal arena and the effect of 
those concepts on the international ad hoc tribunals.  Its judgement is 
authoritative on the concepts of judicial independence and impartiality in the 
international criminal proceedings and has been applied to other cases in the 
international criminal proceedings.112 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
the South West Africa Cases: An Analysis of the Grounds of Nullity in the Decision of July 18
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4.5.2. a  PRE-FURUNDZIJA 
 
There were two decisions of the Bureau of the ICTY that dealt with the issue 
of impartiality of the judges. Both of them challenged the impartiality of 
Judge Elizabeth Odio -Benito of Costa Rica. 
 
i) DECISION OF THE BUREAU ON MOTION ON JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE113 
 
The accused in the case of The Prosecutor v Zejnil Delalic, Zdravko Mucic 
also known as “Pavo”, Hazim Delic and Esad Landzo (also known as Zenga) 
(“the Celibici case”) filed a motion challenging the individual independence 
and impartiality of Judge Odio-Benito. This was one case where both concepts 
were inter-related. The accused filed a motion under Rule 15(B).114Rule 15(B) 
insofar as relevant, states that any party may apply for a judge to be 
disqualified from the trial on the grounds set out in sub-rule (A). The 
application was made to presiding Judge who then referred the matter to the 
Bureau of the Tribunal. 
 
The accused requested that Judge Odio-Benito cease to take any further part 
in the proceedings before the court.  There were two grounds on which the 
applicants sought disqualification. The first ground was that the judge had 
ceased to meet the qualifications for a judge of the ICTY by virtue of her 
taking oath as a Vice-President of the Republic of Costa Rica. The second 
ground for seeking disqualification was that by becoming a member of the 
Executive branch of the Government of the Republic of Costa Rica, “the Judge 
had ceased to possess the criteria required for independent (sic) judge in international 
law and has acquired an association which may affect her impartiality”115   The 
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accused alleged that the Judge was no longer independent when she became a 
member of the Executive which in turn had an adverse effect on her 
impartiality. The argument adopted by the accused was rather convoluted. 
They argued that since the judge had assumed that position of the Vice-
President, the qualification requirement in Article 13, that a judge of the 
Tribunal must be someone who would have held the highest judicial officer in 
the national legal system of her country.116 By becoming a politician, she was 
no longer a high judicial officer in her country and as such, the requirements 
of impartiality and possession of the qualifications for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices in Costa Rica have not been met. 117 
 
The facts and the chronology of events are germane to the issue of 
impartiality of the judge in this instant. Judge Odio Benito was elected as a 
judge of the ICTY on 17th September 1993. She took up office in November 
1993 and her term of office for four years was due to end in November 1997. 
She was not re-elected. This would have meant that her term of office would 
have expired whilst she was still hearing the Celibici case. By Resolution 1126 
(1997), the Security Council extended Judge Odio Benito‟s term of office 
together with the terms of the office of  the other judges sitting on the Celibici  
case, so that they could complete the hearing.118 
 
Whilst the case was still pending, Judge Odio-Benito was elected as one of 
two Vice-Presidents of the Republic of Costa Rica on 1st February 1998 and on 
8 May 1998 she took the oath of office as the Second Vice-President. Certain 
facts are relevant as they would assist in deciding her impartiality as a judge. 
First, before seeking nomination of the position of the Vice-President of her 
country,119 the judge had written to the then President of the Tribunal, Judge 
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Antonio Cassese, informing of her intention to do so. The issue was discussed 
by the judges at a plenary meeting where the letter was submitted.120 Judge 
Odio Benito assured the plenary that until she completed her duties as a 
judge hearing the Celibicicase, she would not assume any of the political 
functions that the position of the Vice-President of the Republic of the Costa 
Rica entailed. Her letter was supported by a letter from the President of the 
Republic of Costa Rica, who also made the same assurance to the Tribunal. It 
was apparent that the judge was taking extra steps to ensure the Bureau of 
her impartiality. The Plenary unanimously decided that, given the express 
undertaking by the judge, such action would not be incompatible with her 
duties as a Judge of the Tribunal.  Certain  State systems forbid a judge 
assuming the position of a politician as this would be contrary to the doctrine 
of separation of powers and would have adverse implications to his or her 
judicial independence and impartiality. However, there were express 
guarantees from both the impugned judge as well as her Government that the 
two positions would not be in conflict as the judge would not assume her 
political office until her judicial duties were complete. Judge Odio Benito 
again took steps to safeguard her position by sending another letter to the 
President assuring him the same after she was elected. Again this matter was 
discussed at a plenary meeting and approval was given to her taking the oath 
of office.121 
 
The independence and the impartiality of Judge Odio-Benito were addressed 
thus. The Bureau referred to the jurisprudence of the European Court on these 
issues under Article 6(1).  It applied the two-pronged test espoused in the 
Hauschildt122Case. The subjective prong is the personal conviction of the 
judge whereas the objective approach is whether the judge has offered 
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sufficient guarantees to exclude “legitimate doubt” as to his impartiality.123 In 
assessing the objective approach, the court must assess relevant circumstances 
that may give rise to an “appearance of partiality”.  A legitimate reason to fear 
that there is a lack of impartiality means that the judge has to withdraw from 
the case. 124   The burden is on the judge to show objectively that he is 
impartial.125It is a rather high burden as the judge must show that there is no 
legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality. In other words, if there is an 
iota of evidence that shows there may be impartiality on the part of the judge, 
then he has to recuse himself.126 
 
The determination of the lack of independence varies from case to case. It is a 
question of fact to be decided on the circumstances peculiar to the case in 
hand. The Bureau examined the facts surrounding this case and came to the 
conclusion to the conclusion that there was no incompatibility of functions 
between Judge Odio Benito‟s office as the Vice-President of the Republic of 
Costa Rica and her position a judge of the International Tribunal.127  The mere 
fact that a person who exercises judicial functions is in another capacity 
subject to executive supervision, is not by itself enough to impair judicial 
independence. There must be a link between the executive control and the judicial 
functions to raise a doubt as to the independence of the judge. In any event, the 
Bureau dispelled any notion of incompatibility of functions as Judge Odio-
Benito was not exercising any political or administrative function. 
 
In this case, the objective test had been satisfied by the judge offering 
guarantees as to her independence. This conclusion is backed by the facts that 
she adduced, including getting approval of the Plenary before she was even 
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nominated for the position of a Vice-President and referring to the Plenary 
frequently to ensure that her colleagues were aware of developments. 
 
The applicants argued further that the impartiality of Judge Odio Benito was 
affected by the fact that Republic of Costa Rica was, at the time the 
application was made, a member of the Security Council, the body that 
created the Tribunal.128The applicants argued that the Security Council has 
the power to alter the Statute of the Tribunal and it had done so in increasing 
the number of judges. They argued further that the Security Council had also 
extended the term of Judge Odio Benito to complete the hearing of the 
Celibici case. They urged the Bureau to take all these facts into consideration 
and conclude that the judge was not impartial. However, this fact is irrelevant 
as the extension of her term was not affected in a prejudicial manner by the 
membership of the Republic of Costa Rica in a non-permanent capacity of the 
Security Council. The Republic of Costa Rica was a member of the Security 
Council from 1st January 1997. The judge‟s term was extended on the 22nd of 
August 1997, before she was elected as a Vice-President which was on the 1st 
of February 1998.129 
 
The Bureau therefore did not find any reason to disqualify the judge 
especially since the judge had assured the Bureau that she would not assume 
the position of the Vice-President of the Republic of Costa Rica until the 
completion of her judicial duties. 
 
Whilst there was a nexus between the judge and the Security Council, it was a 
tenuous link that could not sustain the argument that there is a reasonable 
apprehension or a legitimate doubt that the judge may be biased. The 
approach of the Bureau might have been different had the judge, prior to her 
appointment, was acting as legal counsel or a diplomat for her country in the 
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Security Council especially on matters relating to the establishment of the 
Tribunal. The decision of the Plenary also may have been different had the 
judge sought re-election and was successful. In such circumstances, the two 
positions held by Judge Odio Benito would have been inferred as 
incompatible, since a politician holding judicial office contemporaneously goes 
against the grain of the doctrine of judicial independence. As a politician, she 
may be put in a position where she has to offer opinions and act in official 
capacity which may then taint her office as an international judge. The Bureau 
was reassured by the guarantees of the judge and hence dismissed the claims 
by the accused that the judge was not independent or impartial. It found that 
the judge was not disqualified from hearing the case.  
 
The application of the legal principles relating to the concepts of judicial 
independence and impartiality to this case are straightforward. On the facts of 
the case, the Bureau would have been hard-pressed to find the judge not 
independent or impartial. Indeed, here the challenges were spurious. 
 
 
ii) DECISION OF THE BUREAU ON MOTION TO DISQUALIFY 
JUDGES PURSUANT TO RULE 15 OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
CERTAIN JUDGES RECUSE THEMSELVES130 
 
The accused131 filed another motion under Rule 15 by which they requested 
for disqualification or recusal of all Judges who had participated in the 
Plenary sessions132 which had found Judge Odio Benito„s nomination and 
subsequent election as Vice-President of Costa Rica was not incompatible 
with her service as a Judge of the Tribunal from sitting on their appeal against 
conviction. The Appellants were appealing against the decision of the Bureau 
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of 4th September 1998 that had ruled Judge Odio Benito was not disqualified 
from sitting on their trial. The judges who would have been affected by this 
motion were three of the judges of the Appeals Chamber sitting on their 
appeal, namely Judge Riad, Judge Wang and Judge Nieto-Navia. 133  The 
accused alleged that the judges had pre-judged an issue which was to be 
raised in their appeal. (Theoretically however, there was no guarantee that the 
judges who would have replaced the impugned judges would not have faced 
the same challenge.) 
 
The accused alleged that the three judges in question had participated in the 
deliberations and decided on the issue of the Judge‟s impartiality as a judge 
vis-à-vis her position as the Vice-President of the Republic of Costa Rica. The 
judges concerned had pre-judged an issue which the accused were raising in 
appeal. The accused argued: 
 
“That taken together, Rules 15(A), 15(C) and 15(D) suggest that a judge who has 
already expressed an opinion on a case or who has taken part in a portion of a case 
cannot sit on a subsequent part, on the grounds that his or her fairness and 
impartiality could otherwise reasonably be questioned”134 
 
In dismissing the Motion of the Appellants, the Bureau held that a distinction 
must be drawn between the requirements for a judicial office 135  at the 
Tribunal which then is linked to conduct and situations that are incompatible 
with the discharge of judicial functions and secondly, the question of grounds 
of disqualification of a judge from sitting in a particular case.136 Whist the 
former is a general premise on the qualifications of candidates appointed to 
the international bench, the latter relates to the position of a judge vis-à-vis a 
particular case. He could be a qualified judge under Article 13 but be 
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disqualified from sitting on a particular case if he is in breach of the 
provisions of Rule 15.  
 
Article 13(4) provides, inter alia, that the terms and conditions of service of the 
judges at the ICTY shall be the same as that of the judges at the International 
Court of Justice. Based on that indirect reference, the Bureau then referred to 
Article 16 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, insofar as 
relevant states as follows: 
 
“(1) No member of the Court may exercise any political or administrative function, or 
engage in any other occupation of a professional nature”137 
 
The prohibition in the Statute is straightforward. There are no exceptions and 
as it is an outright bar against the overlap between political and 
administrative functions.  
 
The objections of the appellants to Judge Odio-Benito was analogous  to the 
embargo proviso of Article 16 of the Statute of the ICJ and that falls under the 
purview of the Judges to consider as it is an administrative matter.  However 
where the matter falls under Rule 15, it becomes a judicial matter. 
 
The distinction between the administrative and judicial functions138 exercised 
by the judge was stated to be thus: 
 
“The two issues set out so far are different. The first issue relates to the question of 
whether or not a Judge possesses all the necessary requirements for serving as a Judge 
of the Tribunal. This is a matter of an administrative nature, internal to the Tribunal. 
It can only be settled by the relevant bodies of the Tribunal. If these bodies are satisfied 
that the Judge does not fulfil one of the requisite conditions, for instance because he or 
she has engaged in political or administrative functions incompatible with the judicial 
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function, the Judge is duty bound either to abandon those incompatible functions or to 
resign from the position of Judge.”139 
 
This part of the judgment seems to suggest that it is the Judge himself or 
herself who has the responsibility to decide that he is disqualified from sitting 
by virtue of the incompatibility of functions principle. He should decide 
which office he would want to occupy and abandon the other. 
 
 “By contrast, the other issue is a judicial matter, which may be raised not only by the 
Judge concerned but also by any party to the proceedings before a Trial Chamber or 
the Appeals Chamber. It relates to the right of a Judge to sit in a specific case. If the 
Judge does not fulfil the requirements referred to in Rule 15(B), he or she is 
disqualified from hearing that particular case, although he or she is fully entitled to 
continue to exercise the functions of a Judge of the Tribunal and sit in other cases.” 140 
 
There are situations when these two issues of general disqualifications and 
specific disqualifications overlap. The overlap may arise  if a Judge sitting in a 
particular case had engaged in political, administrative or professional 
activities which then resulted in the consequence that this Judge has a 
"personal interest" in the case or has some "association" with the case causing 
the Judge to be biased and hence to lack the required impartiality141. This 
would cover situations like the Zafrullah Khan case142; the test for impartiality 
has to be fulfilled before a certain judge could be said to lack impartiality 
because of his prior involvement. 
 
The Bureau found that in this case, President Cassese had discussed the 
matter with Judge Odio Benito and had dealt with the matter administratively. 
Again the decisions reached by the Plenary on the Odio Benito matter were 
considered to be administrative decisions. In dismissing the application, the 
                                                 
139
Decision, supra n.129, paragraph 9 
140
Ibid 
141
Ibid 
142
Text, infra 250 
240 
 
Bureau held that the judges were deciding on an administrative matter and 
said that the appellants in particular had failed to show that Judges Riad, 
Wang and Nieto-Navia had a personal interest in the question of whether 
Judge Odio Benito was entitled to sit in the Celibici Case or that they have any 
associations with this question which might affect their impartiality. 
 
The Bureau held that the onus of proof was on the party alleging 
incompatibility and that he must prove that the alleged incompatibilities were 
to such a degree that there was a lack of impartiality in this particular case. It 
would not be sufficient for that party to allege that the impugned judge is 
exercising a political, administrative or professional function which is 
incompatible with his judicial functions. The applicant must show that the act 
complained of had a “direct and specific impact” upon the impartiality of a 
Judge in a particular case before a Chamber for it to consider the 
disqualification aspect.143 
 
It is suggested that whilst the distinction between the judicial and 
administrative, political and professional activities is a pertinent one, it is 
unnecessary to make a distinction of who should decide these issues. The 
ultimate concern should be whether the reasonable observer would 
reasonably apprehend that that particular judge is biased in the circumstances. 
The demarcation suggested by the Bureau is tedious. The requirement that 
the appellant need to show a “direct and specific impact” also seems to be 
different from the impartiality test. Admittedly, the “impact” aspect is to be 
determined before the disqualification aspect but there should not be any 
necessity for such a process in view of the Furundzija test. 
 
The Bureau dismissed the application by the defendants. 
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However, as the judges had decided at the plenary sessions that Judge Odio 
Benito‟s appointment as the Vice-President is not incompatible with her 
position as a judge, it would be highly unlikely that they would change their 
minds at the full hearing of the motion. The issue was pre-judged at the 
Plenary hearing and the application by the Appellants was dismissed on the 
ground that it did not to relate the disqualification issue. Moreover the sitting 
judges had the decision on the independence of Judge Odio Benito made for 
them at the plenary sessions.144 The fact that both the presidents of the court 
who dealt with the Odio Benito letters were also involved in the cases 
involving the Motions for disqualifications is a relevant consideration in this 
aspect. 
 
 
4.5.2.b  THE PROSECUTOR v ANTO FURUNDZIJA145 
 
The facts of the case need to be examined in order to relate to the principles 
involved in the test expounded by the court.   The accused, Anto Furundzija 
was charged with several offences under the Statute of the ICTY. One of the 
offences he was charged with was violation of the laws or customs of war 
under Article 3of theStatuteof the ICTY relating to outrages upon personal 
dignity including rape.146. The accused was found guilty and sentenced to 
imprisonment.147 The accused appealed against his conviction and sentence. 
He submitted five grounds of appeal. One of those grounds was against the 
decision on his challenge to impartiality of Judge Florence Mumba, one of the 
judges in the Trial Chamber who heard his case. The accused argued that she 
should have been disqualified under the second limb of the partiality 
provisions in Rule 15(A). He submitted that Judge Mumba was not impartial 
and that by applying the objective test for impartiality that is “whether a 
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reasonable member of the public, knowing all of the facts would come to the 
conclusion that Judge Mumba has or had any associations, which might affect her 
impartiality”.148 
 
The grievance of the appellant was based on Judge Mumba‟s activities, as a 
representative of Zambia. She was a member of the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women (“UNCSW”) prior to her appointment to 
the ICTY.  
 
However, amongst the concerns of the UNCSW, which was explored during 
Judge Mumba‟s membership therein was the war in the former Yugoslavia 
and the allegations of mass and systematic rape. Several resolutions were 
passed condemning the commission of these offences and urging the ICTY to 
give priority to the prosecution of the alleged offenders. This issue was again 
discussed at the UN Fourth World Conference on Women that was held in 
Beijing, China in 1995 and was identified as a critical area of concern in a 
document drafted by the participants called “Platform For Action”. 149 Three 
of the authors of the amicus curiae filed in court on this matter, as well as one 
of the Prosecutors of the trial attended a post-Beijing meeting of the Expert 
Group Meeting in Canada in 1997. Two points of note here are first, that 
Judge Mumba was appointed to the ICTY in May 1997. The Appeals Chamber 
made a finding of fact that she was no longer a member of the UNCSW by 
this time. The Appeal Chamber also found that she was not a member of the 
UNCSW whilst she was a serving judge of the ICTY.150 The second point that 
is of relevance is that although the prosecutor concerned and the three 
authors of the amicus curiae were at the Meeting, Judge Mumba did not 
participate in that gathering.151 
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There was no evidence to show that there was a direct and significant link 
between Judge Mumba and the prosecutor and the authors of the amicus 
curiae other than the fact that they were involved in the same organisation. 
Even then, that involvement was not contemporaneous. These factors are 
important, for these are the considerations that a reasonable observer should 
take account into when deciding on the impartiality issue. 
 
The impartiality of Judge Mumba was challenged on two grounds.  
 
First, that by reason of her participation in UNCSW, she had helped to 
“advance a legal or political agenda which she helped to create whilst a 
member of the UNSW”152  This is the “personal convictions” factor.  The 
second issue is the alleged relationship between the judge, the prosecutor and 
the authors of the amicus curiae. There is an appearance of bias if it is shown 
that the nexus of the relationship is so close and proximate that it would lead 
a reasonable fair-minded observer to reasonably apprehend bias.  
 
The Appeals Chamber, having referred to Article 13, then determined the 
manner in which the requirement of impartiality should be interpreted and 
then applied to the circumstances of the case. 
 
In advocating the test for impartiality for international judges, the Appeals 
Chamber did do no more than apply the provisions in the decisions of the 
European Court of Human Rights. It adopted the same two-prong approach 
of that Court, i.e. the subjective and objective tests.  
 
“The existence of impartiality for the purposes of Article 6(1)153 must be determined 
according to a subjective test, that is on the basis of the personal conviction that a 
particular judge has in a given case, and also according to an objective test,that is 
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ascertaining whether the judge offered guarantees sufficient to exclude any legitimate 
doubt in this respect." 154 
 
After discussing various judgements from different jurisdictions155 on this 
issue, the Appeals Chamber concluded that where a judge is exercising his 
judicial functions, the general rule is that he should be subjectively free from 
bias but also objectively there should not be surrounding circumstances that 
give an appearance of bias.156 
 
The approach advocated and adopted by the Court was as follows:  
“A. A Judge is not impartial if it is shown that actual bias exists. 
 
B. There is an unacceptable appearance of bias if:  
 
i) a Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial or proprietary 
interest in the outcome of a case, or if the Judge's decision will lead 
to the promotion of a cause in which he or she is involved, together 
with one of the parties.157Under these circumstances, a Judge's 
disqualification from the case is automatic; or 
 
ii) the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer, properly 
informed, to reasonably apprehend bias. ”158(emphasis added) 
 
The approach appears rather a straightforward one. If there is a perception 
that there is actual bias on the part of the judge, he is automatically 
disqualified. There is also an assumption of automatic disqualification if he is 
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either a party to the proceedings or has a financial or proprietary interest in 
the outcome of the case. As this goes against the principle nemo judex in sua 
causa, only automatic disqualification will suffice.  
Disqualification is also automatic if the judge‟s decision will promote a cause 
he is involved in together with one of the parties. This is rather niggling; for it 
seems to imply that there must be a direct link with one of the parties. 
Looking at this hypothetically, assuming that Judge Mumba is an active 
member of UNSW and had been actively promoting its cause, including 
delivering speeches whereby she condemns the perpetrators of the crime of 
rape in the Balkans conflict and expresses her determination to send them to 
imprisonment. If her impartiality is then challenged by the accused, does the 
accused alleging bias have to show that the judge has a connection with one 
of the parties? Again, examining this issue hypothetically, on the assumption 
that there were no amici curiae and the prosecution team did not include any 
counsel who was involved in UNSW or CEDAW159, how is the accused going 
to prove that Judge Mumba was involved in promoting a cause together with 
one of the parties? If there is no party who is interested in the common cause 
with the impugned Judge, does this mean that the challenge would fail? It is 
argued that actual bias should be proven if the judge is interested in the 
promotion of a cause or linked to a party to the action, not both. In Pinochet 
(No.2), the House of Lords found both these elements. 160  However, the 
absence of one of these elements does not necessarily mean absence of bias on 
the part of the judge. It is argued that involvement “together with a party” 
requirement is superfluous. 
The reasonable observer has to be an informed person, who has knowledge of 
all relevant circumstances, including the established principle that judicial 
independence and impartiality are integral to the judicial office. He should 
                                                 
159
 It must be remembered that counsel had no link with the Judge in the first place. 
160
supra n.42 
246 
 
also bear in mind that judicial impartiality is one of the duties that the judges 
swear to upheld.161 
 
The burden of proof is on the party alleging the bias of the judge. He should 
be able to adduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption of impartiality. 
The standard of proof is high.  These principles are only to be expected as it 
would disrupt expeditious proceedings of trials if allegations of impartiality 
could be proven with ease. This in turn would the danger of applications for 
disqualifications becoming endemic. 
 
Views on the attributes of a reasonable observer are varied.  Whilst the 
Appeals Chamber described him (or her) as an informed person, with 
knowledge of all the relevant circumstances including the requirements of 
independence and impartiality, the Bureau said that the test to be applied is 
that of reaction of a “fair-minded person with sufficient knowledge of the 
actual circumstances to make a reasoned judgement”162 It is submitted that 
the former definition is preferable as the reasonable person should take into 
cognisance the importance of the concepts of judicial independence and 
impartiality for the observation of due process of law. 
 
Since the Appellant specifically stated that they do not allege actual bias163 on 
the part of Judge Mumba, the Appeals Chamber then turned on the question 
as to whether Judge Mumba was a party to the cause or had a “disqualifying 
interest”.164 
 
The Appeals Chamber assessed the facts in Judge Mumba‟s case and held that 
the Appellant‟s allegations did not have any merit. First, a comparison was 
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made with the position of Lord Hoffman in Pinochet.  The main difference was 
that Judge Mumba‟s activities were not contemporaneous with the trial of the 
Appellant. Secondly, unlike Lord Hoffman and the Amnesty International, 
there is no link between the judge and the members of the prosecuting team 
as well as the amicus curiae in this present case. The link alleged by the 
Appellant was tenuous as he could not prove any connection between the 
other parties other than the fact that all four of them at one point or another 
were members of the same United Nations group. 
 
The separate declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen165 in Furundzija is relevant 
insofar as the judgement relates to the reasonable fair-minded observer in 
assessing judicial impartiality. The observer was given preference over the 
court as the assessor of impartiality as: 
 
“The litmus test of what is acceptable and what is not is the need to maintain public 
confidence in the integrity of the system under which justice is administered”166 
 
Since public confidence is vital, the perception of a member of public, having 
all the characteristics ascribed to him by the Appeals Chamber is paramount 
in deciding whether the impugned judge was impartial or not. In his opinion, 
therefore, the test is interpreted as "to ask whether a fair-minded and 
informed member of the public would reasonably apprehend bias in all the 
circumstances of the case.” Applying that principle to the circumstances and 
evidence in the particular case, the judge found that “the evidence in this 
matter returns a negative answer."167 
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4.5.2. c POST-FURUNDZIJA 
 
i. THE PROSECUTOR V BRDNANIN and TALIC 
 
In the case of The Prosecutor v Radoslav Brdjnanin and Momir Talic (Case 
No. IT-99-36-PT)168, the Bureau was again presented with a motion seeking 
the disqualification or recusal of Judge Mumba from both the trial 
proceedings and the determination of a preliminary issue at the Trial 
Chamber. The accused claimed that one of the issues that to be determined at 
his trial had already been determined by the Appeals Chamber in the Tadic 
Conviction decision. The accused claimed that as the judge had sat in the 
Appeals Chamber in that case and decided the issue in favour of the 
Prosecution, it would be difficult to see how she could change her opinion. He 
argued that by virtue of the second limb of Rule 15(A) the Judge had already 
formed an association which might affect her impartiality.169 
 
Judge Hunt dismissed the motion by the accused on the grounds that the 
opinion of the hypothetical fair-minded observer with sufficient knowledge of 
the actual circumstances to make a reasonable judgement would not have 
apprehended bias.170 
 
 It would be difficult for the accused to prove bias based on this ground. 
Judges sit on various trials every day. The fact that ICTY is a specialised 
judicial institution with a small number of judges would give rise to judges 
sitting on matters where similar facts and points of law emerge. That does not 
necessarily mean that the judge is biased for each case is decided on its facts. 
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As the Appeals Chamber said in Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-Bosco 
Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v the Prosecutor171 
 
“The Appeals Chamber recalls the Judges of this Tribunal and those of the ICTY are 
sometimes involved in several trials which, by their very nature, cover issues that 
overlap. It is assumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that, by 
virtue of their training and experience, the Judges will rule fairly on the issues 
before them, relying solely and exclusively on the evidence adduced in that 
particular case. The Appeals Chamber agrees with the ICTY Bureau that “a judge is 
not disqualified from hearing two or more criminal trials arising out of the same series 
of events, where he is exposed to evidence relating to these events in both cases.”172 
 
If the accused in Bradnin and Talic were able to produce writings or tangible 
evidence of the impugned judge‟s stand on the issues that were in contention 
at his trial, the challenge might have succeeded. However, mere allegation of 
lack of partiality was not enough. It appears that most of the challenges 
against the impartiality of the judges were based on flimsy grounds. 
 
 
ii. DELALIC (THE APPEAL CHAMBERS DECISION) 
 
The Appellants appealed on the ruling by the Bureau on the impartiality issue 
in their substantive appeal on the merits and judgement of their case.173 Much 
of what was stated by the Bureau was repeated in the judgement of the 
Appeal Chamber. The Appeals Chamber held that Article 13 contained 
essential qualifications which are applicable to all judges appointed to the 
Tribunal. These essential qualifications relate to character, which includes 
impartiality and integrity, to legal skills and expertise which is required for 
the appointment to the highest judicial office and experience in relation to the 
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laws that fall within the scope of jurisdiction of the Tribunal. The latter 
encompasses criminal law, international law, international humanitarian law 
and human rights law.174 
 
Insofar as the independence of the judge was concerned, the Appeal 
Chambers followed its earlier decision in the Furundzija case and held that 
Rule 15(A) encompassed circumstances establishing actual as well as an 
appearance or a reasonable apprehension of bias. Applying the test it had 
formulated in the Furundzija case, the Appeals Chamber dismissed the 
challenge by the Appellants.  
 
The main reason for dismissing the appeal was that the factual situation 
before the Court did not fall within the traditional concept of the doctrine of 
separation of powers. That doctrine applies to the branches of Government 
within the same political sphere to ensure that the powers and duties of those 
branches remain separate and independent of each other. The purpose was to 
avoid conflict of interests between the organs. Here, as the organs in question 
arose in different systems – the national system and the international system, 
the potential for conflict has been “greatly reduced”.175 
 
The potential for conflict between the judicial and the political functions may 
be reduced but its existence is still there. If “different spheres” requirement is 
all that the ICTY need to concern itself in gauging whether there is a conflict 
of interest, then there is no need for disqualification of judges on grounds of 
their prior activities or association, since potentially these aspects to their 
independence arise in different political systems. The same argument could 
apply and many more nominees would qualify for appointment to the 
Tribunals on the ground that the potential for conflict of interest has been 
greatly reduced.176 
                                                 
174
Ibid Paragraph 659 
175
 This argument could be applied to the Judge Odio-Benito scenario. 
176
Decision supra n.172Paragraph 690 
251 
 
 
In the course of their submissions, the Appellants argued that the Security 
Council “administers” the Tribunal so that it could affect the judicial 
decisions of the Court. The first premise is not accurate for the administration 
of the Tribunal is within its own hands and is accountable both to the Security 
Council and the General Assembly overall.177  Inherent in this argument is 
that the Court is dependent on the Security Council, hence affecting its 
judicial independence and impartiality. The Appeal Chamber‟s short answer 
to that was that the submission was fanciful and dismissed the overall 
challenge to the judicial independence of Judge Odio Benito.178 The Appeals 
Chamber held that it was not satisfied that the fair-minded observer would in 
all those circumstances have reasonable grounds for thinking that Judge Odio 
Benito was neither impartial nor independent.  
 
A second ground of challenge on Judge Odio Benito was that during the 
course of her position as a judge of the ICTY and sitting on the Celibici trial, 
she also served as a trustee of the United Nations Voluntary Fund for Victims 
of Torture (“Victims of Torture Fund”). As such she was automatically 
disqualified from sitting as a judge in the Appellants‟ case.  
 
Aside from the automatic disqualification issue, the Appellants also alleged 
that the Judge was disqualified by virtue of the fact that she had an 
undisclosed affiliation which could have cast doubts on her impartiality and 
which might affect her impartiality adversely. Further it was argued that by 
virtue of non-disclosure of that fact by the judge and her failure to obtain the 
consent of the defence counsel, she should have been automatically 
disqualified from participating in the proceedings.179 
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The Odio Benito scenario is similar to the situation involving Lord Hoffman 
in the Pinochet case as their involvement in the respective institutions were 
contemporaneous with their holding of judicial office. However, whilst the 
institution in which Hoffman was involved in was a party, albeit indirectly, to 
the proceedings, there was no such role for the Victims of Torture Fund in the 
Celibici case. There is another ground on which a finding of partiality may be 
made. This is the “personal interest” aspect, that the judge was personally 
interested in the outcome of the trial and was therefore biased against the 
accused. 
 
The Appeal Chamber considered that the decision of the House of Lords in 
Pinochet was a national court decision which did not “constitute any kind of 
definitive code for matters arising in the unique context of this International 
Tribunal”180 Whilst it should be expected that an international tribunal is not 
bound by nor should it consider itself bound by decisions of national courts, 
one would expect greater weight be given to decisions of superior courts. In 
any event, the Pinochet case could and indeed was distinguished on the links 
between the impugned judges and the organisations they were committed to. 
The Victims of Torture Fund did not participate in the Celibici case, unlike the 
Amnesty International. 
 
The above cases involving Judges Mumba and Odio-Benito aimed at 
disqualifying them on grounds of bias and non-independence in relation to 
their non-judicial activities.181 However the grounds mooted by the accused in 
all the cases involving both the judges were unsuccessful as they were based 
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on mainly spurious grounds. At the Sierra Leone court however, the outcome 
was different. 
 
In the case of the Prosecutor v Issay Hassan Sesay,182 the defendants sought 
the recusal of Judge Geoffrey Robertson, the President of the Appeals 
Chamber from sitting on their matter under Rule 15 of the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence.183 The defence alleged that the judge ought to be disqualified 
on various grounds: that of actual bias, reasonable appearance of bias and 
financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of the case. The complaints of 
the defendants were based on the contents of a book authored by the 
President entitled “Crimes against Humanity – the Struggle for Global 
Justice”. 184 In that book, the President allegedly made comments and 
expressed opinions which revealed bias. The defendants alleged that: 
 
a) There was actual bias on the part of the judge in that he had expressed 
strong and biased views in his book on two militant groups of which three 
accused who were waiting for trial were ex-members. The defendants alleged 
that the judge had prejudged many of the issues central to and in dispute in 
the cases before the court.185 
 
b) There was a reasonable appearance of bias that could be gauged from the 
contents of the book. A reasonable fair-minded person reading this material 
would consider that the President could not properly adjudicate on any 
matter on any matter in these cases.186 
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iii) There was a financial or proprietary interest in the outcome of the case as 
convictions of the accused would validate his published statements.187 
 
The Appeals Chamber held that Judge Robertson should disqualify himself.188 
A major factor in their decision was the concession by the prosecution that 
there was a valid argument that there was an appearance of bias on the part 
of Judge Robertson. The material could lead a reasonable observer, properly 
informed, to apprehend bias.189 
 
The impugned judge was asked to present his side of the case. He objected to 
the motion on the grounds that it had blanket consequences which in effect 
would disqualify him from sitting on all matters involving the two groups 
and not just a particular case. He argued that the motion was a threat to 
judicial independence as it threatened the security of tenure. The recusal 
should be his own decision and he should not be pushed out of his office. The 
end result of the Motion was that it sought to secure his resignation from the 
bench or any other office to which he had been appointed through an internal 
Chambers decision.190 
 
Whilst the misgivings of the judge were valid insofar as his security of tenure 
was concerned, it is vital to assess whether he had offered any objective 
guarantees to dispel any legitimate doubt or reasonable apprehension the a 
reasonable observer may have as to his impartiality. Judge Robinson‟s views 
on the alleged perpetrators of the atrocities in Sierra Leone are documented 
through his work and the passages that gave concern to his impartiality were 
annexed to the application by the accused. 
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The Appeal Chamber held that it was irrelevant whether there was truth in 
the passages quoted by the defendant. The test for impartiality is simply the 
“crucial and decisive question whether an independent bystander or the reasonable 
man reading the passages quoted would have a legitimate reason to apprehend bias.” 
The Appeal Chamber held that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias 
on the part of the judge. 191  The Appeal Chamber held that there was 
reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the judge. This is the correct 
approach, for here, there was cogent credible evidence that would raise a 
legitimate reason to apprehend bias. The accused had actually identified 
passages from the book where Judge Robertson had identified him as a 
perpetrator of the offences that were within the jurisdiction of the Special 
Court and for which he was charged. Compared to the cases of Judges 
Mumba and Odio-Benito, the facts arising from the case involving Judge 
Robertson were straightforward. The challenge was not spurious either. 
 
The impartiality of Judge Renate Winter of the same court was challenged by 
the accused in the case of The Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman.192The defence 
alleged Judge Winter‟s activities with the United Nations Children Fund 
(UNICEF), who had applied to join in the proceedings as amicus curiae was 
proximate enough to lead to the conclusion that Judge Winter is actually 
biased towards him. He also alleged alternatively she has a personal 
association or interest in the case and should therefore be disqualified in 
accordance with the principles enunciated in Pinochet, Furundzija and 
Sesay.193His challenge was based on the involvement of the judge in the 
preparation of a report by UNICEF on child soldiers and the power of the 
Special Court to prosecute for conscripting and enlisting children as soldiers. 
UNICEF acknowledged Judge Winter‟s contributions and said that they were 
recommending her to other country offices. Judge Winter was also listed with 
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senior UNICEF personnel in conducting a Master‟s degree in Children‟s 
Rights at the University of Frieburg. 
 
The Appeals Chamber held that the applying the opinion of the hypothetical 
observer test, the defence failed to show any bias as they could not prove that 
Judge Winter was so closely associated  with UNICEF that she could properly 
be said to have had an interest in the outcome of the proceedings.194 An 
interesting comment made by the Appeals Chamber was that a party 
challenging the impartiality of a judge must demonstrate that the judge has a 
personal interest as opposed to professional interest in the subject matter of a 
case.195 This is a helpful distinction in deciding whether the judge was not 
impartial, as she can be professionally interested in the outcome of the case 
due to her work with international human rights organisations without being 
biased towards the parties to the trial before her.  
 
A distinction could also be made between this case and the Hoffman case 
because here, the judge was involved in her professional capacity as a legal 
expert. The matters that she was involved in were very wide and it is argued 
that there was no legitimate reason to apprehend bias. There was no 
indication that she had formed an opinion on the guilt of the accused just 
because he was charged with committing offences that she had a professional 
interest in. 
 
The impartiality of the judges was also challenged at the ICTR. The handful of 
decisions includes the Prosecutor v Akayesu, Ferdinand Nahimana, Jean-
Bosco Barayagwiza, Hassan Ngeze v Prosecutor, Kayishema and Ruzinda 
and Rutangada. These cases reiterate no more than what was stated in 
Furundzija, that is, the impartiality of the judges at the International Tribunal 
is automatically presumed and that the accused has the burden of disproving 
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such impartiality. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the assumption 
is that “judges can disabuse their minds of any irrelevant personal beliefs or 
predispositions.”196 The Furundzija test was applied to all these cases. Needless 
to say, none of the accused succeeded in their challenges.197 
 
 
4.6 OTHER ASPECTS OF IMPARTIALITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
TRIBUNALS 
 
Notwithstanding Rule 15, there are certain situations at the International 
Tribunals that could invite comments on the impartiality of the Tribunal‟s 
judges. 
 
4.6.1. The compètence de la compètence declaration 
 
The decision of the Appeals Chamber in Tadic (Jurisdiction)198 was momentous 
for several reasons. One of those reasons was the Appeals Chamber‟s defiant 
assertion of judicial independence from the Security Council by declaring 
itself having the competence to review decisions of the Security Council.199 
The Appeals Chamber held that it had compètence de la compètence200to decide 
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on the validity of its establishment and that it had the jurisdiction to 
determine its own jurisdiction.201 
 
Having decided so, the Appeals Chamber proceeded to hold that the Tribunal 
was validly established. A concise evaluation of this facet of the Appeals 
Chamber‟s judgement states: “The Tribunal, sitting in its own cause, declares 
itself legitimate.”202 It came as no surprise that the Tribunal validated its own 
existence.203 The general application of the compètence doctrine would apply 
where the court is already in existence. Here the court is asked to decide 
whether it was properly established in the first place.204 The court did not 
exercise its jurisdiction to decide its jurisdiction, as much as its jurisdiction to 
decide its establishment. It is the latter issue that has doubtful foundation. If it is 
not properly established, how could it have jurisdiction? 
 
The exercise of the Tribunals in this particular manner attracts questions as to 
its impartiality. It is submitted that the Tribunal could not have come to any 
other conclusion but that it was validly established, for it would be 
unimaginable for the Tribunal to rule itself out of existence. Such a decision 
however smacks of biasness, because there is nothing in the judgement that 
would allay the reasonable apprehension of a reasonable observer that there 
was no bias.205 Not only would such a decision to the contrary would rule out 
its existence, it would also mean that the judges, including those who sat in 
the Appeals Chamber, would lose their positions and salaries. It would have 
been far less controversial if the Appeals Chamber had adopted the stance of 
the Trial Chamber and Judge Li and simply ruled that it did not have the 
competence to consider this issue of legitimacy and validity of its 
establishment by the Security Council. 
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4.6.2 Rule-making powers of the judges of the International Tribunals 
 
A possible factor that could affect the impartiality of the judges at the 
International Tribunals is the power of the Tribunals to create and amend the 
Rules of Practice and Procedure. Article 15 of the Statute of the 
ICTY206empowers the judges to create rules of procedure and evidence for the 
conduct of proceedings from the pre-trial phase to appeals and other 
incidental issues such as protection of victims and witnesses.  
 
The power endowed to the judges to make their own rules could be 
interpreted in the most simplistic of terms, that they are being judges in their 
own cause. They decide what rules will apply to the proceedings before them 
and they would then decide whether such rules are appropriate and 
applicable.207 This type of conduct may raise a perception of bias.208 
 
4.6.3 Judges on rotation 
 
Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence states that “Permanent Judges shall 
rotate on a regular basis between the Trial Chambers and the Appeals Chamber. Rotation 
shall take into account the efficient disposal of cases.”209 
 
This provision is open to observations of apprehension of bias, for a judge may 
sit in one chamber or the other. Its relevance is questionable, it is one thing to say 
that certain judges will sit in the Appeals Chamber and certain judges to sit in the 
Trial Chamber such as in national jurisdictions where the most senior of judges 
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sit in the highest court at the apex of the hierarchy. Here, however, judges are 
allowed to rotate, to play the judicial version of musical chairs. 
 
Assuming that Judge A sits in one case in the Trial Chamber and he makes a 
decision. In another case with similar facts, Judge A sits on the Appeals Chamber. 
Whoever is appealing would have a reasonable apprehension that the judge had 
pre-judged the issue because he had decided in the earlier case in a certain 
manner. In another scenario, Judge A sits in the Appeals Chamber and decides 
on certain issues. He then sits on a case in a Trial Chamber based on similar facts. 
How reassured would a reasonable observer be that there will not be bias on the 
part of the Judge? 
 
The rotation proviso is rather strange as it allows the same judges to sit on trials 
as well as appellate stages. This is a system that is quite unique as it is hardly 
fund in national systems. A provision that allows judges to sit interchangeably on 
trial and appellate proceedings is undesirable for it has potential to be abused. 
 
 
4.7  PRIOR ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGES 
 
The non-judicial activities of a judge, particularly prior to his appointment to 
the international court have posed a quandary to the international courts. 
When may the prior activities of a judge in international law construed as 
adversely affecting his independence and impartiality? 
 
The foremost international court of the United Nations, the International 
Court of Justice, has faced this problem during its years of operation. In the 
context of the ICJ, potential sources of threats to individual independence are 
the United Nations and the States of the judge‟s nationality. A respected jurist 
stated as follows:  
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“…. it was explained that the judges „should be not only impartial but also 
independent of control by their own countries or the United Nations organization.‟ 
(13 UNCIO 174). What this means – or is interpreted in practice to mean – is that 
after election the Members of the Court must become independent in this sense. It did 
not preclude the nomination or election of a candidate who, at the time of nomination 
or election, was in the service of a government or of an international inter-
governmental organization – although it would be desirable for candidates in that 
situation to disengage themselves from their official activities once their candidatures 
are announced and until the election is completed.”210 
 
Hence, although the appointed judge could be under the service of his State 
or the United Nations agency, he may be nominated to the office of an 
international judge. There is no bar to the office of a judge even if he was, at 
the time of nomination or election, was in the service of a government or was 
actively involved in an institution which was very active in the fields of 
international law and affairs. He should divest himself of the relationship he 
has with the State once he is nominated to the position of a judge. The prior 
activities of a judge should generally not affect the independence and the 
impartiality of the judiciary. However, his independence and impartiality 
may be affected when he sits on a case where he has had a connection with 
the parties or the subject-matter of the case prior to his appointment to the 
Bench.  
 
The relevant provision in the Statute of the Court is Article 17(2) which states 
that no member should participate in the proceedings of a case where he had 
previously taken part as an agent or counsel or advocate for one of the parties 
or as a member of a national or international court or commission of enquiry 
or had acted in any other capacity.211 The wide provisions of Article 17(2) would 
ensure that a judge who is connected to a State party to the proceedings 
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before the Court in any capacity is disqualified from the panel if it could be 
shown that the connection between him and the State on this particular 
matter is so close and proximate that it would negate any impartiality on the 
part of the judge. 
 
An examination of the legislative background of Article 17 is helpful on the 
approach of the international community towards the need to appoint 
experienced judge balanced with the requirement that he is impartial and 
independent. It is imperative that in appointing judges, impartiality should 
not be compromised. On the other hand, judges who are appointed have to 
have knowledge and experience in international law. A balance needs to be 
reached between subjective impartiality and knowledge acquired. The 
question is how that balance is to be achieved.  
 
In the South West African Cases, the disqualification of the Pakistani judge, 
Judge Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan raised some interesting questions. The 
judge was asked by the President of the ICJ to disqualify himself from 
participation in the case involving South Africa as it would be, in his opinion, 
improper for him to participate. It was believed that one of the factors taken 
into account was that Judge Khan was the President of the 17th session of the 
General Assembly and in that capacity, had presided over the debates on 
South Africa during his presidency.212 The question was whether it was a 
valid reason to disqualify the judge from hearing the case. The judge himself 
was not consulted on his view on this matter. Even so, the fact that he had 
been the President of the General Assembly should not have been held 
against him. As the President of the General Assembly he was acting in an 
official and objective capacity. By disqualifying him, the Court had deprived 
itself of a member who had wide experience in and knowledge of 
international law. 213  Further, it was thought that the recusal came not 
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voluntarily but rather due to the pressure exercised on the judge by the then 
President of the Court, Sir Percy Spender. 214  This also raises the latent 
question of internal threat to the independence of a judge, that is, he is put in 
a position where he has to compromise his personal independence due to 
pressure from his superior. 
 
There is no hard and fast rule that can be used as a gauge to decide when 
previous non-judicial activities 215  would affect the independence and 
impartiality of a judge as to disqualify him from sitting on a matter. Each case 
should be decided on its facts. There have been examples where judges who 
had acted as legal advisors to their Governments were not disqualified from 
sitting on a panel when prima facie their activities came under the purview of 
Article 17(2).216 The views expressed by a diplomat are prima facie not his own, 
but the official view and stand of the Government that he represented at that 
time. The position is not clear when he had acted as legal advisors to the 
States. Here, they would have expressed a legal opinion. Could they change 
their minds if subsequently they had to adjudicate on similar facts they had 
advised their Governments on?  
 
The underlying reasons in the jurisprudence of the ICJ imply that the 
disqualification of a judge depends on the circumstances of his 
involvement.217 If he was involved in the matter in an official capacity and 
had expressed a personal albeit professional view as counsel to his 
Government on that issue on that issue which then comes up for hearing 
before the Court where his Government is a party, he should disqualify 
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himself.218 He could not possibly be seen to be impartial. When the particular 
judge represented his Government on matters discussed where the 
Government is not a party, would he still be disqualified? As the Appeals 
Chamber succinctly stated in Furundzija, the views expressed by the judge 
would have been the official stand of his Government and not his own 
views.219 The proper approach, it has been suggested, is that disqualification 
should rest on the manner of his involvement. If his involvement is on the law 
that requires to be adjudicated, he should not be disqualified. However he 
should disqualify himself if his involvement was in connection to the facts that 
need to be adjudicated.220 The dilemma of international lawyers is that the 
sphere of international law is so small that if Article 17(2) is interpreted 
strictly, every member of the Court could be disqualified in certain cases.221 
 
In the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory222case, the Government of Israel, one of the parties to 
the proceedings before the ICJ, objected to the composition of the court. The 
Government of Israel challenged the participation of Judge Nabil Elaraby on 
two grounds. First, that he had played an active, official role for a “cause that 
is in contention in this case”. The various roles of the judge prior to his 
appointment included his participation in proceedings and activities at the 
United Nations as representative as well as the principal legal advisor to 
various agencies of the Government of Egypt on issues relating to Israel. The 
second ground of request for disqualification was that Judge Elaraby had 
given an interview to an Egyptian newspaper. Israel alleged that the opinions 
expressed therein combined with his activities in his previous professional 
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capacity showed an active opposition to Israel including on matters which 
were being directly dealt with by the Court.223 
 
The ICJ relied on its earlier decision in the Legal Consequences for States of 
the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) where it ruled that 
statements made or participation by the impugned judges in their former 
capacity as representatives of their governments in United Nations in matters 
concerning South Africa did not attract the provisions of Article 17(2). 
 
The Court found that the activities of Judge Elaraby were performed in his 
capacity as a diplomat and that they took place long before the issue before 
the ICJ in this present case arose. Further the question that was to be decided 
by the Court in this present case was not discussed at proceedings in the 
United Nations until after the judge had ceased to participate as 
representative of Egypt. Finally, the Court held that the judge had not 
expressed any opinion on the question before the Court in this present case in 
the interview complained of. The Court found that Judge Elaraby could not 
be regarded as having “previously taken part” in the case in any capacity.224 
The Court dismissed Israel‟s complaint. 
 
Judge Buergenthal dissented with the majority on this decision on the ground 
that the interview given by Judge Elaraby was made two months before he 
was elected to the Court when he was no longer an official of his Government 
and hence spoke in his personal capacity.225 
 
The crucial issue was that he agreed with the majority that Article 17(2) 
would not apply where the prior activities of the impugned judge was 
performed in the discharge of his diplomatic and governmental functions as 
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the views he was expressing were not his but of the government that he was 
representing.226 However, his disagreement with the finding of the majority 
on the second issue is valid, for the judge had expressed views that could lead 
a reasonably held belief that the judge did not bring an open and impartial 
mind to this case. 
 
The jurisprudential disadvantage of the ICJ is that the Court does not have a 
Furundzija type test to help it gauge the question of partiality. The reliance is 
on Article 17, which only refers to the capacity of the judge and not to the 
mental outlook required, unlike the international criminal courts. This 
explains to an extent the inconsistent approach of the ICJ to the cases before it.  
 
The dilemma faced by international law experts is that the statutory 
requirements of qualifications for judicial appointments include experience in 
international law.227Such experience can be gained only if the judge had 
involved himself in international law prior to his appointment. This could be 
in various capacities – as diplomat, counsel and politician. Whilst the 
experience gained is to be seen as an advantage, it could be construed as a 
disadvantage if such involvement would affect the impartiality of the judge. It 
is submitted that the solution to the dilemma posed is to assess the views of 
the fair-minded, reasonable observer, having cognizance of all the 
circumstances, facts and the principles of judicial independence and 
impartiality as well as the requirement of experience in international law 
would reasonably apprehend that there was bias on the judge, taking into 
consideration of any objective guarantees that the judge may offer. Each case 
will be decided on its own facts. The extent of the impugned judge‟s 
involvement and the capacity that he had acted in are two main issues that 
the Court could consider. 
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The situations of Judges Mumba, Odio-Benito, Robertson, Hoffman, Winter et 
al are now easily resolved under Article 41(2) and Rule 34 of the Statute and 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC respectively. Rule 34 is very 
comprehensive and is designed to avoid situations that have occurred at the 
ICJ as well as the international ad hoc tribunals. If there is a reasonable doubt 
as to the judge‟s impartiality, he should disqualify himself from hearing that 
situation. His involvement in the case, although relevant, is not the decisive 
factor. Neither is the capacity of his involvement. What is crucial is whether 
there exists a reasonable doubt. 
 
 
4.8 CONCLUSION 
 
Judicial impartiality is as crucial in international criminal proceedings as it is 
in State practice.  A judge should be neutral, impartial and free from bias 
when he is deciding a case. However, there have been situations where his 
impartiality has been called in question and the courts have formulated a two-
tiered test to gauge impartiality. The impartiality of national judges could be 
questioned in various ways, depending the nature of his interest in the matter 
and the connection or association he may have with the party to the trial 
proceedings before him.  
 
The comparative study of the assessment of judicial impartiality in different 
jurisdictions stresses the importance of negating any form of biasness on the 
part of the judge. Different courts apply different tests, but the common 
thread that runs through the cases is that judges can be challenged as to their 
impartiality. The International Tribunals, having no point of reference to 
assess impartiality in their judiciary, had recourse to national jurisprudence 
and tailored the test of impartiality to their own needs. 
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Of all the tests advocated by various national courts, it is the two tiered test  
propounded by the European Court  which is a comprehensive one as a judge 
should not be disqualified from a case by mere allegations of bias. The very 
nature of his office demands impartiality. Bias is a serious allegation as it goes 
against the very nature of the office of the judge that demands impartiality. 
The general rule therefore is that a judge is presumed impartial and it is for 
the party alleging to prove bias. The Piersack228test rests on subjective and 
objective tests. The former rests on his personal conviction in a particular case 
and the latter relates to the perception of the reasonable man and whether the 
judge had offered objective guarantees to dispel any perception of bias.  
 
The issue of recusal is very important in the international criminal 
proceedings. It is a particular problem in international arena where the judges 
are usually appointed by virtue of their knowledge and experience in 
international law.229 This knowledge and experience may be gained through 
their work in the international legal arena230 prior to their appointments to the 
international tribunals and courts. The involvement may be varied, in 
accordance with the capacity in which the judges were involved. The judges 
may have acted as diplomats or representatives of their Governments in 
political and non-political matters or worked with non-governmental 
organisations particularly on issues of human rights. They may have acted as 
counsel or advisors to one of the parties or non-governmental organisations 
who may have had a interest in the outcome of a case that particular judge 
subsequently was called to decide or who may appear as amicus curiae in the 
                                                 
228
supra n.5 
229
 Mackenzie and Sands, supra n.60 280 
230
 Expertise and knowledge of international law is a necessary qualification for appointment of judges 
to the international tribunals. See also Amerasinghe where the author analyses the international legal 
experience of judges appointed to the International Court of Justice and concludes that the United 
Nations has deemed candidates for judicial office in  the ICJ qualified where their international legal 
experience included involvement in the International Law Commission or participation in diplomatic 
conferences or performing diplomatic functions on international law. Judges, who prior to their 
appointment were international legal advisors to their countries or to international organisations were 
also deemed to have experience in international law. He argues that something more is required other 
than reputation and experience as international lawyers and that election to the ICJ has become a matter 
of politics rather than merits. However, there is no suggestion as to what that “something more” should 
be. 
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proceedings. Some of the judges may have been academics who would have 
written and published articles expressing their views on the issues which they 
may later be called upon to decide. On one end of the scale, a judge needs to 
possess knowledge and experience of international law as he or she bears an 
extraordinary responsibility in deciding on pioneering cases of international 
and humanitarian laws. Specialised knowledge is not just essential, it is vital. 
This issue also relates to qualifications of judges. On the other end, he or she 
must ensure that knowledge and experience does not taint his impartiality, 
giving rise to a perception of bias or appearance of bias. A balance must be 
achieved between these two issues, which may not be easy. Each case has to 
be decided on its particular circumstances. It is difficult to formulate a fixed 
rule to decide on the impartiality of the judge in matters such as these. The 
most preferable solution would be to apply the two-tiered test to case-by-case. 
It is suggested that where the case before the court is one where the judge was 
involved so directly and intimately that it would be contrary to the due 
process that he is called upon to decide on the very issues that he had already 
expressed legal opinions on. This situation normally occurs when he had 
acted as legal counsel to one of the parties. 231  Where he had acted as a 
diplomat however, the situation is not so clear and the application of the test 
for impartiality is more than useful in deciding whether the judge was 
impartial. 
 
The provisions for the appointment and disqualification of international 
judges are detailed particularly those relating to the judiciary at the ICC. A 
bigger role is envisaged for the ICC, and as it will be the foremost criminal 
court with universal jurisdiction, it is imperative that the judges who are 
appointed are not only qualified, but independent and impartial as well. The 
mechanisms of disqualification and removal of the judges at the ICC are very 
stringent and judges have to be very strict with their conduct. On the other 
hand, such stringent conditions would circumvent the problems that the 
                                                 
231
 See practice at the International Court of Justice. 
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international judiciary at the other international criminal tribunals face, 
namely the potential conflict and incompatibility between the office that they 
hold and the activities that they undertook prior to their appointments. 
Article 41 of the Statute of the ICC that deals with the concept of judicial 
impartiality is wide and covers potential situations where the judge may find 
his impartiality reasonably doubted.  
 
The jurisprudence of the international criminal tribunals on these concepts is 
burgeoning and with the specific provisions of the Statute of the ICC, the 
accused and in particular his counsel, have legal points of reference that 
would guarantee a fundamental aspect of his right to a fair trial, the right to 
have his case heard by an independent and impartial tribunal.  A future 
international criminal judge would have some guidance from the statutory 
provisions of the judicial organ he serves on and the jurisprudence of 
international criminal courts. 
 
It is suggested that individual judicial independence is best summed-up by 
the following passage: 
 
By “independence” of a person we ordinarily mean that he does not act on 
instructions from superior authorities, and that he is not accountable to them. We do 
not, of course, mean ideal independence, implying absence of any environmental 
influence. We should insist,  however, that this influence stop short of 
destroying the individual’s ability or willingness, or both, to search for facts, 
to question dogma and to articulate his thoughts.”232 (Emphasis added) 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
232
Z.L.Zile  A Soviet Contribution to International Adjudication: Professor Kyrlov’s Jurisprudential 
Legacy (1964) 58 AJIL 359.  Personal independence is tied in with impartiality, so this passage could 
apply equally to the issue of impartiality and the aspects of convictions and beliefs as well as prior 
activities. 
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To quote another passage 
 
“Let them (the judges) be seen, not as gowned robots, but men [sic], warts and all.”233 
 
The modern international judge must have some knowledge of current and 
world affairs. It would have been really strange indeed, if an ICTY or ICTR 
judge did not know what was happening in the Balkans or Rwanda prior to 
his appointment to the Tribunals. That however does not mean he is biased or 
partial. He should be given the latitude of having his own beliefs and 
opinions. It is when those beliefs and opinions intrude into the trial 
proceedings and impinge his impartiality, he should be impugned and 
removed for that partiality would have an adverse effect on the right of the 
accused to a fair trial. 
                                                 
233
 G. Henry Case Note:  Pinochet: In Search of the Perfect Judge (1999) 21 Sydney L. Rev 667 
quoting Shetreet Judges on Trialn.25 
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CONCLUSION 
__________________________ 
 
CONCLUSION:  THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF THE 
INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
JUDICIARY 
 
“History will judge how the accused were treated. It is the judges who are on trial 
here.” 1 
 
Questions were asked at the inception of the International Criminal 
Tribunals.2 Questions are still asked towards the near-end of their life spans.3 
With the creation of the International Criminal Court, these questions are as 
relevant and as important. Are international criminal courts and tribunals 
“truly independent”? Do they afford the accused full guarantee of his fair trial 
rights? Or are they more intent on appeasing their creators, the victims and 
the international community?  
 
To assert their legitimacy and credibility as international courts of law, the 
International Tribunals and the International Criminal Courts need to ensure 
that they are independent and impartial. The concepts of judicial 
independence and impartiality are therefore as relevant to the international 
legal system as they are to national systems. 
 
                                                 
1
 Comment made to the author by a senior defence counsel during an interview the author conducted at 
the ICTY, The Hague, 28
th
 May 2002. 
2
 Mirko Klarin The Tribunal’s Four Battles (2004) 1 JCIJ 546, quoting Madeleine Albright’s evidence 
at the sentencing proceedings of Biljana Plasvic where a bleak picture was created regarding the future 
of the Tribunal, its establishment, its proceedings and its composition.  
3
 Perhaps the harshest criticisms of the Tribunal come not from its critics but the Assistant Secretary-
General for Legal Affairs of the United Nations. Ralph Zacklin The Failings of Ad Hoc International 
Tribunals (2004) 2 JCIJ 54 where the author says that the ICTY and ICTR are “too costly, inefficient 
and ineffective.”  Yet others have not been so condemning. ”This is not a victor’s justice; this is a 
victim’s justice” Watson supra Chapter 4, n.197 719 
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Judicial independence and impartiality are more than mere legal concepts. 
They are core procedural and judicial guarantees which are fundamental to 
the due process of law and are in particular essential requirements to ensure 
that the rights of the accused to a fair trial are guaranteed.  
 
These concepts are established in national legal systems but are relatively new 
in international criminal proceedings. It is argued that due to the intrinsic 
normative value of these concepts to the fair trial process, they are inherent in 
any system of justice, necessary to maintain the maxim that justice must not 
only be done, but be manifestly seen to be done. It is therefore immaterial whether 
the judicial process that is under scrutiny is a national system or an 
international one. It is argued also that it is immaterial whether the concepts 
are enshrined in a written instrument to be binding on the parties that create 
the judicial institution and the members that form its composition. 
 
The lack of precedents in the international criminal law arena for the 
application of these concepts should not be a bar to the actual implementation 
in practice. The precedent set by Nuremberg, though of minimal guidance, 
does demonstrate that these concepts are given serious, if not paramount 
consideration in a system of justice. Nuremberg, despite its flaws, paid 
testimony to the operation of this principle of justice. 
 
Judicial independence and impartiality are necessary to uphold the right of 
the accused to a fair trial.  This is axiomatic throughout almost all legal 
systems in the world. Thus these issues are examined in the international 
criminal arena. 
 
In the Tadic (Protective Measures) Decision, the Trial Chamber said: 
 
In drafting the Statute and the Rules every attempt was made to comply with 
internationally recognized standards of fundamental human rights. The Report of the 
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Secretary-General emphasizes the importance of the International Tribunal in fully 
respecting such standards. ……The drafters of the Report recognized that ensuring 
that the proceedings before the International Tribunal were conducted in accordance 
with international standards of fair trial and due process was important not only to 
ensure respect for the individual rights of the accused, but also to ensure the 
legitimacy of the proceedings and to set a standard for proceedings before other ad hoc 
tribunals or a permanent international criminal court of the future. (See Morris and 
Scharf, supra, at 175.) In response to these concerns, the drafters adopted a liberal 
approach in procedural matters. Article 21 of the Statute provides minimum judicial 
guarantees to which all defendants are entitled and reflects the internationally 
recognized standard of due process set forth in Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR"). In fact, the Statute provides 
greater rights than the ICCPR by extending judicial guarantees to the pre-trial stage 
of the investigation. 
 
It is the argument of this thesis that the International Tribunals have failed to 
provide the minimum judicial guarantees that they declared that they are 
obligated to. That is not to say that the Tribunals are a complete failure. It is 
contended that based on case studies and circumstances peculiar to the ad hoc 
Tribunals, the courts are not truly independent. They may be quite 
independent, fairly independent perhaps but not truly independent. There are 
many reasons for this view. The very unique mode of their creation puts them 
in a position peculiar to national systems. They are not regarded as a third 
arm of the Government but creatures of United Nations or agreements 
between parties. They rely on their creators for efficacy and effectiveness. 
From vital matters such as finance and State cooperation to other matters such 
as recruitment of professionals, they have to rely on external sources. Then 
there are matters that are unique to the Tribunals themselves, such as legal 
aid and Victims and Witnesses Units, which traditionally are not within the 
purview of a judicial organ. Thus, it is difficult at times to assert their 
independence when much is relied for their functions and operations on third 
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parties. This is the reality of the situation. As much as the International 
Tribunals have declared that political considerations do not affect their 
independence, it is regrettably inaccurate as observed by several of their 
controversial and debatable decisions.  These decisions have compromised 
the rights of the accused and the structural framework is open to criticisms.4 
However, having said all that, it is contended that the accused enjoys greater 
fair trial rights at the international tribunals than he would have had had he 
been charged at a national court; in some countries he may not even be 
charged in court.5 Based on the reasons given above, it is also argued that they 
have not conformed to the notions of independence familiar in national legal 
systems. 
 
The International Tribunals have faced problematic cases which there have 
been challenges on the institutional independence of the Tribunal, the 
personal independence of the judges and their impartiality as well. It is 
argued that these cases, although raise legitimate questions as to the 
independence and impartiality, do not emanate startling consequences that 
would seriously put these issues in serious doubt.  
 
                                                 
4
 Even the physical set-up of the ICTY has been criticised. By having the Chambers, Registry and the 
Office of the Prosecutor in the same building, commentators state that the independence of the Tribunal 
is open to criticism. De Bertonado supra Chapter Threen.152 419. However, the physical structure of 
the building is rather complicated with walls between the different organs as well as electronic 
entrances. Interview with Graham Blewitt, supra Chapter Four, n.208.These three institutions i.e. the 
Registry, Office of the Prosecutor and Chambers are considered as organs of the International Tribunal. 
Article 11 of the Statute of the ICTY. This organisational framework is peculiar to international 
criminal legal system, as in national legal systems, the Prosecution is hardly part of the court system. 
5
 In Malaysia for example, a war crimes suspect may be arrested under the Internal Security Act of 
1960. Section 73(1) of the Act states as follows: "Any police officer may without warrant arrest and 
detain pending enquiries any person in respect of whom he has reason to believe that there are 
grounds which would justify his detention under section 8; and that he has acted or is about to act or is 
likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to 
maintenance of essential services therein or to the economic life thereof."Section 8:“(i) If the Minister 
is satisfied that the detention of any person is necessary with a view to preventing him from acting in 
any manner prejudicial to the security of Malaysia or any part thereof or to the maintenance of 
essential services therein or the economic life thereof, he may make an order (hereinafter referred to as 
a detention order) directing that that person be detained for any period not exceeding two years."A 
war crimes suspect would, it is submitted, fall under S.73(1). The ISA is anathema to due process and 
the author has been an active member of NGOs calling for its abolition. 
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There are two main issues relating to the judicial independence of the 
international criminal courts and tribunals. First, the constitutional issue of 
the establishment of the courts and the relationship with their creators and 
secondly, the fair trial issue where judicial independence is a procedural 
guarantee for the rights of the accused. 
 
The mode of establishment of the International Tribunals by the Security 
Council has established a proximate association between the Security Council 
and the International Tribunals that is not comparable to associations between 
political and judicial organs in national systems. Thus the relationship 
between the Council and the International Tribunals is a potential source of 
threat to their institutional independence.  
 
A complete detachment however is difficult to achieve in an international 
setting as there is no application of the doctrine of separation of powers that is 
crucial to the effective functioning of a democratic system. The International 
Tribunals exist outside a national system and therefore cannot exercise all of 
their jurisdiction and powers independently of the Security Council. They 
require the Council‟s powers and authority to obtain the attendance of the 
accused, the enforcement of orders, the compelling of State cooperation and 
other matters that are out of their powers. As such the independence of the 
Tribunals was always at a risk and the practice of the Tribunals seeking 
intervention by the Security Council may not be compatible with its judicial 
characteristics. However, there is no practical alternative for the International 
Tribunals. The mandates of the Tribunals which were established by the 
Security Council cannot be fulfilled due to their inability to properly carry out 
their jurisdictions in any particular case from its initiation to its completion. 
The Tribunals therefore face hard questions and opinions that their 
dependence on the Security Council do not concur with their responsibility to 
be completely independent are inevitable. The Tribunals find themselves in 
situations that cannot be avoided where they have to take controversial 
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decisions. The Todorovic case is a clear example of such a situation. There the 
ICTY asserted its independence by issuing a decision against an organisation 
whose members were made up of some permanent members of the Security 
Council. The consequences of that decision did not augur well for the 
continued cooperation between the Tribunal and NATO. It therefore raises 
the question as to the execution of the mandate of the International Tribunals 
to prosecute accused persons when they could not be secured to attend the 
trial proceedings. 
 
The positions of the International Tribunals as subsidiary organs have put 
them in yet another precarious position. The Tribunals were measures 
intended to address the threats posed to international peace and security. It 
was made clear at the outset that the Tribunals cease operations as soon as 
international peace and security had been restored to the respective areas of 
conflict6. Tied to this assertion was the expectation that the Tribunals would 
be terminated.  With that in mind, the Completion Strategies were 
implemented. However, the Tribunals are not the usual genre of measures 
adopted by the Security Council to combat threats to international peace and 
security. These are judicial organs who deal with the rights of the individuals 
– the accused, the victims and the witnesses. Although the Completion 
Strategies envisaged the transfer of cases involving middle and lower ranked 
suspects to national jurisdictions and thereby decreasing the caseload of the 
Tribunals, the Tribunals nevertheless are pressurised to complete their cases 
by certain deadlines. The problems that the Strategies caused are rather 
worrying. It would be difficult to achieve a trial that is fair involving the 
examination of complex factual and legal issues, the assessment of evidence 
gleaned from oral evidence as well as documents within a certain period of 
time. The imposition of this obligation on the International Tribunals makes it 
hard to avoid the legal adage “justice hurried is justice buried”. The hard-earned 
reputation of the Tribunals as independent judicial organs has taken a slight 
                                                 
6
 Report of the Secretary-General, supra Chapter One, n.91 
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battering by the perception that they are more interested in achieving the 
dictates of their principal organ than carrying out their judicial 
responsibilities.  
 
The individual independence of the judges at the international criminal courts 
invokes a discussion of several aspects.  Various standards need to be secured 
before individual independence is guaranteed. These are key matters that 
should be preserved at the international courts themselves. Matters such as 
methods of appointment, qualifications, security of tenure, conditions of work 
at the international judicial organs are as important as they are in State 
practice. It has been argued that the nominations and elections of the 
international judges are highly politicised. This however cannot be avoided as 
the States are the parties nominating their nationals as judges. It is the general 
practice that they would nominate those who represent their views. Again, 
the overall picture is that the judges at the international criminal tribunals and 
courts are independent and impartial. They are highly-qualified individuals 
with varying degrees of expertise in international law, international criminal 
law, international humanitarian law and criminal law and the jurisprudence 
of the Tribunals have shown that they do ensure that their reasoning are 
backed with legal principles. It is argued that although nominations and 
elections are susceptible to politicisation, those appointed to the Bench have, 
to the best of their ability conducted the proceedings to ensure that the 
accused receives a fair trial. The writer, a member of the Bar of Malaysia, 
attended the trial proceedings of the late President of the Serbia, Slobodan 
Milosevic at the ICTY and witnessed firsthand the proceedings conducted. It 
is a considered view that despite the refusal of Mr. Milosevic to accept the 
jurisdiction of the court, the judges gave Mr. Milosevic a lot of leeway and the 
Tribunal itself had provided him with every facility, including amicus curiae 
and translation facilities so that he could participate in the proceedings.7 The 
trial conducted by the ICTY was in many ways far superior to certain national 
                                                 
7
 See also Michael Scharf  The Legacy of the Milosevic Trial Chapter 3, n.19 
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systems, including those systems that have arbitrary and violent practices 
such as detentions without trial and death penalty.8 
 
International lawyers are interested in gauging whether an international 
criminal system works and it is argued that a very significant factor that 
contributes to the success of the international criminal system and the 
tribunals is an independent and impartial judiciary. The value of the 
precedents of the work of the International Tribunals to the International 
Criminal Court is another advantage.  
 
A detailed discussion of the concept of judicial impartiality entailed a 
discussion of both State practice and the practice at the international criminal 
courts. The many challenges that the accused launched at the International 
Tribunals and the Special Court mostly evolved around their work prior to 
their appointment as international criminal judges. The decisions of the 
Appeal Chamber are particularly useful in assessing impartiality of the 
independent judiciary. This issue is raised largely due to the activities of the 
judges prior to their appointment to judicial office. At the International 
Tribunals the challenges that could have seriously affected the impartiality 
(and consequently the independence) were based on their activities in 
international arena, in particular with the United Nations – Judge Odio-Benito 
who once acted as the representative of her country, the Republic of Costa 
Rica to the Security Council, Judge Florence Mumba vis-à-vis her activities 
with the UNSW and Judge Renate Winter and her consultative work with 
UNICEF. The challenges launched by the accused at the International 
Tribunals against the judges were based on the assumption that the prior 
activities of the judges had affected their impartiality and in some cases, their 
independence.9 The activities of international judges in the international arena 
                                                 
8
Supra 
9
 Although it is argued that the challenge to Judge Odio-Benito’s alleged political involvement was 
well-founded on its face. Jules Deschenes. However, it is argued that the challenge is based on 
convoluted facts and arguments as explained in Chapter Five., supra 
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are however not a problem peculiar to the International Tribunals. It is an 
issue that has affected international judiciary generally. It is submitted that 
this should not be an issue at all, if the impugned judge was involved in an 
official capacity and represented the views of the State. It was not his personal 
opinions or convictions that were presented to the international community. 
Conversely, it could be argued that States would only nominate candidates 
who represent their views and a perception of bias could not be avoided but it 
is argued that once candidates are appointed, they are presumed to have 
discarded the official views of the State which they had earlier represented. 
 
International law is a specialised and constantly developing area of law.  The 
number of experts in international law is comparatively small and the chances 
that a diplomat would be elected to a judicial position are very high. It is 
submitted that comparatively the conduct of the judges at the international 
criminal tribunals have not attracted intense criticisms unlike the one-off 
situation in Sierra Leone. Judge Geoffrey Robertson‟s prior conduct as the 
author of a book that dealt specifically on the very issues which fell within the 
jurisdiction of the court he was President of should have automatically 
disqualified him from sitting on trials.  The appointment of Judge Robertson 
is surprising. The party who had appointed him must have known of his 
activities prior to his appointment and the possibility of his impartiality being 
challenged outright as a result of his personal views expressed in his book, 
The work is a broad piece of work, spanning over the conflict in Sierra Leone 
and the organisations that were involved in the conflict and whose members 
are now in court facing trial.  Judge Robertson was an international human 
rights lawyer before he was appointed as a judge and did bring to the court 
the benefit of his knowledge, skills and expertise. But no matter how excellent 
a judge is, a perception of bias would have compromised the fairness of the 
proceedings and the independence of the tribunal. The unique aspect of the 
finding of bias on the part of the judge by the Appeals Chamber is that Judge 
Robertson was not disqualified from just from the that particular trial but also 
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from all trials involving members of the organisations that were the subject-
matter of his book. 
 
The statutory provisions of the ICC on the disqualification and recusal of 
judges when their impartiality is doubted are very wide. This would avoid a 
perception of bias based on the extrajudicial considerations that has occurred 
at the International Tribunals and the Special Court. It is recommended that 
judges should recuse themselves out of their own accord instead of being 
challenged by the accused. Where the judge is in doubt he should consult the 
President of the Court. 
 
It is contended that despite their weaknesses especially in maintaining a 
detached stance from their creating organ that is a highly political body, the 
international criminal tribunals have proven themselves to be more than 
adequate in ensuring that justice is achieved.10 The use of the word “adequate” 
is intentional as it is difficult for the tribunals to conduct themselves in an 
exemplary manner that would be expected of national courts by virtue of the 
lack of constitutional framework. Even so, the tribunals consider themselves 
as purely judicial organs and that they come in the purview of the United 
Nations only where the administration of the courts are concerned. Despite 
several controversial decisions, the judges have managed to ensure that the 
accused receive a fair trial not just within the Statute and the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence but also in conformity with the international 
standards in the international and regional human rights instruments. These 
                                                 
10
Leila Nadya Sadat relates an anecdotal example of the impact the ICTY has had in the international 
community. In 2001, during an Israeli Cabinet Meeting, the following transpired between the 
Infrastructure Minister Avigdor Lieberman and then Foreign Minister (and the current President of 
Israel),  Shimon Peres over what steps Israel should take to address the threat of Palestinian suicide 
bombers. 
Mr. Lieberman:  At 8 a.m. we’ll bomb all the commercial centres….. 
   At noon, we’ll bomb their gas stations…. 
   At two we’ll bomb their banks…. 
Mr. Peres (interrupting): And at 6 p.m. you’ll receive an invitation to the international tribunal at the 
Hague. 
Legal niceties and correctness of that remark aside, that conversation reflects the effect of the ICTY has 
achieved amongst the international community.  Sadat The Legacy of the ICTY: The International 
Criminal Court (2002-2003) New Eng L. Rev 1973. 
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instruments are not binding on the judicial organs. However the Secretary-
General had expressed his hope that the International Tribunals do conform 
to the international standards and the judges have taken his comments into 
consideration.  Some of the accused prefer to be tried at the International 
Tribunals rather than being sent back to the national courts as they believe 
that national proceedings is less independent and impartial than the 
proceedings at the International Tribunals.  
 
It is recommended that the United Nations-sponsored and the regional 
instruments on the independence and impartiality of the judiciary are 
implemented at international stage. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur 
for the Independence of Judges and Lawyers should be widened to include 
the international judiciary including the International Criminal Court as a 
monitoring and a complaint mechanism and accessible to judges. 
 
Several issues came to the fore upon interviews conducted by the author at 
the Hague in June 2002. First, the Chambers were very vehement and proud 
about their independence from the Security Council. To use a phrase used by 
a Senior Legal Officer, judges were “sternly independent”. It was opined by 
senior officers from Chambers that the judges are sensitive to the perceptions 
of the outside world and that they felt that they had to show that they had 
integrity. Integrity was the core of their qualifications. The prevalent feeling 
was that trials were very fair and that judges were very concerned with the 
rights of the accused, including understanding the proceedings. Judges were 
apparently understanding of the defence lawyers‟ ignorance of the Rules. 
However, it was intimated by a defence counsel that as counsel and accused 
come from civil law systems, they find the common law systems confusing. 
 
On the other hand, defence counsel interviewed were not that optimistic. 
Aside from the different legal systems of practice, they were of the view that 
the Tribunal was very “prosecution-orientated” and the atmosphere was “we 
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must convict”. That there are non-career judges on the Bench was frustrating 
to the defence and the lack of judicial experience was telling. It was opined 
that the non-litigation judges had no clue as to how to conduct a criminal trial. 
Counsel also opined that the ad litem judges were more interested and less 
burnt-out. That the defence counsels were at a disadvantage was apparent. 
On the day I was at the ICTY, the defence counsel had signed a petition to the 
Chambers, complaining, inter alia on the double security checks they had to 
go through, lack of basic facilities such as facsimile machines, photostat 
machines, research facilities and the preferential treatment the Prosecution 
has in terms of financial and professional resources. Unfortunately, at that 
point in time, there was no defence bar and counsel were left to their own 
devices in preparing the cases for the accused. 
 
However, it is concluded that notwithstanding the hard problems the 
international criminal justice faces, the International Tribunals are proof that 
independent international criminal courts can operate post –Nuremberg. 
Perhaps it is best summed-up in the following quote. It is not by a judge or a 
lawyer or a legal expert or even a commentator. It is by a victim and it is on 
what ultimately is the goal of the international criminal justice system. 
 
“His name is Amor Masovic, and his mission, for the past 10 years, has been to search 
for the persons who have gone missing in the war. In most cases, he finds them in the 
mass graves scattered across the crags of Bosnia. He says: 
 
Were it not for the Tribunal, we would probably be very, very far from the truth and 
justice. Were it not for the Tribunal, we would perhaps still be discussing whether 
Srebrenica happened or not, whether the eight thousand people who were killed ever 
existed at all. All that would be in question were it not for the Tribunal. Keraterm, 
Manjaca, Trnopolje, all those camps, the crimes in Visegrad, the crimes in Foca, in 
many other places, in Celebici, would be in question. Were it not for the Tribunal, all 
that would be in question. The Tribunal has therefore undoubtedly played an 
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extremely positive role. In fact, the only positive role, having in mind the way in 
which the international community treats what happened in the former 
Yugoslavia.”11 
 
 
                                                 
11
 Mirko Klarin The Tribunal's Four Battles (2004) 2 JICJ  546, 557 n.8. On a personal note, the author 
had the opportunity to view the proceedings against the late Slobodan Milosevic, the former President 
of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the ICTY in the Hague. It appeared to me that the Judges of the 
Tribunal were bending over backwards to accommodate Mr.Milosevic, including his politic diatribes 
which he would indulge every few minutes or so. As a practitioner, I was amazed at the patience shown 
by the Tribunal. If a similar trial had taken place in the national legal system in which I practised, 
sanctions could have been taken against Mr. Milosevic, including for contempt of court. A cynic could 
say that the Judges were being careful in their treatment of Milosevic in order to avoid international 
criticism. My personal observation , however, was that the Judges were making every attempt to ensure 
that the trial against Mr. Milosevic was fair. See also Scharf, supra n.7 
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Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary 
Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of 
Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 
September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 
of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985 
 
Whereas in the Charter of the United Nations the peoples of the world 
affirm, inter alia, their determination to establish conditions under which 
justice can be maintained to achieve international co-operation in promoting 
and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms 
without any discrimination,  
Whereas the Universal Declaration of Human Rights enshrines in 
particular the principles of equality before the law, of the presumption of 
innocence and of the right to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by law,  
Whereas the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and on Civil and Political Rights both guarantee the exercise of those 
rights, and in addition, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights further 
guarantees the right to be tried without undue delay,  
Whereas frequently there still exists a gap between the vision underlying 
those principles and the actual situation,  
Whereas the organization and administration of justice in every country 
should be inspired by those principles, and efforts should be undertaken to 
translate them fully into reality,  
Whereas rules concerning the exercise of judicial office should aim at 
enabling judges to act in accordance with those principles,  
Whereas judges are charged with the ultimate decision over life, 
freedoms, rights, duties and property of citizens,  
Whereas the Sixth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
and the Treatment of Offenders, by its resolution 16, called upon the 
324 
 
Committee on Crime Prevention and Control to include among its priorities 
the elaboration of guidelines relating to the independence of judges and the 
selection, professional training and status of judges and prosecutors,  
Whereas it is, therefore, appropriate that consideration be first given to 
the role of judges in relation to the system of justice and to the importance 
of their selection, training and conduct,  
The following basic principles, formulated to assist Member States in 
their task of securing and promoting the independence of the judiciary 
should be taken into account and respected by Governments within the 
framework of their national legislation and practice and be brought to the 
attention of judges, lawyers, members of the executive and the legislature 
and the public in general. The principles have been formulated principally 
with professional judges in mind, but they apply equally, as appropriate, to 
lay judges, where they exist.  
Independence of the judiciary 
1. The independence of the judiciary shall be guaranteed by the State and 
enshrined in the Constitution or the law of the country. It is the duty of all 
governmental and other institutions to respect and observe the independence 
of the judiciary.  
2. The judiciary shall decide matters before them impartially, on the basis 
of facts and in accordance with the law, without any restrictions, improper 
influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or 
indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.  
3. The judiciary shall have jurisdiction over all issues of a judicial nature 
and shall have exclusive authority to decide whether an issue submitted for 
its decision is within its competence as defined by law.  
4. There shall not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with 
the judicial process, nor shall judicial decisions by the courts be subject to 
revision. This principle is without prejudice to judicial review or to 
mitigation or commutation by competent authorities of sentences imposed 
by the judiciary, in accordance with the law.  
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5. Everyone shall have the right to be tried by ordinary courts or tribunals 
using established legal procedures. Tribunals that do not use the duly 
established procedures of the legal process shall not be created to displace 
the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or judicial tribunals.  
6. The principle of the independence of the judiciary entitles and requires 
the judiciary to ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and that 
the rights of the parties are respected.  
7. It is the duty of each Member State to provide adequate resources to 
enable the judiciary to properly perform its functions.  
Freedom of expression and association 
8. In accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
members of the judiciary are like other citizens entitled to freedom of 
expression, belief, association and assembly; provided, however, that in 
exercising such rights, judges shall always conduct themselves in such a 
manner as to preserve the dignity of their office and the impartiality and 
independence of the judiciary.  
9. Judges shall be free to form and join associations of judges or other 
organizations to represent their interests, to promote their professional 
training and to protect their judicial independence.  
Qualifications, selection and training 
10. Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity 
and ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of 
judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for improper 
motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no discrimination against a 
person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or status, except that a 
requirement, that a candidate for judicial office must be a national of the 
country concerned, shall not be considered discriminatory.  
Conditions of service and tenure 
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11. The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate 
remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement shall 
be adequately secured by law.  
12. Judges, whether appointed or elected, shall have guaranteed tenure 
until a mandatory retirement age or the expiry of their term of office, where 
such exists.  
13. Promotion of judges, wherever such a system exists, should be based 
on objective factors, in particular ability, integrity and experience.  
14. The assignment of cases to judges within the court to which they 
belong is an internal matter of judicial administration. Professional secrecy 
and immunity  
15. The judiciary shall be bound by professional secrecy with regard to 
their deliberations and to confidential information acquired in the course of 
their duties other than in public proceedings, and shall not be compelled to 
testify on such matters.  
16. Without prejudice to any disciplinary procedure or to any right of 
appeal or to compensation from the State, in accordance with national law, 
judges should enjoy personal immunity from civil suits for monetary 
damages for improper acts or omissions in the exercise of their judicial 
functions.  
Discipline, suspension and removal 
17. A charge or complaint made against a judge in his/her judicial and 
professional capacity shall be processed expeditiously and fairly under an 
appropriate procedure. The judge shall have the right to a fair hearing. The 
examination of the matter at its initial stage shall be kept confidential, unless 
otherwise requested by the judge.  
18. Judges shall be subject to suspension or removal only for reasons of 
incapacity or behaviour that renders them unfit to discharge their duties.  
19. All disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings shall be 
determined in accordance with established standards of judicial conduct.  
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20. Decisions in disciplinary, suspension or removal proceedings should 
be subject to an independent review. This principle may not apply to the 
decisions of the highest court and those of the legislature in impeachment or 
similar proceedings.  
 
